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Although there have been various issues involving shame in the educational 
scene, little research in the field of philosophy of education has seriously investigated 
this topic. In my dissertation, a comparative philosophical study is conducted in an 
attempt to develop a better understanding of shame in moral education. This study 
explores when shame is morally appropriate and how shame is relevant to moral 
education, either positively or negatively, through historical and multidisciplinary 
reviews on the concept of shame and cross-cultural analysis of shame-related matters 
within the context of moral education between South Korea and the United States. 
In the process of finding sources discussing shame and related issues, a variety 
of scholarly works in the humanities and social sciences, from classical to 
contemporary, are surveyed in early chapters of this dissertation. Accordingly, 
diversified concepts of shame and its complex nature concerning moral education are 
identified. The later chapters illustrate how shame is associated with education 
practices, pedagogical approaches, and curriculum by providing selected examples, not 
only observed by other researchers but also obtained from my own case studies—
utilizing content analysis of Korean textbooks and semi-structured interviews with 
education practitioners in an urban area in central Oklahoma. 
As a result, this study shows that the moral value of shame is explicitly taught in 
the Korean education system and negative shame-related phenomena such as shaming 
are tightly guarded against in the American education setting. This leads to two different 
consequences: the misuse of shame is underestimated in South Korea, while the moral 
potential of shame is undervalued in the United States. Ultimately, the study prescribes 
xiii 
the re-contextualization of shame in company with the promotion of intercultural 
awareness, which are both urgently needed for a well-balanced, high quality moral 
education in today’s multicultural and globalized age. 
Keywords: sense of shame, shame in moral education, moral pedagogy
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Morality has been a major theme in various academic fields, such as philosophy, 
psychology, and education. In European and North American societies most of the 
discussion about morality has taken the rationalist perspective; as a result, the emotive 
aspect of morality has been seen as subordinate to moral reasoning. The view of emotion as 
the opposite of reason held a dominant position in modern rationalism and psychological 
theorizing (Crawford et al. 1992). In this connection, studies on moral education have 
revolved around this intellectualist model that concentrates on knowledge acquisition 
through reasoning, as is reflected in the works of rationalist philosophers such as R. S. 
Peters and cognitive developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget and Lawrence 
Kohlberg. However, as the research on moral emotions has seen a sharp rise since the 
1980s, the moral emotion perspective has gained credence (Haidt 2003). The intellectualist 
model of moral education also became weakened by the revival of neo-Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, which maintains that perception, emotion, and judgment are developmentally 
interrelated (Curren 2001, 1129). 
Shame, as a moral emotion, also attracted scholarly attention, but it has been mostly 
underrated and misread when compared with guilt, which is believed to foster responsible, 
normative, moral behavior (Tangney and Dearing 2002). The tendency to devalue shame 
may be partly to do with the fact that a philosophical conversation around the topic of 
shame has paid no attention to any non-Western views of shame. As Nathaniel Barrett 
points out, “This absence is especially conspicuous in light of the prominent role afforded to 
shame within Confucianism, surely one of the great intellectual traditions of non-Western 
origin” (2015, 145). The neglect of Confucianism or reluctance to discuss Confucian views 
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of shame may hinder a full understanding of shame subjected to interpretation through 
various frameworks. For this reason, differing approaches are needed to adequately cope 
with the concept of shame within the context of moral education. 
Background of the Problem 
Currently there are a wide range of arguments for and against shame, from those 
who view it as an essential moral sensitivity for self-reflection (as in Confucianism), to 
those who view it as a useful tool of social regulation (as in sociology), to those who view it 
as prone to pathology or abuse (as in psychiatry). On the other hand, historical evidence 
shows a change in the general conception of shame. In Greek antiquity, shame was thought 
an appropriate response that motivates one’s proper behavior (Engelen 2009). Early 
Confucian scholars, such as Mencius, enforced the importance of shame awareness as a 
self-regarding moral sense that promotes cultivating an integrated personality and leading 
an ethical life. This positive perception of shame is quite dissimilar to the overall sentiment 
towards shame today. 
Firstly, the typical uneasiness or reservation about the moral dimension of shame is 
often grounded in moral rationalism or Kantian deontology, claiming that moral motivation 
should be internal and autonomous and that one can be morally responsible only for the act 
that one has fully intentionally done. In this view, shame is suspicious in relation to its 
moral relevance because “vulnerability to being shamed appears to signal the agent’s failure 
to sustain her own autonomous judgment about what morality requires” (Calhoun 2004, 
128). 
Secondly, much research based on experimental psychology and psychiatry has 
elucidated dangers related to shame in that shame as a noxious emotion can lower one’s 
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self-esteem or lead to destructive behavior (e.g. Smith et al. 2002). However, this type of 
shame (pathological or toxic shame) strays far from the main interest in this dissertation, 
although the recent literature on shame has focused entirely on “affective phenomena that 
take place at a given time, last for a little while…, and then disappear” (Deonna, Rodogno, 
and Teroni 2012, 10). There is a need to distinguish emotional dispositions from emotional 
episodes in the understanding of shame. The dispositions associated with the emotion of 
shame are called the sense of shame, which has positive connotations such as modesty or 
reflective awareness of oneself. These are contrasted with shame episodes in response to 
being ashamed, in which a person might feel about herself that she is defective (Deonna, 
Rodogno, and Teroni 2012, 11-12). Therefore, in sum, sense of shame or one’s sensitivity to 
shame is a key term that deserves to be illuminated in order to justify the moral value of 
shame. 
Thirdly, the dominant cultural model of shame and guilt (shame-culture versus 
guilt-culture) has played a substantial part in aggravating negative perceptions toward 
shame (Wong and Tsai 2007). In this model, European and North American cultures are 
guilt-oriented, whereas ‘primitive’ and non-Western cultures are shame-oriented. From this 
point of view, guilt cultures are known to be capable of progressive change. By contrast, 
shame cultures are said to be static, backward, and dominated by “crowd psychology” 
without absolute moral standards (Piers and Singer 1953, 45). However, this kind of binary 
division of cultures does not seem to be valid, as many empirical studies have verified 
“significant cultural variation in the valuation, elicitors, and behavioral consequences of 
shame and guilt” (Wong and Tsai 2007, 209). Through a review of the emotion literature, 
Ying Wong and Jeanne Tsai (2007, 2014) find counter evidence to this dominant model of 
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shame and guilt. They conclude that, across cultures, both shame and guilt are valued in 
contexts of promoting an interdependent self, whereas these two emotions are devalued in 
contexts of promoting an independent self. Accordingly, we can see that the value of shame 
does not depend on whether a culture is a shame-culture or guilt-culture. 
Statement of the Problem 
There is a gap in the knowledge about shame. The fact that the general perception 
of shame has changed over time and that the assessment of shame has varied by context 
leads us to examine diverse ideas on shame from different angles. However, there has been 
little in-depth educational discourse on the concept of shame and divergent shame-related 
matters such as conscience, moral sanction, punishment, bullying, self-blame, etc. 
Education has not actively dealt with these fundamental and challenging issues around 
shame. Instead of that, there are educational efforts to eliminate discussions of shameful 
acts of the past, such as injustices committed against marginalized or subordinated groups 
(Zembylas 2008). Such a passive treatment of the current education is understandable given 
that shame is worrisome in a multicultural society where diversity and social justice issues 
are greatly magnified, when shame is likely to be applied inappropriately or immorally 
(Nussbaum 2004). Yet we need to know that the unqualified denial or disfavor of shame 
results in a lack of a proper understanding. 
While many conflicting ideas and theories have been expressed on the topic of 
shame, in the literature of contemporary moral education shame has not been adequately 
explained. Moral educational inquiry needs to go deep into questions concerning shame 
such as: What are the differences in perceptions towards shame? What is the relationship 
between shame and morality? When does shame denote moral, immoral, or non-moral 
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situations? How does shame work positively or negatively? What forms of shame could be 
relevant to moral education? How are the different understandings of shame and moral 
education related? In order to answer these questions seriously, we should not be confined 
to the established Western-centered perspectives on emotion, morality, and education. 
Reviewing various thoughts across time and cultures would be helpful in finding a missing 
piece or neglected part of shame. In this regard, a brief historical review and, by way of 
illustration, a cross-cultural comparison in K-12 moral education between South Korea and 
the United States is to proceed in order to indicate diverse understandings of shame and 
dissimilar forms of moral education. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study aims to contribute to creating an adequate moral educational inquiry into 
the questions regarding shame in intercultural and/or international contexts. In this 
dissertation, the conventional categorization of cultures is unacceptable, and accordingly, 
shame will not be viewed as a purely negative emotion. Therefore, firstly, I would call 
Korea a ‘shame-philic’ society and the U.S. a ‘shame-phobic’ society in order to reject a 
biased, Western-centric classification between shame culture and guilt culture. Secondly, 
my argument does not take such dichotomous position as shame always functions positively 
in the culture of shame-philia, whereas shame only works in a harmful way in the culture of 
shame-phobia.1 Rather, this study seeks to reclaim the positive dimension of shame that has 
                                                
1 The Greek/Latin suffixes (-philic, -phobic, -philia and -phobia) here are used to 
metaphorically express cross-cultural differences surrounding shame and guilt. From a 
psychiatry perspective, a phobia is a type of anxiety disorder and a philia is an abnormal 
liking. However, in reference to social phenomena according to different cultural 
tendencies or attitudes toward shame, I do not intend to abide by these pathological 
definitions. In fact, a number of terms with the suffix -phobia are currently used non-
clinically, such as xenophobia and homophobia. As homophobia denotes negative 
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been developed and justified in wisdom traditions and also to identify factors what is 
worrisome involving shame, such as shaming punishment, which has rightly been criticized 
within rationalist traditions. In the light of the fact that shame can be either constructive or 
destructive depending on the context, navigating the real meaning of shame and the 
implications of shame for moral education is the purpose of this study. 
Significance of the Study 
This dissertation is intended to provide a new perspective for educational 
theorists/practitioners who are interested in moral, comparative, multicultural and/or global 
education. This study will also be beneficial to scholars and advanced students in 
humanities and social sciences, when they employ the complex implications of shame in 
different lines of research, particularly in ancient Greek philosophy, Confucian ethics, moral 
psychology, and cultural studies. But most of all, this study will be a significant endeavor in 
reconsidering traditional values or norms of non-Western cultures in today’s moral 
educational context. This study is different from existing research trends, which mostly are 
limited to Western literature rooted in the rationalist perspective, because it thoroughly 
observes both cultural and chronological differences surrounding the concept of shame. 
Although there have been varied ideas involving morality and education throughout 
the world, teachings from wisdom traditions and of non-Western thoughts are often 
regarded as outdated, and thus hardly acknowledged to be relevant in contemporary moral 
education. In a multicultural and global era, studying the contextual meaning of shame has 
implications for moral education because the underlying values and beliefs concerning 
                                                
attitudes toward homosexuality, shame-phobia suggests negative attitudes toward 
shame. 
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shame have had a ripple effect on shaping different ethical principles, moral codes, and 
social practices. For example, when sexual morality (abstinence) is enormously 
emphasized, a massive degree of public shaming towards a teen mom functions as cultural 
restraints. In another case, when cultivating the mind as part of self-discipline is highly 
underscored, shame involves moral sensitivity. All things considered, we must not insist on 
a single formula or framework with respect to treating moral educational matters. This 
dissertation makes the case for a new, balanced approach to shame in connection with moral 
education. I expect this research project to contribute to promoting a lively and deep debate 
on the moral attributes of shame and to raising intercultural and international awareness of 
moral education discourse. 
Primary Research Questions 
The main goal of this dissertation is to present the moral educational implications of 
shame through a conceptual and contextual inquiry into shame, morality, and the 
relationship between shame and moral education. First, the concepts on shame and moral 
education clarifying what shame is and what is moral must take precedence, because there 
are different words for shame in various languages and vastly different conceptions of 
shame across cultural contexts. Second, in order to see how the concept of shame is linked 
to (mis)educational ideas and practices regarding morality, such as when shame would be 
morally appropriate and what forms of shame would be relevant to moral education, the 
areas of morality and of moral education will be explored. The primary research questions 
are as below: 
1. How shame is variously defined and contextualized? 
1-1) How does shame work positively or negatively? 
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1-2) When, if ever, is shame morally justified? 
2. How does shame play a part in moral education? 
2-1) How does moral education handle the complex concept of shame? 
2-2) How to foster a proper sense of shame? 
Research Design 
This study focuses on reviewing a variety of ideas about shame and moral education 
based on the method of analytic philosophy. However, in a bid to partially illuminate 
cultural differences surrounding the conception of shame and its relevance to moral 
education, content analysis and interviews were also applied to this dissertation. Korean K-
12 textbooks for moral education and interview materials with American K-12 school 
teachers have been collected in this context. 
In the Korean school system, moral education at K-12 level is compulsory under the 
national curriculum. This shows that Korean education system adopts a ‘value-explicit’ 
approach to moral education, which delivers a clear moral message with the content of the 
course. Under the textbook screening system, a series of required courses are taught through 
3rd to 9th grade, and an elective subject is taught to 10th or 11th grade. Taking this 
consideration into account, textbook content analysis as the first qualitative research method 
were applied (See Chapter 4). On the other hand, a specialized nation- or state-wide 
curriculum or textbook for moral education has not fully developed in the U.S. Recently, 
character education programs for moral education are being partly implemented. Yet there 
is no specific textbook or fixed content for moral education in the U.S. Therefore, it is hard 
to identify a standardized record in written form about the topic of shame. Hence, a 
different set of data is needed to find out when there is American moral education and how 
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shame is perceived in American school settings. Accordingly, qualitative interview in the 
south-central U.S. was designed as an alternative (See Chapter 5). 
Examples from textbook contents and interview materials will illustrate in part how 
shame is dealt differently in formal and hidden curriculums for moral education in Korea 
and the U.S. The preliminary findings suggest that Korean moral education adopts a 
‘positive reinforcement’ approach to teach the moral value of shame, while American moral 
education takes a ‘negative punishment’ approach towards shame-related issues that are 
negative and worrisome. In the process of examining such divergent understandings and 
treatments depending on culture involving moral education and shame, we arrive at the 
overarching conclusion that the misuse of shame is underestimated in Korea and that the 
moral potential of shame is undervalued in the U.S. 
Theoretical Framework 
The basic premise of my argument is that the emotional experience of shame entails 
a negative evaluation of the self (the agent oneself). In this regard, shame is called a ‘self-
conscious’ or ‘self-critical’ emotion. Such an approach to describing shame seems to take 
the individualistic stance in psychology that views the self as the basic unit of study and 
emphasizes self-sufficiency. However, few studies in the literature on moral emotions have 
thoroughly examined “intersubjectivity” and “interaction” as crucial for understanding the 
moral role of shame (Montes Sánchez 2014). 
How we understand the moral role of shame depends in part on our definition of 
morality (meta-ethical commitments). On one hand, following the rationalist approach of 
adhering to a clear separation between self and behavior when it comes to morality, shame 
should be detached from any outside influences such as established social norms to get 
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involved in moral autonomy. On the other hand, on the functionalistic or consequentialist 
approach of morality where ‘moral’ means ‘prosocial,’ shame should motivate persons to 
conform with preexisting standards of the society as a force for social cohesion. To 
summarize, in attempt to verify the moral relevance of shame, one strategy centers on the 
autonomous dimension of shame while another emphasizes the social nature of shame. 
However, neither is sufficient for a thoroughgoing review of moral shame. Therefore, a 
third option that reconciles the social nature of shame with autonomy is available, as 
Bernard Williams (2008) suggests that in the workings of shame mature moral agents care 
about how they appear in the (imagined) eyes of (imagined) others whose reactions they 
would respect (82-84). 
For these reason, first of all, the intersubjective or interactionist perspective is 
reflected in showing that shame involves self-assessment that is interpersonal. Experiencing 
shame fundamentally contributes to the perception of relationships between the self and 
others. The experience of shame helps the self to check whether one’s behavior corresponds 
to a shared code of social conduct or not, because this reflexive character of shame is based 
on “the reciprocal play of conscience and public opinion” (Isenberg 1949, 11). 
Next, my own views on moral education in this dissertation are most deeply 
informed by virtue ethics, in which the cultivation of moral wisdom is necessary for the 
sake of eudemonia, human flourishing in terms of both excellence and integrity (Prior 
2007). With this traditional wisdom perspective, the concept of shame has a rich meaning 
because the virtue ethics approach to moral education highlights moral practices 
accompanied by moral emotions. For one thing, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states 
that young people, who live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, should be prone 
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to the feeling of shame because they are restrained by shame (N.E. 1128b17-20). To give 
another example from a different wisdom tradition, in the early Confucian ethical 
framework recognizing what is shameful and feeling shame toward an appropriate object at 
the right time have been educationally emphasized as the stimulus to improve one’s 
character. In this line of view, a sense of shame is relevant to the constant process of 
cultivating a moral mind. 
Although theoretically the above perspectives are helpful in rediscovering the moral 
value of shame, the concept requires further reining-in considering the problematic reality 
around shame-related issues. This leads to an exhaustive inspection of not only corrupt 
forms of shame such as discriminatory shaming but also of the conventional morality 
surrounding distorted shame. For example, sexism was taken for granted in past societies, 
including ancient Greece and China. Gender imbalances still cause shame to be used 
against women in sexual shaming or body shaming. So, shame can be used incorrectly, and 
such problematic uses of shame create “cultural liabilities,” which can bring about 
“unforeseen and often undesirable” results (Martin 2011, 107). Shame can be harmful 
depending on how it is deployed in a society. In principle, shame itself is a value-free and 
gender-neutral concept. Yet practically certain groups of people who have been 
marginalized, such as women, racial and ethnic minorities, LGBTQ, people with 
disabilities, and people of low socioeconomic status, are apt to become the targets of 
vicious shaming or the victims of internalized shame.  
It is true that shame is likely to be used as a sanction or controlling strategy in an 
unjust society that maintains an oppressive system. Therefore, only a limited scope of 
shame with educational value will be advocated in this dissertation. That is to say, a well-
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intended sense of shame so far as self-reflection needs to be reclaimed whereas bad customs 
related to shame ought to be abolished. Eventually, feminist critiques on the misuse of 
shame and a feminist approach to ethics and moral education emerge as the third theoretical 
framework for this dissertation study. To summarize, I will be discussing the nature and 
complexities of shame through interactionist perspective, virtue ethics approach, and 
feminist scholarship in order to tackle prevailing Kantian principle-based ethics and 
utilitarian forms of consequentialism, i.e. the rationalist tradition and the intellectualist 
approach, in the study of shame and moral education. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Scope 
This study features a conceptual analysis of shame within the scope of moral 
education based on materials from related literature, textbooks, and interviews. These 
multiple sets of data were collected on the view that the use of differing approaches is 
required to adequately address the research problem and answer the research questions 
(Creswell 2008). Considering different cultural patterns and the dissimilar general 
conception of morality between Korea and the U.S., various ideas related to shame and 
theoretical approaches to education need to be compared and contrasted in the early 
chapters. Thus, the first half of the dissertation will be developed with philosophical 
analysis. Next, for an exploratory understanding of educational practice, two other sources 
for the study were added, on the assumption that curriculum content and teacher opinion 
reflect part of the current educational situation well.  
In the latter chapters, the content of the Korean curriculum and interviews with 
American teachers were analyzed as examples to suggest a picture of K-12 moral education 
regarding the concept of shame in Korea and in the U.S. I acknowledge that this approach 
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has some limitations. For one thing, while content analysis in Korean textbooks helps to see 
the overall description of how the concept of shame is being addressed in formal moral 
education, it may not be able to capture something unwritten such as a hidden curriculum 
involving shame. This lack of capturing the multidimensional aspect of shame in moral 
education can be at least partially addressed by narratives of teachers. 
Still another potential limitation remains when it comes to the number of interview 
participants and the geographical locations. Considering the massive diversity in the U.S. 
education system, the interviews that were given to 8 teachers in a specific area cannot be 
generate to American teachers throughout the country. In other words, the results of this 
textbook analysis and case study interviews may not generalize about Korean or American 
moral education in relation to a universal conception of shame. Nevertheless, they would be 
suggestive of what may be commonly seen about how different ideas and practices 
concerning shame are associated with moral education in the K-12 school setting. 
Preliminary Definition of Terms 
Emotion: Emotions can be analyzed from multiple perspectives. In psychology 
emotion is typically defined as “a complex pattern of changes, including physiological 
arousal, feelings, cognitive processes, and behavioral reactions, made in response to a 
situation perceived to be personally significant” (Gerrig and Zimbardo 2002, 394). In short, 
emotions can be understood as either mental states or as processes. As a type of mental 
state, emotion causes certain behaviors. When understood as a process, an emotion involves 
“the interval between the perception of the stimulus” that triggers a bodily response. This 
process is “typically taken to include an evaluation of the stimulus,” and it means that an 
emotion is not a simple and direct response to a stimulus. In other words, emotions occur 
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depending on how the individual understands the stimulus, and thus differ from reflexes or 
moods (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Theories of Emotion”). The fact that 
emotions stimulate our mindsets or modes of behavior indicates the relationship between 
emotions and morality, as Carroll Izard puts it, “all the emotions play some part, directly or 
indirectly in the development of conscience and morality” (1977, 421). 
Moral emotion: Moral emotion refers to the subset of emotions that are most 
directly associated with morality, the emotions that respond to moral violations or that 
motivate moral behavior and that “connect a person to social structure and culture through 
self-awareness” (Turner and Stets 2007, 548). On one major taxonomy, there are four 
families of moral emotions based on the following two criteria, by the extent of 
disinterestedness of elicitors and pro-sociality of action tendency: the other-condemning 
family such as contempt, anger, and disgust; the self-conscious family such as shame, 
embarrassment, and guilt; the other-suffering family such as compassion; and the other-
praising family such as gratitude and elevation (Haidt 2003, 855). From a sociological 
perspective, shame is viewed as more primitive and less useful whereas guilt is the 
prototypical moral emotion, but this perspective needs to be reexamined carefully. Despite 
such disparate characteristics and varying degrees among the moral emotions, it is generally 
accepted that one who strongly feels moral emotions has a greater tendency to act morally 
(Damon 1988). 
Shame: A dictionary definition of shame is “a painful emotion caused by 
consciousness of guilt, shortcoming, or impropriety and the susceptibility to such 
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emotion.”2 This indicates that the concept of shame is closely related to that of guilt, 
although shame “targets the self in its totality,” and thus “is affected by a global 
devaluation” (Zahavi 2014, 208). In fact, many Western researchers in moral psychology 
and philosophy “list shame, embarrassment, and guilt as the principal self-conscious 
emotions, along with pride as a positive opposite of shame” (Haidt 2003, 859). Yet, a 
linguistic analysis of shame-related terms, which will be explained in detail in the following 
chapter, shows that this categorization scheme does not apply neatly to either ancient Greek 
or non-Western cultures. Shame can be interpreted in different ways in that the cognitive 
domain of shame is not one-dimensional. According to Paul Gilbert, it seems that shame 
focuses on either the social world, the internal world, or both. External shame belongs to the 
first domain, when we become “an object of scorn, contempt, or ridicule to others” (Gilbert 
1998, 17, emphasis in original). Internal shame is involved in the second domain, relating to 
negative self-evaluation that is “derived from how the self judges the self” (Gilbert 1998, 
18). Intersubjective shame resides in between the space of two engaged subjects, the self 
and others, when a shared consciousness of what is shameful. Focusing entirely on external 
shame has difficulty explaining moral value of shame, and concentrating solely on internal 
shame risks conflating shame with guilt. Hence, though I do not completely abandon 
external and internal conceptions of shame, this study accentuates the importance of 
intersubjective shame, which has the strengths of both and the weakness of neither. 
Shaming: Shaming is a deliberate act of admonition or blaming. When the criticism 
is a well-meant shaming is used “to impress our moral expectations on others” for an 
                                                
2 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “shame.” Retrieved from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/shame. 
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educational purpose (Calhoun 2004, 127). In this sense, parental shaming can be 
understood as a type of “reintegrative shaming” that is followed by efforts to reintegrate the 
shamed back into the community through forgiveness, which is different from 
“disintegrative shaming” such as humiliation or stigmatization (Braithwaite 1989). 
However, shaming is also frequently associated with external shame, and thus has “socially 
stigmatized traits,” such as shaming somebody for being obese (Gilbert 1998, 20). 
Accordingly, one would feel ashamed due to such an unreasonable shaming, even though 
they know they have done nothing wrong, because shame is also “an involuntary response 
to an awareness that one has lost status and is devalued” (Gilbert 1998, 21-22). Even so, it is 
important and perhaps surprising to note that shaming does not necessarily generate shame. 
That is to say, the experience of ‘being ashamed’ or ‘being humiliated’ in the precise 
meaning does not always evoke shame. For instance, in The Scarlet Letter, Hester Prynne, 
who was wearing an elaborately embroidered scarlet letter A — standing for ‘adultery’ — 
on her breast, might not have felt shame in the truest sense (that is to say, she never 
internalized her shame), even though she realized her position of humiliation and 
punishment in prison. Rather, she feels contempt for those who would shame her in that 
their opinion holds no weight for her. Therefore, in the light of internal shame, one might be 
ashamed but might not feel shame when they do not feel negatively about themselves. 
Moral shame: Moral shame is a special kind of shame that goes with a momentum 
for seeing the error of one’s own way through the recognition of moral shortcomings (Ally 
2005, 301). According to Jennifer Manion, moral attaches to shame appropriately when the 
shame is “precipitated by some moral lapse, failure or omission that results in an agent’s 
disappointment in aspects of her own moral character about which she has some significant 
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control” (2002, 77). Because feelings of shame entail an evaluation of the core aspects of 
the self, experiencing moral shame is likely to encourage a deep, significant transformation 
of moral character (Manion 2002, 84). In this regard, from the Confucian ethics approach to 
moral education, experiencing moral shame per se can be understood as part of the 
education process in connection with moral self-cultivation. 
Moral education: Moral education is commonly defined as an active endeavor to 
help children to know what is right, to become good, and to behave morally. Although there 
are different forms and approaches to moral education, in many countries moral education 
is generally broader than the formal curriculum. Currently, only a very few countries such 
as Korea and Taiwan have effectively reinforced direct moral teaching, running a separate 
subject in the formal curriculum.3 Moral schooling in South Korea stressed a cognitive 
approach until the late 1990s. Yet, since 2000, the Korean national curriculum for moral 
education has taken partly the virtue ethical approach and partly an integrative approach. 
According to the latest revised moral education curriculum in 2007, the primary aim of 
moral education is to cultivate students’ morality. Hence, contemporary Korean moral 
schooling has been focusing on building students’ moral characteristics. This approach 
                                                
3 A movement to revive public moral education has risen elsewhere in recent years. The 
United Kingdom and Japan are now committed to this initiative. In the U.K., the 
introduction of Citizenship as a new core subject, which covers five percent of 
secondary schools’ curriculum, has sparked interest in strengthening moral education. 
The U.K. expects schools to contribute to the moral and civic education of the young, 
and the teaching of Citizenship is now a legal requirement, with the realization that 
moral education is a necessary supplement and counterbalance to citizenship education 
(Halstead and Pike 2006). In Japan, moral education is going to be legally upgraded to a 
formal subject matter in 2018. More concretely, homeroom teachers will teach the new 
moral education course with an authorized textbook for 34 to 35 hours in a year. 
Keywords such as “sincerity” or “equity” will be specified in the texts, and topics that 
are relevant today such as information ethics or bioethics will be discussed more in 
classroom (The Asahi Shimbun editorial Oct 28, 2014). 
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corresponds to a virtue ethics point of view, which emphasizes building a decent member of 
society who acts morally with proper emotion and good moral insight.4 
In a North American context, the term ‘moral education’ has been strongly 
associated with a constructivist psychological framework (e.g. Kohlberg 1984), which 
views the goal of moral education as the promotion of the development of moral cognitive 
structures. This form of moral education in its current guise has remained relatively stable 
over time (McClellan, 1999). Another type of moral education called ‘character education’ 
is now increasingly popular in the U.S. context. Character education includes a broad range 
of concepts such as positive school culture, moral education, just communities, caring 
school communities, social-emotional learning, positive youth development, civic 
education, and service learning (McClellan 1999). There are numerous character education 
programs that have recently been incorporated into schools across states. Hence, one may 
say that most of the work on moral/character education in the U.S. context has developed 
revolving around either (traditionally) psychological behaviorism or (more recently) 
Aristotelian virtues ethics (Althof and Berkowitz 2006, 496-500). 
Outline of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter 2 will explore ancient insights into shame that might be something new to 
people today. Through a conceptual/linguistic analysis, Attic Greek and early Chinese views 
on shame and the relevant terms will be discovered. 
                                                
4 Unlike the ‘rational principle’ focused model, the virtue ethics approach to moral 
education has its roots in communal moral traditions such as Aristotelian or Confucian 
ethics. 
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Chapter 3 will review the contemporary literature on shame in different areas of 
study. A wide array of ideas about shame are introduced and compared to put forth a 
multilateral effort into understanding shame.  
Chapter 4 will describe how shame is addressed in Korean moral education through 
content analysis of the national curriculum for moral education at K-12 level. Selected 
excerpts from Korean moral textbooks, including texts and illustrations, will show that the 
moral value of shame is explicitly taught in school system. 
Chapter 5 will describe how shame is treated in the U.S. school setting via 
practitioners’ talks. The analysis of case study interviews will suggest a picture of the U.S. 
moral education concerning shame and the related issues. 
Chapter 6 will summarize the study by comparing differences in the concept of 
shame and approach to moral education between South Korea and the United States. There 
will be considerations about what good moral education would look like in dealing with 
shame and suggestions for further research. 
  
20 
Chapter 2. Ancient Insights into Shame 
How did the people of the past see the concept of shame? This question serves as a 
useful starting point for the discussion on multiple aspects of shame. From the wisdom 
traditions and perspectives, shame is rich in moral significance. In this regard, this chapter 
aims to rediscover ancient insights of East and West regarding shame concepts, specifically 
as in the writings of prominent philosophers of the times such as Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, 
and Mencius.5 
Shame in Attic Greek 
It has been claimed that the distinction between ‘shame as disgrace’ and ‘shame as 
modesty’ has not successfully survived in English, compared with other European 
languages (See Table 1). 
Table 1. ‘Shame as Disgrace’ and ‘Shame as Modesty’6 
 
 disgrace modesty 
Greek aischune aidos 
Latin foedus pudor 
French honte pudor 
Italian vergogna pudore 
German Schande Scham 
 
The second meaning of shame as modesty is called “a sense of shame,” and this type of 
shame, especially in the Greek word aidos, connotes awe and reverence as well as modesty 
                                                
5 I limit the scope of this discussion to philosophical works in ancient Greece and 
China. Although shame often appears in ancient Greek literature such as Sophocles’ 
Ajax, I do not intend to review works of literature in this dissertation. 
6 This table is based on Scheff and Retzinger (1991, 7) with slight revision to 
standardize spelling. 
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or shyness (Scheff and Retzinger 1991, 6-7; Scheff 1997, 209). Hence, the English term 
‘shame’ in a contemporary context has a limited sense, as Thomas Scheff (1995) puts it, 
“the definition of shame in English is narrow and extreme” whereas “in the other European 
languages, shame is defined more broadly and less negatively” (1053). Yet, it would be 
more accurate to say that shame primarily is thought of in terms of disgrace in the 
contemporary English usage. 
In fact, there are two semantic orientations of shame in English: One usage of 
shame refers to ‘being ashamed’ or ‘feeling shame’ as a negative-reactive emotion; Another 
usage of shame refers to ‘having a sense of shame’ a disposition or sensitivity to discern 
what is appropriate and correct, thus protecting us from becoming ashamed (Cain 2008, 
218; Sokolon 2006, 110; Seok 2015, 24). Carl Schneider (1977) also distinguishes being 
ashamed from the sense of shame by addressing each of them as ‘disgrace-shame’ and 
‘discretion-shame.’ While the former is a feeling of being exposed, humiliated, and 
dishonored, the latter involves something more than emotion that functions as a guide to a 
more authentic form of self-realization. 
These two different connotations of shame appear in Plato’s and Aristotle’s works. 
In the ancient Greek language, aidos and aischune are two main words that can be 
translated into English as ‘shame’ (Cairns 1993; Williams 2008; Scheff 1997; Sokolon 
2013; Konstan 2006; Tarnopolsky 2010; Raymond 2013). The word aidos is the more 
archaic and poetic form of the two, and refers to a “character trait” that “displays of respect 
for the honor of others” as well as an “occurrent feeling of shame” (Raymond 2013, 8). 
While aidos became increasingly an obsolete word over the sixth to fourth centuries 
B.C., aischune, which originally meant ‘being a disgrace,’ became a common word in the 
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middle of the fifth century B.C. (Konstan 2006, 94; n. 11). Considering that aischune 
“gradually began to take on some of the more positive connotations of respect that had been 
characteristic of the archaic term aidos,” it is safe to say that the meaning of aidos was 
incorporated into the meaning of aischune (Tarnopolsky 2010, 12). 
Plato and Aristotle sometimes treat ‘aidos’ and ‘aischune’ as synonymous, but they 
tend to make frequent use of the word aidos when shame denotes a “praiseworthy feeling or 
disposition that prevents one from acting in a dishonorable way” (Raymond 2013, 9). In 
this regard, Terence Irwin (1999) translates aidos as ‘shame’ and aischune as ‘disgrace’ in 
his annotation and translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics when distinction between 
the two terms is required. 
Shame in the Writings of Plato 
In Plato’s works aidos is often used in a conventional sense—sometimes in 
conjunction with deos (translated as ‘fear’). According to Douglas Cairns (1993, 372), 
although the association of aidos and fear recurs in the Platonic dialogues, aidos is 
differentiated from deos in the Republic (465ab): “For there are two sufficient guardians 
hindering him, fear and shame: shame preventing him from laying hands as on parents, fear 
that the others will come to the aid of the man who suffers it, some as sons, others as 
brothers, and others as fathers.”7 
Yet, Plato also suggests a conception of shame as positive commitment to one’s 
own standards or values. In the Gorgias Socrates repeatedly expresses that he would 
experience aischune if he were unable to “help either himself or his friends or relatives from 
                                                
7 Translated by Allan Bloom (1991), p. 144. 
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committing an injustice toward human beings or the gods” (Tarnopolsky 2010, 109). For 
instance, Socrates tells Callicles: 
If injustice is the greatest of evils for the man who does injustice, and an even 
greater evil than the greatest, if that is possible, is doing injustice and not paying 
justice — then what lack of power to defend himself would make a man really 
ridiculous? Won’t it be the lack of power to defend himself against the greatest of 
harms to us? Surely this defence definitely must be the most shameful for us to lack 
power to provide, for ourselves and for friends and family. And the second most 
shameful will be the lack of defence against the second most serious evil, and the 
third most shameful against the third most serious evil, and so on in the same way 
— the greater each evil is, the finer it is to have the power to defend ourselves 
against it, and the more shameful it is to lack the power. (Gorg. 509b-c)8  
 
Here Socrates’s shame would be occasioned by his failure to live up to his own standards, 
which implies self-directed shame in the dispositional sense without external sanctions. 
As such, both aidos and aischune share “the possible connotation of respect for an 
other” in Plato’s works (Tarnopolsky 2010, 11). In addition, it is shown that Plato’s 
conception of shame is not entirely dependent on the opinions of others. 
Shame in the Writings of Aristotle 
Like Plato, it seems that Aristotle uses aidos and aischune interchangeably, and thus 
they are often difficult to distinguish. The Nicomachean Ethics 4.9 is the best example of 
where the two words appear in parallel: 
It is not appropriate to treat shame (aidos) as a virtue (arete); for it would seem to be 
more like a feeling than like a state [of character]. It is defined, at any rate, as a sort 
of fear of disrepute. Its expression is similar to that of fear of something terrifying; 
for a feeling of disgrace (aischune) makes people blush, and fear of death makes 
them turn pale. Hence both [types of fear] appear to be in some way bodily 
[reactions], which seem to be more characteristic of feelings than of states. 
Further, the feeling of shame (aidos) is suitable for youth, not for every time of life. 
For we think it right for young people to be prone to shame, since they live by their 
feelings, and hence often go astray, but are restrained by shame; and hence we 
praise young people who are prone to shame. No one, by contrast, would praise an 
                                                
8 Translated by Terence Irwin (1979), p. 87. 
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older person for readiness to feel disgrace (aischune), since we think it wrong for 
him to do any action that causes a feeling of disgrace. 
For the feeling of disgrace is not proper to the decent person either, if it is caused by 
base actions; for these should not be done. If some actions are really disgraceful and 
others are base [only] in [his] belief, that does not matter, since neither should be 
done, and so he should not feel disgrace. On the contrary; being the sort of person 
who does any disgraceful action is proper to a vicious person. 
If someone’s state [of character] would make him feel disgrace if he were to do a 
disgraceful action, and because of this he thinks he is decent, that is absurd. For 
shame is concerned with what is voluntary, and the decent person will never 
willingly do base actions. 
Shame (aidos) might, however, be decent on an assumption; if one were to do 
[disgraceful actions], one would feel disgrace (aischune); but this does not apply to 
the virtues. If we grant that it is base to feel no disgrace or shame at disgraceful 
actions, it still does not follow that to do such actions and then to feel disgrace at 
them is decent. (N.E. 1128b10-34)9 
 
Aristotle identifies aidos with aischune in the first paragraph; he defines shame as a sort of 
‘fear of disrepute’ and equates it with ‘feeling of disgrace.’ However, differences in the use 
of these terms are seen in the second paragraph. Aristotle states that the feeling of disgrace 
is not appropriate for the older people whereas the feeling of shame is suitable for youth. 
The main topic in this passage shifts from aidos (shame) to aischune (disgrace) 
between the first two paragraphs. Marta Jimenez (2011) addresses this as “a tricky move” 
intended to leave aidos outside of his next claim in the third paragraph, i.e. aischune is not 
proper to the decent person, to keep “the term aidos in its positive inhibitory sense” (141). 
However, according to Cairns (1993), this move is “not in any way underhand” as far as 
Aristotle does not treat them “as two distinct concepts” (415). It is also true that the 
distinctions between aidos and aischune in general usage had begun to blur by the time of 
Plato and Aristotle (Tarnopolsky 2010, 11). 
                                                
9 Translated by Terence Irwin (1999), p. 66-67. 
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In fact, Aristotle obscures the distinctions between the two terms again in the same 
passage. In the last paragraph aidos refers to “retrospective shame at actions we have done,” 
which is different from how the word was used previously in the passage (Irwin 1999, 227). 
Nevertheless, it is a matter of fact that a subtle nuance surrounding aidos and aischune is 
well captured through this whole passage—prospective aidos versus retrospective aischune. 
In addition, retrospective aischune refers to “a disgraceful state of affairs” whereas it does 
“not bear the exalted connotations of aidos” as a trait of character (Cairns 1993, 415). This 
is why only aidos would be decent, although there is the possibility that the disposition to 
experience aidos entails “a susceptibility to retrospective aischune” (Cairns 1993, 416). 
In this way, it has been said that in Aristotle’s works aidos is like more an ‘ethical 
trait’ compared with aischune (Sokolon 2006). The Nicomachean Ethics 3.6 shows this 
well: 
Certainly we fear all bad things—for instance, bad reputation, poverty, sickness, 
friendlessness, death—but they do not all seem to concern the brave person. For 
fear of some bad things, such as bad reputation, is actually right and fine, and lack 
of fear is shameful; for if someone fears bad reputation, he is decent and properly 
prone to shame [aidos], and if he has no fear of it, he has no feeling of disgrace. 
Some, however, call this fearless person brave, by a transference of the name; for he 
has some similarity to the brave person, since the brave person is also a type of 
fearless person. (N.E. 1115a10-16)10 
 
Based on Irwin’s annotation, Aristotle here considers aidos “anticipatory shame” that is 
about being “properly ashamed when I even think of the possibility of doing a wrong 
action” (1999, 227). This type of shame looks different from the aforementioned 
retrospective aischune (as in the Nicomachean Ethics 4.9), which the virtuous person never 
experiences. 
                                                
10 Translated by Terence Irwin (1999), p. 40. 
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In another setting, in the Nicomachean Ethics 2.7 and the Eudemian Ethics 3.7 
aidos is understood as the ‘intermediate’ or ‘mean state’ between two vicious extremes, and 
thus is praiseworthy: 
There are also means in feelings and about feelings. Aidos, for instance, is not a 
virtue, but the person prone to shame… receives praise. For here also one person is 
called intermediate, and another—the person excessively prone to shame, who is 
ashamed about everything—is called excessive; the person who is deficient in 
shame or never feels shame at all is said to have no sense of disgrace; and the 
intermediate one is called prone to shame. (N.E. 1108a33-b)11 
Aidos is a mean state between shamelessness and diffidence: the person who cares 
for nobody’s opinion is shameless, the person who values everyone’s is diffident, 
while aidemon [“who is someone who feels aidos in the appropriate way, and is 
praised on that account”] regards only that of manifestly decent people. (E.E. 
1233b26-29)12 
 
These passages say that it is is praiseworthy to have a proper sense of aidos, being neither 
excessively prone to shame nor deficient in shame. They also suggest that an adequate 
degree of shame depends on how a person invites a second opinion, to an optimum median 
level. Such comments from Aristotle, which “reveal a complex and nuanced understanding 
of shame,” imply that “human beings internalize cultural norms but also that we reflect 
upon and evaluate such norms” (Sokolon 2013, 455). As Cairns (1993) puts it, we can see 
that “aidos is an indispensable ally in the process of moral development” (425). 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s Understanding of Shame 
As is well known, Plato and Aristotle are the early great philosophers on the 
phenomena of Greek psychological, ethical, and social experience and they are both 
practitioners of an inquiry into the nature of shame (Cairns 1993, viii & ix). Their remarks 
                                                
11 Translated by Terence Irwin (1999), p. 27. 
12 Translated followed by Christopher Raymond (2013), p. 98-99.  
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on the conception of shame—aidos and/or aischune, which reveal a complex and nuanced 
understanding of shame, present a neglected or forgotten perspective on shame that is 
morally relevant and desirable. More importantly, they also offer evidence that refutes some 
misunderstandings about shame (Cairns 1993; Sokolon 2013). 
Shame has often received severe criticism in Western societies. Compared with 
guilt, as Millie Creighton indicates, shame’s status as moral emotion has been questioned in 
the following way: “Shame responds to the judgments of others and is indifferent to ethical 
principles in themselves, whereas guilt is an inner sensibility and corresponds to the morally 
autonomous self of modern man” (1990, 296). The contrast between shame and guilt is also 
explicitly reflected in the formula of ‘shame-culture versus guilt-culture’ made popular by 
Ruth Benedict (1946). This antithesis presupposes that the shift from a shame culture to a 
guilt culture is a sign of moral progress (e.g. Dodds 1951; Pattison 2000). 
In fact, words or references related to the conception of guilt are hardly seen in 
Greek literature and the works of Plato and Aristotle. Some Greek terms such as hamartia, 
ate, and aitia are often translated as ‘guilt’ in English, but those are dissimilar from the 
contemporary meaning of guilt; rather, they denote “mistakes or faults” (Sokolon 2006, 
110). However, the fact that we cannot find a precise Greek equivalent for English guilt 
does not provide a basis for the claim that ancient Greece is a shame culture or the notion of 
guilt is not developed in their mindset. Rather, it has been argued that ancient Greeks unite 
what we call shame and guilt in English into one concept by bringing guilt under a wider 
conception of shame (Konstan 2006; Williams 2008). In particular, Aristotle’s discussion of 
shame and cause of shame in the Rhetoric 2.6 shows shame is derived from specific acts or 
events as well as a loss of honor whether those acts or events were voluntary or involuntary: 
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 Let shame be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation concerning the class of evils, 
whether present or past or future, that seems to bring a person into disrespect and 
shamelessness a belittling and indifference about these same things. If what has 
been defined is shame, necessarily being shamed applies to such evils as seem [in 
the eyes of others] to be disgraceful to a person or one about whom he cares. Such 
are those actions that result from vice, for example, throwing away a shield or 
fleeing in battle; for these come from cowardice. And [such is] refusing to pay back 
a deposit; for this comes from injustice. And [such is] having sexual relations with 
those with whom one should not or where one should not or when one should not; 
for this comes from licentiousness…Since shame is imagination about a loss of 
reputation and for its own sake, not for its results, and since no one cares about 
reputation [in the abstract] but on account of those who hold an opinion of him, 
necessarily a person feels shame toward those whose opinion he takes account 
of…And on the whole [they feel shame] whenever they have in their background 
deeds or facts that they will be [seen to] disgrace, whether these are their own or 
their ancestors’ or those of certain others with whom there exists to them some tie of 
kinship…And if they are going to be seen and be associated in public with those 
who know their guilt, they are more embarrassed…Clearly, we shall find good 
material on shamelessness from their opposites. (1383b12-1385a?)13 
 
According to Konstan (2006), this passage can be an example that is inconsistent with the 
ideas of the present day surrounding shame and guilt. The passage also reveals that shame 
“results from imagining particular acts or events, whether committed or intended, for 
example doing someone an injustice or failing to help another when it is in one’s power to 
do so” (101). Hence, we can say that “Greek shame had a somewhat wider extension so as 
to include some of the modern notion of guilt” (93). Furthermore, it would be more 
appropriate to understand that we can feel both guilt and shame towards the same action 
and that for either shame or guilt we experience more painful and regretful feelings if the 
action is voluntary rather than involuntary. 
As we have seen, Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions on aidos and aischune shed a 
different light on problems attaching to the contemporary idea of shame. Their insights into 
                                                
13 Translated by George Kennedy (1991), p. 144-149. 
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shame supply a clue to rebut the view of ‘progressivist’ that Greek culture lacked the 
conceptions of modern morality, which demands the primacy of guilt over shame, and that 
shame-driven actions are superficial or crudely heteronomous (Roochnik 2015, 228). 
Shame in Early Confucianism 
A rigid separation between shame, guilt, and embarrassment is not found in some 
non-Western cultures, as guilt does not even exist or is culturally unelaborated whereas 
shame/embarrassment is highly elaborated (Benedict 1946). For a case in point, in most 
Asian cultures “a single culturally central emotion combines what appear to be shame and 
embarrassment, along with shyness, modesty, and social fear” (Haidt 2003, 859). To be 
more specific, the distinction or hierarchy between shame and guilt has not been seriously 
considered in the Chinese character cultural zone, and there are still various lexical items 
for shame concepts. 
We can see that many different words for shame have been developed in the 
Chinese language and that shame emotion is highly elaborated and organized in Chinese 
cultures. The following two empirical studies substantiate this. Firstly, Jin Li, Lianqin 
Wang, and Kurt Fischer (2004) conduct an investigation into Chinese terms for shame 
targeting native Chinese and consequently collect in total 113 Chinese shame terms. Among 
these it is noteworthy that guilt refers to one of the self-focused shame states. Secondly, 
from his ethnographic interviews with Taiwanese people, Olwen Bedford (2004) suggests 
that there are “more guilt- and shame-related words and finer discriminations in meaning” 
in the Chinese language, compared to English (48). 
The importance of shame in the Chinese context is particularly associated with 
Confucianism, an integral part of the psycho-cultural-intellectual construct in traditional 
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China and other East Asian countries, such as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Confucian 
philosophy conceptualizes shame as a moral sensitivity beyond a mere emotion, which 
plays a special role in cultivating character and leading an ethical life. In addition, such 
characteristics of shame are closely addressed in early Confucian texts. According to Jane 
Geaney (2004), there are approximately fifty references to shame in the three most 
important classical Confucian texts—the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi.14 The English term 
“shame” usually corresponds to the Chinese letters and/or words —chi (恥), xiu (羞), and ru 
(辱), and those are well laid out in the three early Confucian texts. Depending on context, 
chi, xiu, or ru can be interpreted in several ways, such as a sense of shame, moral 
sensitivity, conscience, dishonor/disgrace, and humiliation. 
Generic Concept for Shame (chi) in the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi 
The most common, generic shame term is chi and it occurs often in the early 
Confucian texts with varying degrees of interpretation. Among these various meanings, in 
the Analects especially two distinctive types of chi are contrasted— ‘external chi’ versus 
‘internal chi.’ External chi is caused by outward influences; it locates the source of moral 
authority outside the self and is externally motivated, typically in comparison with others 
(Geaney 2004, 139). On the other hand, internal chi as an inner sense of morality is 
generated by one’s failure to live up to one’s own ideal standard, whether or not the failure 
is seen by outside observers (Seok 2015, 31). 
Confucius was fully aware that shame has relevance to external conditions and to 
the public eye, so he makes a qualitative distinction between external chi and internal chi 
                                                
14 The fact that shame is prominently featured in early Confucianism is worthy of 
notice; because, in contrast, other traditional ideas from that era, including Daoism and 
Mohism, do not seem interested in shame much (Geaney 2004, 120). 
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and thus illustrates whether a certain situation deserves to evoke internal chi or not. Firstly, 
a scholar is urged not to be ashamed of poor-quality clothes and coarse food, which are not 
worthy of a proper sense of shame (Analects 4.9). Secondly, seeking advice from anyone is 
not shameful because a genuine learner will not be ashamed to ask and learn from one in a 
lower social status (Analects 5.15). Like this, material values and social status do not apply 
to the cause of internal chi. Lastly, hypocrisy is shame-worthy in that not living up to one’s 
word is shameful. On this account, exemplary persons must expend effort to act up to what 
they say, if not they would feel shame if their words were better than their deeds (Analects 
14.27). These references to chi reveal that Confucius noticed the special relation between 
shame and character flaws and rejected externally-motivated shame. 
In other words, while external influences that are irrelevant to the issue of morality 
do not induce internal chi, internal factors resulting from one’s character flaws do. Since 
internal chi is elicited in an attempt to become a better person based on self-examination, in 
a general sense it can be properly interpreted as ‘moral shame,’ which is a special kind of 
shame that involves seeing the error of one’s own way through recognition of moral 
shortcomings (Ally 2005, 301). 
This moral sense of shame is clearly shown when we trace the linguistic origin of 
chi (恥), a generic term of shame: it is made by putting together two characters—er (耳) and 
xin (心) referring to ‘ear’ and ‘heart-mind’ respectively.15 The human ear turns red when one 
feels shame as the result of acknowledging that one is involved in an unsavory thing. It 
                                                
15 From the Confucian perspective, while ‘heart-mind’ itself is the physical organ of the 
heart; it is also viewed as the site of what we would describe as both cognitive and 
affective activities. Hence, Confucian thinkers ascribe xin, beyond a bodily organ, as a 
seat of reflection. The heart-mind can reflect on what is proper and can halt any course 
of action it regards as improper. That is to say, xin is the ability to self-reflect. 
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follows that blushing reveals one’s inner state of mind, which is an indication of a 
conscience at work. As a manifestation of conscience, shame helps us correct our 
misbehaviors or cultivate our characteristics in order not to feel the same emotion later. In 
this context, Mencius identifies chi as an indispensable attribute of humans by saying that, 
“A man may not be without shame. When one is ashamed of having been without shame, 
he will afterwards not have occasion to be ashamed” (Mencius 7A.6).16 This statement 
draws a line between ‘having a sense of shame’ and ‘being ashamed,’ as we have seen 
before in the preceding section.  
Next, chi embodies the cognitive aspect that enables one’s honest self-evaluation 
thus moral discernment, as indicated below by Xunzi:  
The gentleman is ashamed not to cultivate himself, but he is not ashamed to appear 
to have flaws. He would be ashamed not to be trustworthy, but he is not ashamed 
that he does not appear trustable. He would be ashamed to be lacking in ability, but 
he is not ashamed that he remains unused. (Xunzi 6.12)17 
 
The passage emphasizes the importance of self-regarding shame that judges the situation 
correctly—whether a certain value is unworthy of shame. This reveals the linkage between 
shame and sensitivity to values. In this sense, shame is “the ability of healthy and 
continuous self-criticism and self-improvement,” which makes one do one’s best in any 
situation (Seok 2015, 50). This reflects a sincere attitude towards living a life of integrity. 
Moreover, cultivating a proper sense of shame is essential for making one’s integrity reach 
its full potential, from the Confucian perspective of human/society flourishing: 
If you try to guide the common people with coercive regulations and keep them in 
line with punishments, they will become evasive and will have no sense of shame. 
                                                
16 Translated by James Legge (1960), vol. 2, p. 451. 
17 Translated by John Knoblock (1988), vol. 1, p. 228. 
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If, however, you guide them with virtue, and keep them in line by means of ritual, 
the people will have a sense of shame and will rectify themselves (Analects 2.3).18 
 
This paragraph shows that a sense of shame (chi) aspiring to self-regulation is essential for 
the ideal form of governance. This means a well-governed society is oriented towards 
attracting voluntary moral formation from people rather than controlling behavior through 
strict regulations and punishment. Therefore, we can see clearly that using ‘shaming’ as 
punishment does not interest Confucius because it is not the way to help people develop a 
proper sense of shame. 
In sum, chi is seen as an integrity check tool in the process of aspiring toward 
something better. Based on the Confucian traditional viewpoint, to attain the highest reach 
of living we should strive for a state of nothing shameful. The lofty ideal of a sense of 
shame is more than going beyond shamelessness. While having a sense of shame, which is 
one of feelings indigenous to humans, is the minimum condition, having an honorable life 
without shameful things is what is to be actively encouraged. 
Moral Sensitivity (xiu) in Mencius and Xunzi 
Another term for shame, xiu (羞), appears in the works of Mencius and Xunzi. For 
Mencius, people are capable of becoming good through self-cultivation, which is a process 
of the development of ‘four sprouts,’ the natural origins of moral emotions (Nichols 2011, 
614). Thus, the first thing that people should do is cultivate the four kinds of human 
predispositions—the heart-mind of compassion, heart-mind of shame (xiu), heart-mind of 
modesty, and heart-mind of discernment, which are to be developed into the four virtues—
benevolence, righteousness, observance of the rites, and wisdom (Mencius 6A.6). Here it is 
                                                
18 Translated by Edward Slingerland (2003), p. 8. 
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noteworthy that on Mencius’s conception of shame (xiu), shame is the foundation of 
righteousness. In another passage, Mencius points out that nourishing this heart-mind of 
shame, which means feeling shame at unrighteousness, promotes proper behavior and 
social justice (Mencius 2A.6). That is to say, as a moral sensitivity, shame-feelings would 
provoke the judgment or decision to favor what is right. Influenced by the heart-mind of 
shame, people will not engage in shady practices but will try to act honorably.  
Xunzi also uses the term xiu to express the superiority of inner moral sensitivity 
over external restriction or punishment. Xunzi explains, in ancient times, people did not rob 
tombs despite ornate coffins because they felt “the shame of offending against their proper 
social station was great” (Xunzi 18.7).19 From this, we can see that for Xunzi retaining a 
sense of shame is vital to maintain one’s moral pride and uplift public morality. 
In both Mencius and Xunzi, the usage of xiu is commonly associated with clear 
conscience. Drawing an idea from Mencius, all humans already have the heart-mind of 
shame as a beginning of moral sensitivity, which when properly developed grows into 
righteousness. Therefore, xiu becomes the minimum qualification of human morality, not an 
inhibition to it. 
Shame as Opposite Concept of Honor (ru) in Xunzi 
Xunzi considers the notion of shame as the contrary concept of honor by stating that 
“those who put first what is just and later matters of benefits are honorable; those who put 
first what is beneficial and later what is just are shameful” (Xunzi 4.6).20 This passage 
seemingly denotes that being honorable or shameful is a matter of choice: seeking justice 
                                                
19 Translated by John Knoblock (1988), vol. 3, p. 44. 
20 Translated by John Knoblock (1988), vol. 1, p. 189. 
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first causes honor whereas seeking benefit first causes shame. However, this causal 
relationship between shame and honor does not always correspond to ordinary cases of our 
daily life. One who pursues first what is just may not be honorable from the general social 
standards but be shameful, regardless of one’s moral character or commitment. 
This contradiction may arise from the conceptual confusion around honor and 
shame. To tackle this problem, Xunzi separates two sorts of shame in the usage of ru (辱) 
based on qualitative differences between shame experiences— ‘intrinsic disgrace’ (yi-ru) 
verses ‘extrinsic disgrace’ (shi-ru). The former is the disgrace that derives from 
considerations of morality, and the latter is which derives from the force of circumstances. 
Moreover, for Xunzi, only intrinsic disgrace is ethically significant (Xunzi 18.9). 
Yet, in reality, a person can have extrinsic shame, being placed in a shameful 
circumstance, or being shameful without any moral demerits. Since Xunzi recognized the 
fact that inappropriate or unnecessary shame over external conditions frequently happens in 
contexts of material/power inequality and dependence, he stressed that only intrinsic shame 
is ethically meaningful. On the contrary, a person of intrinsic honor can have shi-ru, or live 
in a shameful circumstance. Xunzi recognizes such an actual issue, being shameful without 
any moral demerits in everyday life, and this is why Xunzi distinguishes intrinsic shame, 
which embodies sincere moral commitment and self-transformation to lead a blameless life, 
from extrinsic shame. This moral superiority of intrinsic shame discredits the widely held 
distinction of shame as a response to external sanctions and guilt as a response to internal 
sanctions. From many western scholars’ understanding, shame is just an outer reaction or 
vulgar feeling caused by the public attention or criticism, and guilt is only an appropriate 
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feeling caused by the awareness of a failure to live up to the standard of one’s own 
conscience. 
Xunzi clearly acknowledges that inappropriate or unnecessary shame over one’s 
public appearance, social position, or poverty frequently happens in contexts of 
material/power inequality and dependence. Nevertheless, as Xunzi believes in the moral 
property of shame and seeks an inclusive ethical ideal, we must not neglect the underlying 
reasons and actual social processes that illuminate the main course of Confucian mode of 
thinking and moral life. 
To sum up, throughout this subsection we have found that xiu conveys a more 
emotive or affective aspect of xin and that ru is often accompanied by the notion of 
disgrace. Yet, we have also seen the close relationship between chi, xiu, and ru together. 
This affinity among them is found in current usage of the term xiu-chi compounded of xiu 
and chi or chi-ru mixed of chi and ru. Xiu-chi and chi-ru stand for the meaning of shame as 
common words in contemporary Chinese. In any case, shame is performed as a moral 
sanction or restraint. This means shame can induce a person to conduct moral obligations in 
human relationships. Consequently, it is natural that self-critical shame has been regarded as 
a moral virtue in the Confucian culture. 
Chapter Summary 
Overall, this chapter aimed to revive a richer conception of shame. We have 
investigated shame concepts and related terms in the ancient wisdom traditions, with 
particular emphasis on Attic Greek and early Confucian treatments. A search of the relevant 
literature in this chapter implies that the notion of shame was a great deal more morally 
positive and its meaning was comprehensive, compared with contemporary English 
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contexts. This part of the intellectual legacy of our past gives valuable guidance in the 
reconceptualization of shame. 
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Chapter 3. A Review of the Literature on Shame 
As described in the previous chapter, shame was not considered so negatively in the 
ancient wisdom traditions. In contrast, since the Age of Enlightenment, the reviews for 
shame have been mixed. There is a widespread perception that shame is suspicious or 
pessimistic due to its negative connotations. From this point of view, shame is nothing but a 
bad object to be suppressed or conquered. On the other hand, quite a number of scholarly 
works have argued that shame is morally important. In this chapter, a wide array of ideas 
about shame is introduced through close examination of relevant literature in various fields 
of study. 
Various Aspects of Shame 
In psychology, shame is commonly considered an emotion. There are many 
different approaches to shame, and various views on shame are rooted in diverse thoughts 
of emotion itself. So, shame can be observed in terms of emotion and its components such 
as an affect, cognition, state, or combination of all these things. 
Shame as an Affect 
Shame has been studied using ‘affect’ by affect theorists (e.g. Nathanson 1992; 
Tomkins 1963, 1987), and their idea that shame is the result of the incomplete reduction of 
interest and joy, has been widely accepted even though there is little empirical support for 
this assertion (M. Lewis 1992). What is affect? Affect specifically refers to the biological 
portion of emotion, which causes our body to react in certain ways (Nathanson 1992). 
According to Silvan Tomkins (1963, 1987), an affect is an innate biological response that 
combines with life experience to form emotion and personality, evolved as the system of 
motivation for human beings. And there are nine affects that are present at birth: Interest-
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Excitement, Enjoyment-Joy, Surprise-Startle, Fear-Terror, Distress-Anguish, Anger-Rage, 
Shame-Humiliation, Disgust, and Contempt.21 Among these, the hyphenated format 
Tomkins uses captures that an affect can occur at different intensities. For example, for 
Tomkins, anger and rage are based on the same affective response but occur at different 
volumes; rage is anger with the volume turned up (Lucas & McManus 2015). 
Likewise, shame and humiliation have overlapping physical responses, consisting 
of blushing, confusion of mind, downward cast eyes, lowered head, etc., but they are 
different in levels of arousal; i.e. they share the same symptoms in different degrees.22 It is 
argued that the affect of shame-humiliation is triggered by situations that result in the 
interruption of pleasure (Nathanson 1992; Tomkins 1963, 1987). In other words, shame 
occurs when positive affect is incompletely reduced; it happens when a good feeling gets 
reduced but not stopped completely.23 The purpose of shame is to be sufficiently negative 
so as to bring attention to whatever might have caused the positive affect to be impeded, in 
which we can learn how to avoid the loss of the positive in that moment or in the future.24 
                                                
21 Refer to http://www.tomkins.org/what-tomkins-said/introduction/affects-evolved-so-
we-could-learn-what-to-seek-and-what-to-avoid for details. 
22 These expressions are incredibly similar to the description of shame affect by Charles 
Darwin (1872). Darwin noted that when one is ashamed the head is averted or bend 
down with the eyes wavering or turned away and the skin reddens not only in the facial 
region but also all over the body. 
23 Refer to http://www.tomkins.org/what-tomkins-said/introduction/positive-affects-
when-interrupted-yield-to-the-affect-of-shame for details. 
24 Refer to http://www.tomkins.org/what-tomkins-said/introduction/nine-affects-
present-at-birth-combine-to-form-emotion-mood-and-personality for details. 
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The Cognitive Domains of Shame 
It has been accepted that there are links between cognition and affect in the theory 
of emotion. For example, Michael Lewis (1992) argues that emotional experience is 
dependent upon cognitive processes because it “occurs as a result of the interpretation and 
evaluation of states and expressions” (28). Such an interactionist view is also well described 
in the statement of Carroll Izard (1977), which is that “perhaps all the emotions play some 
part, directly or indirectly in the development of conscience and morality” (421). Seen in 
this light, emotions are recognized as “the interaction of physiological arousal and cognitive 
appraisal of a situation” that concerns morality (Brabeck & Gorman 1992, 93). 
As mentioned earlier, for the affect theorists who consider emotions as 
physiological states or biological systems, shame as an affect is not cognitive in nature. Yet, 
it is accepted that shame has a cognitive part as well as its affective part by many shame 
researchers who adopt the cognitive-affect theory of emotion (Blum 2008, 94). According 
to Paul Gilbert (1998, 17), shame has three cognitive aspects: “Generally, shame seems to 
focus on either the social world (beliefs about how others see the self), the internal world 
(how one sees oneself), or both (how one sees oneself as a consequence of how one thinks 
others see the self).” 
In the first domain, shame is referred to as ‘external shame’ because it focuses on 
the outside world (Gilbert 2007). Here shame involves negative judgments by others as we 
become an object for others. In the second domain, shame is derived from how the self 
judges the self, which is referred to as ‘internal or internalized shame’ (Gilbert 2007; H. B. 
Lewis 1971). This time shame relates to the subjective sense of self, which is based on 
negative self-evaluation. Next, there is the connection between external and internal shame, 
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though not always. Having socially stigmatized traits (e.g. being obese) can lead to a sense 
of internalized shame or not. In this way, shame is closely associated with negative 
judgments or evaluations because “to be in a state of shame I must compare my action 
against some standard, either my own or someone else’s” (M. Lewis 1992, 29). 
Self-Conscious Emotions 
Emotions are commonly divided into two categories: primary versus secondary 
emotions. The primary, basic, or pure emotions are thought to be genetically given, such as 
joy, sadness, fear, disgust, and anger. The secondary or complex emotions refer to emotional 
reactions to other emotions, so they emerge later than the first set of emotions. Michael 
Lewis (1992) further differentiates emotions on the basis of the use of the self. Namely, 
based on whether or not the elicitation of a certain emotion does require “introspection or 
self-reference” i.e. self-thought about the self, emotions can be classified either as “non-
self-referential emotions” or “self-referential emotions” (19). This criterion plays an 
important part as to whether shame belongs to the second set of emotions. 
The emotions in the second group are often cited as ‘self-conscious emotions.’ Self-
conscious emotions by definition are emotions that relate to our sense of self and our 
consciousness of others. Self-conscious emotions do not happen automatically unlike 
primary emotions; rather, they are evoked by self-reflection and self-evaluation. Shame, 
guilt, embarrassment, and pride are listed among self-conscious emotions (M. Lewis 1993; 
Tangney and Fischer 1995). Shame and guilt, in particular, are often likened to an emotional 
moral barometer that provides information on the social and moral acceptability of human 
behavior, and are thus called ‘moral emotions’ (Tangney 2002; Tangney, Stuewig & 
Mashek 2007). 
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Comparison with Guilt 
Many people in the English-speaking world use the words shame and guilt 
interchangeably. Shame is often used synonymously with guilt in America (Ellsworth 
1994). Both shame and guilt are “negative, self-relevant emotions that occur in response to 
failure or transgressions” and they are viewed as playing a fundamental role in morality 
(Tangney 2002, 99). Yet, a number of Western researchers, including Tangney and her 
collaborators who have done many empirical investigations into self-conscious emotions, 
now agree that shame and guilt are two distinct emotions. In this section, three major 
attempts to differentiate between shame and guilt —(a) a distinction based on types of 
eliciting events, (b) a distinction based on the public vs. private nature of the transgression, 
and (c) a distinction based on a focus of the self vs. behavior— are explained in the order 
named.25 
Moral vs. Nonmoral Events 
There is little empirical support to verify the distinction between shame and guilt 
inducing situations clearly. It turned out that most types of events (e.g., lying, cheating, and 
stealing, failing to help another, disobeying parents) are cited by some respondents in 
connection with feelings of shame and by other respondents in connection with guilt 
(Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007, 348). 
Yet, some researchers claim that shame is evoked by a broader range of situations 
than guilt. That is to say, shame includes both moral transgressions and nonmoral 
experience of incompetence or inferiority, whereas guilt is more specifically linked to 
                                                
25 The classification came from Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek’s (2007) “Moral 
Emotions and Moral Behavior.” 
43 
transgressions in the moral realm (Smith et al. 2002). In other words, compared to guilt 
“shame is less obviously connected to moral codes” (Turner & Stets 2007, 551). However, 
looking beyond the ethics of the modern Western rationalism,26 when we consider another 
way to think about the domain of morality, shame is fully qualified for a moral emotion in 
cultures in which emphasize an ethics of community (Shweder 2003, 1121). Thus, from the 
broader cultural perspectives, it is hard to draw a distinction between shame and guilt based 
on types of event that elicit each emotion. (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007). 
Public vs. Private Nature of Transgression 
The distinction between shame and guilt, which focuses on the public versus private 
nature of transgression, is another traditional assumption. In this view, shame results more 
from “public exposure and disapproval of some shortcoming or transgression” whereas 
guilt is regarded as “a more private experience arising from self-generated pangs of 
conscience” (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007, 348). This perspective has some analogy 
with a classic formulation to the contrast of shame and guilt cultures, which are based on if 
a culture depends primarily on external or internal sanctions.27  
Not surprisingly, there has been little empirical work confirming the public/private 
distinction in terms of the actual structure of the emotion-eliciting situation. For example, 
two empirical tests (Tangney et al. 1994; Tangney et al. 1996) have revealed that both 
shame and guilt are equally likely to be experienced in the presence of others. Likewise, 
solitary shame experiences are about as common as solitary guilt experiences. On the 
                                                
26 There will be further explanation of the ethical criteria of the modern Western 
rationalism later, on p. 48. 
27 For further explanation of the guilt/shame dichotomy and internal/external criterion, 
turn to p. 54-56. 
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whole, both shame and guilt-inducing situations are equally public, and thus both are 
equally likely to involve interpersonal concerns (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007). 
Focus on Self vs. Behavior 
The distinction between a focus on the self and a focus on behavior is currently the 
most dominant basis for differentiating between shame and guilt. According to Helen Block 
Lewis who first proposed this schema of division, while guilt involves a negative evaluation 
of a specific behavior, shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self. Since shame 
is related to the entire self, being ashamed is much more painful than feeling guilty—by 
undervaluing oneself, one shrinks and feels small and languid. On the other hand, Guilt is 
less demoralizing because the object of condemnation is a specific event, not the entire self 
(1971, 349). Hence, guilt appears to be the more adaptive emotion in motivating people to 
choose the moral paths in life (Tangney 1991; Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek 2007). 
Yet, shame is neither harmful nor unhelpful per se and ‘normal shame’ does not 
result in psychopathology. More importantly, the term ‘bypassed shame,’ first used by H. B. 
Lewis (1971), should be mentioned for a fair appraisal of shame. While normal shame 
refers to “a state in which the shamed person is indeed in an emotional state of shame and is 
also aware of it,” bypassed shame (also referred as ‘overt, unidentified shame’) is “a state in 
which the self is defended from fully experiencing shame” (Blum 2008, 96). When 
triggered properly, shame can be normally dealt with through spontaneous remission. 
However, bypassed shame can manifest in serious conditions such as depression, rage, 
narcissism, and multiple personality disorder (H. B. Lewis 1971). 
45 
Controversy over the Moral Value of Shame 
There has been as much controversy in philosophy over the moral value of shame 
as debate on whether emotions can be moral. Philosophers’ changing outlooks on the role of 
shame and emotion in morality bear a relation to research in related disciplines such as 
psychology, sociology and anthropology. 
Counterarguments to Moral Rationalism 
One common justification of skepticism towards shame is motivated by the 
treatment of emotion in general as intrinsically irrational. It is often believed that some 
irrational decisions or acts arise as a consequence of emotional reactions. That is, emotion is 
considered the opposite of reason (Crawford et al. 1992). Influenced by this rationalist 
perspective, the emotive aspect of morality has been subordinate to moral reasoning 
(Solomon 1993). 
This typical uneasiness of shame involves moral rationalism, which is the view that 
morality originates in reason alone. Moral motivation should be internal, and internality 
becomes a requirement for moral autonomy in systems such as Kant’s deontological ethics. 
From this perspective, shame’s moral relevance is suspicious. Shame seems to be 
vulnerable to exterior influences because it usually occurs when someone is observed. In 
addition, according to R. E. Lamb (1983), shame does not have the necessary connection 
between “feeling ashamed of having done x” and recognizing that one is “morally 
responsible for having done x” so it cannot be a central moral concept (342). This reasoning 
is based on the idea that one can be morally responsible only for the act that one has done. 
That is to say, since the domain of shame is much beyond the scope of responsibility in the 
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true meaning of the word, shame comes apart from the notion of responsibility, thus, is less 
morally relevant. 
However, we require knowing that the modern Western legal conception of 
responsibility, which is heavily dependent on the outcome of behavior, already feeds into 
this kind of logic. Among the basic four elements of this conception of responsibility, cause, 
intention, state of mind and response, people in contemporary western societies tend to pay 
more attention to intention and state of mind by weighing legal liability or deciding 
punishment. On the contrary, the ancient Greeks who are supposed to be vulnerable to 
shame had a clearer conception of a link between cause and response concerning the issue 
of where responsibility lies. According to Williams (2008), a self-respected figure in 
Homeric times felt great responsibility for the results caused by oneself, regardless of one’s 
intentionality or mental status. This is because what a person did unwittingly, even if the 
deed was due to one’s bad luck or fate, consequently, caused a certain response at any rate. 
What is at issue in this situation is a ‘whole person’ response—who brought about this 
result? (55-61). Thus, it does not plausible that shame is devoid of the notion of moral 
responsibility. 
Another reservation about shame’s moral potential is reflected in the concern about 
its heteronomy and excessive notice of others. However, being seen is not a necessary 
condition for eliciting shame in that we can experience shame in any degree without 
external observers or distinct shamers. Rather, shame is related more to the perception of 
self-others relations. In other words, others who reflect on me play in feelings of shame 
through the way of acknowledging a shared moral code across and between individuals. 
This reflexive character of shame is based on “the reciprocal play of conscience and public 
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opinion” (Isenberg 1949, 11). The experience of shame cannot be understood without 
respect of other’s opinions that “entail the acceptance of certain standards for interpersonal 
relationship” (Cua 2003, 153). That is the reason we care for the eyes of others, as Aristotle 
refers to the proverb, “Shame dwells in the eyes” (Rhetoric 1384a30). The interpersonal 
self-assessing aspect of shame allows us to be sensitive to a broader context beyond 
subjectivity; shame facilitates self-understanding with consideration of the outer 
environment or other-influenced judgments. 
Moral Shame and Autonomous Judgment 
Shame has been undervalued among western philosophers. Even when it is 
considered a moral emotion, shame compares unfavorably with guilt in its moral 
importance. The value of feeling ashamed is doubted because shame signals heteronomous 
and excessive concern with other’s opinion, which means that the shamed person appears to 
fail to sustain one’s own autonomous judgment about what morality requires. Such ideas 
inherit from Kantian moral philosophy, which contrasts autonomy with heteronomy. Within 
this framework either we are autonomous but invulnerable to shaming criticisms or we are 
heteronomous but vulnerable to every shaming criticism (Calhoun 2004, 133). 
In response to this worry about shame, on the other hand, there have been attempts 
to show that moral shame is compatible with autonomous judgment.28 First, the most 
obvious strategy that reconciles shame with autonomy is to argue that mature agents only 
feel shame over their failure to live up to their own, autonomously set standards, as argued 
by such authors as John Kekes (1988) and Virgil Aldrich (1939). On this view, it is claimed 
                                                
28 The discussion in this section owes a great deal to Calhoun’s (2004) “An Apology for 
Moral Shame.” 
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“shame does not require a real or imagined audience before whom one might feel shame.” 
Thus, all shame is shame before oneself. Such accounts seem to successfully defend the 
compatibility between shame and autonomy in the case of the mature agent’s shame 
(Calhoun 2004, 129-130). 
Yet, this strategy for reconciling shame with autonomy is insufficient to explain the 
social nature of shame—the connection between shame and concern for one’s standing in a 
social world. Because moral shame is intrinsically tied to concern about the opinions of 
others (Deigh 1983). In this line of argument, unlike the first strategy, Bernard Williams 
(2008) pursues a different strategy for countering the objection that shame signals excessive 
heteronomy by claiming that mature agents only feel shame in the eyes of social others 
whose ethical reactions they respect (Calhoun 2004, 131-132). 
Williams’ strategy is different from the first strategy in that it presents the way to 
unite the social nature of shame with autonomy; he refuses to disconnect shame from the 
eyes and standards of people in our lived social world, as stated, “There is an internalised 
other in them that carries some genuine social weight. Without it, the convictions of 
autonomous self-legislation may become hard to distinguish from an insensate degree of 
moral egoism” (Williams 2008, 100). The mature moral agents reflect on others’ standards 
and decides whose they respect, but there is still a precondition to this scheme—they must 
already have standards of their own to evaluate other’s standards so make her/his judgments 
rationally (Calhoun 2004, 133-134). 
Both strategies make shame suitable for an autonomous agent at the price of 
reducing the influence of others, which stress an individual’s independent judgment alone in 
morality. As the social nature of shame becomes weaker, there seems to be lesser difference 
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between shame and guilt in treatment of the ‘social weight’ of others’ opinions. In contrast, 
we can see differently what morality is and what makes an agent morally mature. Morality 
is fundamentally a social enterprise that regulates interactions between real social actors 
(Calhoun 2004, 144-145). In addition, a mark of moral maturity involving shame goes 
beyond rationalistic subjective self-criticism. In fact, since moral shame is expected of any 
mature moral agent in a general context, we often use shaming criticisms to impress our 
moral expectations on others and to provoke their shame (Calhoun 2004, 127). Because 
moral agents are also participants in various social practices of morality with other people 
(co-participants), not just lone knowers. Seen in this light, shame captures the experience of 
self in relation to others. Therefore, intersubjectivity and interaction are crucial for 
understanding the moral role of shame (Montes Sánchez 2014). 
Another issue associated with both strategies for partially reconciling shame with 
autonomy is that those who feel ashamed by others’ gaze or opinions are likely to be 
regarded as immature moral agents. This is revealed well through the phenomenon of the 
prevalence of shame among socially subordinated groups (such as women, the poor, racial 
minorities, Jews, or LGBTQ) and shaming criticisms toward their moral character. For 
example, women of all races are more likely than white men to be criticized for irrationality, 
lack of self-control, and inadequate attention to moral principles. When women suffer 
shame due to such shaming criticisms, they might additionally be criticized about their 
acceptance of others’ blame without having developed a sufficiently critical moral 
perspectives of their own.29 So, they would do better to ignore others’ shaming and to 
                                                
29 According to Sandra Lee Bartky (1990), women are indeed more shame-prone than 
men in sexist societies where put much value on maleness and masculinity. When 
society prefers to help girls whose sex is biologically female be prudish and passive 
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become insensitive to the shaming gaze of others to survive in societies structured by 
relations of domination and subordination (Calhoun 2004, 128). 
Yet, even if a mature person from socially disesteemed populations disagrees with 
the shamers’ unreasonable contempt or insults, s/he is still vulnerable to feeling ashamed by 
those criticisms (Calhoun 2004, 135-137). For example, an individual who does not feel 
ashamed of her identity as a queer woman of color is still subject to marginalization because 
social norms and stereotypes are shaped by those who have the most privileged and power. 
Calhoun (2004) states:  
Some of the shaming criticism is specifically moral, as when black men are 
routinely suspected of being shoplifters or muggers, or when the poor are assumed 
to have brought poverty on themselves through their own laziness or lack of self-
control; some is not, as when female and black students are presumed to be less 
educable. (p. 136) 
 
All agents are vulnerable to feeling ashamed regardless of the degree of autonomy. 
Therefore, we should take care not to “find fault with ashamed people” (Calhoun 2004, 
137). As Cris Mayo (2001) points out, we also need to see if such conventional beliefs are 
likely to develop a “mechanism for covering social power and social distinctions” (82). This 
means that the power to shame is differentially distributed, and this is bad news for member 
s of subordinate social groups; “in sexist societies, the power to shame will be 
disproportionately concentrated among men; vulnerability to being shamed will be 
disproportionately concentrated among women” (Calhoun 2004, 144). 
In summary, the moral value of shame has been recognized in the field of 
philosophy, from ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle to contemporary moral 
                                                
women and to produce androcentric institutions, the second sex or inferior gender gets 
subjected to shameful treatment and becomes prone to internalize that shaming. 
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philosophers such as Bernard Williams. Yet, in the mainstream Western philosophical 
tradition, shame’s relevance to morality is always conditional on its attachment to 
autonomy. This reflects a typical rationalist approach to emotion and an individualistic way 
of thinking concerning moral issues. Such interpretations might not fit easily into the 
concept of shame in different cultural contexts grounded in differing philosophies and 
traditions. Therefore, it would be helpful to look at shame from different perspectives. 
Shame vs. Guilt Cultures 
It has not been unusual for cultural studies to classify cultures into shame cultures 
and guilt cultures, greatly influenced by Ruth Benedict’s (1946) contrast between Japanese 
society as a shame culture with American society as a guilt culture in her book The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. In this classification, shame 
cultures are numerous and include almost all ‘primitive cultures’ and Asian cultures, 
whereas guilt cultures are few such as the advanced cultures of Western Europe and 
America (Piers and Singer 1953, 45). The ‘guilt-versus-shame dichotomy’ attached to 
cultural division has been controversial and criticized for its potential for ‘ethnocentric 
chauvinism’ so largely abandoned (Creighton 1990, 279). Yet, it is still true that this 
juxtaposition of shame and guilt cultures has immediately or covertly influenced scholarly 
interpretations of the moral properties of the cultures as well as public perception. This 
dichotomous classification coupled with Western-centric approaches has reinforced cultural 
stereotypes as well as reservations about shame’s moral value. 
Internal/External Criterion 
The prevailing criterion for distinguishing shame and guilt cultures is the distinction 
between external and internal sanctions. So it has been accepted that shame cultures rely on 
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shame as an external sanction of control in following cultural norms whereas guilt cultures 
rely on a sense of guilt or ‘conscience’ as an internal sanction. Benedict (1946) claimed that 
shame is controlled by external factors and guilt is controlled by internal ones: 
True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt 
cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other 
people’s criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or 
by fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous. In either case it is a 
potent sanction. But it requires an audience or at least a man’s fantasy of an 
audience. Guilt does not. In a nation where honor means living up to one’s own 
picture of oneself, a man may suffer from guilty though no man knows of his 
misdeed and a man’s feeling of guilt may actually be relieved by confessing his sin. 
(p. 223) 
 
The questions of whether shame can be an internal sanction and whether shame requires an 
audience or observer should be addressed, because the internal/external distinction 
surrounding shame and guilt presupposes that shame is an external sanction set in motion 
by others and guilt is an internal sanction which operates autonomously. To answer briefly, 
shame can be both an internal and external sanction and shame does not always require that 
an audience or observer be present physically. 
Firstly, shame becomes an internal sanction when it is strongly developed. Shame 
involves the awareness of inadequacy or failure to achieve an ideal self-image (Piers and 
Singer 1953). This conception of shame developed from Western psychoanalytic and 
cognitive developmental theory, as we have seen in the previous sections. Yet, we need a 
complement to West-oriented theories of shame and Confucian ethics concerning shame is 
a good resource in this regard. Margaret Ng (1981) illustrates ‘internal shame’ as a moral 
sanction in Confucian morality. Basically, Confucianism teaches that an ideal person should 
be socially and morally autonomous to govern oneself and to engage in politics by his/her 
virtue. And in this process anti-social or immoral conduct is discouraged by shame. The 
53 
ideal is an image of personality beyond deed; every (mis)deed has a repercussion on the 
entire self. Thus, unlike the common understanding of shame from Western perspectives, 
“It is not just being ashamed of having done this or that, but being ashamed of oneself, and 
one does not so much wish one hasn’t done this or that, but rather one wishes that one were 
not such and such” in the framework of Confucian morality (Ng 1981, 79, emphasis in 
original). 
There are in fact two levels—external and internal—of guilt as well as shame. 
Sigmund Freud discussed guilt in both its external and internal stages of development: the 
guilt felt by the child in the anticipation of punishment by an external authority and the guilt 
felt by the civilized adult in the anticipation of punishment by the offended conscience, 
which is the external authority internalized (cited in Ng 1981, 76). On the other hand, 
external shame is aroused by ‘shaming,’ no matter how much the shamer has authority over 
the shamed. Internal shame, just as internal guilt, operates autonomously, but its function is 
not limited to bind people to moral behavior; rather, internal shame plays an important role 
in building moral character. 
Secondly, shame and guilt do not need physical audiences or observers to the extent 
that each can become internalized. The audience or observer in both internal shame and 
guilt is an abstract, imaginary one. As Creighton (1990) indicates, for true shame to be 
experienced, the feeling of shame must be internalized: “Shame must involve a 
correspondent internal feeling in the individual that the inadequacy perceived by others is 
valid. If not, the resulting emotion is more likely to be fear, embarrassment, indifference, 
frustration, or anger, rather than true shame” (287).  
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The external/internal sanction criterion is not sufficient to differentiate shame from 
guilt or shame cultures from guilt cultures. Even if we find empirical data showing different 
distributions or frequencies of use in shame and guilt as moral sanctions by culture, there is 
no reason to infer that shame cultures are ‘backward’ and guilt cultures are ‘progressive’ 
from this dichotomous criterion (Piers and Singer 1953, 78-79). 
Cultural Differences in Shame and Guilt 
Although it might be pejorative labeling a certain society as a shame culture, it is 
too much to say that Benedict’s descriptive analysis between Japan and the United States 
(1946) using the terms ‘shame culture’ and ‘guilt culture’ itself is incorrect. A cultural 
emphasis on either shame or guilt can exhibit the characteristics of society regarding 
cultural values or patterns of behavior (Creighton 1990). This is why anthropological and 
cultural psychological studies have paid much attention to cultural differences in shame and 
guilt. Let us recall the dominant model of shame and guilt: people experience these 
emotions when they have violated standards or norms, but shame and guilt are not all the 
same; shame involves global transgressions whereas guilt involves specific transgressions, 
for example. Yet, such explanations are informed by Western cultural ideas or based on 
Western samples. As Ying Wong and Jeanne Tsai point out, in the mainstream literature on 
emotion, behind the belief that shame occurs when on is negatively evaluated by others so 
has an external orientation, it is assumed that 1) the independent self is morally desirable, 2) 
internal orientation is morally superior to external orientation, and 3) internal and external 
orientation can be easily separated. Therefore, the existing prevailing models of shame and 
guilt may not apply to other cultural contexts (2007, 211).  
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We will find different views of these emotions when we look to other cultures 
rooted in other philosophical traditions. One general approach to comparing culture is 
contrasting ‘individualistic’ cultures that emphasize ‘independent’ self-concepts such as the 
United States with ‘collectivistic’ cultures that emphasize ‘interdependent’ self-concepts 
such as Korea. In collectivistic cultural contexts, for individuals with interdependent self-
concepts, external influences are as important as internal ones because they view 
themselves more fundamentally in terms of their connections with others. In this way, 
having an interdependent self-construal may result in different models of shame and guilt 
(Wong and Tsai 2007, 212). 
In the previous chapter, we have discussed there was not a clear borderline in 
conception between shame and guilt in ancient times; Guilt concepts were not highly 
developed, or were often considered a component of shame in Attic Greece and ancient 
China. Further, some Chinese shame terms can be better understood when they are 
translated as guilt or as a combination of shame and guilt into English.30 In addition to this 
linguistic characteristic of shame terms, shame is often associated with specific attributions 
in Chinese contexts that would be associated with guilt in U.S. contexts. 
Note that shame and guilt are not distinguishable in collectivistic cultures; rather, 
they are less differentiated compared to individualistic cultures, because people in 
collectivistic cultures tend to view themselves as connected with others, their actions and 
                                                
30 This is also applicable in some other East Asian countries such as Korea and Japan 
where Chinese characters have been incorporated. For example, 恥 (chi), a 
representative translated word for English ‘shame’ in Chinese character, is commonly 
used in much the same sense in Korean and Japanese societies. Chinese chi is 
pronounced and written differently by country; as 치 (pronounced as “chee”) in Korean 
and as はじ (pronounced as “haji”) in Japanese. 
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situations (Wong and Tsai 2007, 214). Seen in this way, shame is more effective than guilt 
in collectivistic cultures, in that shame concerns a code of ethics that varies by situation and 
relationship (Bedford and Hwang 2003). The following explains how shame or guilt can be 
more prevalently used or appropriate to experience in a society: 
Both shame and guilt are highly important mechanisms to insure socialization of the 
individual. Guilt transfers the demands of society through the early primitive 
parental images. Social conformity achieved through guilt will be essentially one of 
submission. Shame can be brought to the individual more readily in the process of 
comparing and competing with the peers (siblings, schoolmates, gang, professional 
group, social class, etc.) Social conformity achieved through shame will be 
essentially one of identification. (Piers and Singer 1953, 36, emphasis in original) 
 
For example, in terms of moral sanction, shame, with its corresponding fear of rejection or 
ostracism from the group, is a more effective sanction in Japanese society than in American 
society. In addition, the emphasis on shame as a moral sanction would be consistent with 
situationist ethical views (Creighton 1990, 295-296). Confucian ethics, which is a 
predominant philosophical tradition in many East Asia countries, also puts more stress on 
situations and relations rather than absolute moral standards. Thus, shame could be viewed 
more positively in these contexts (Cho 2000). This recalls how much the positive value of 
shame as a moral sensitivity or an appropriate emotional response has been well-explained 
in early Confucian works. 
The Role of Shame in Moral Education 
Shame appears to be highly valued morally and/or educationally in East Asian 
contexts. For example, when it comes to child-rearing practices, Japanese people seldom 
have negative perceptions toward the fact that children are ridiculed or subjected to 
embarrassment for disciplinary reasons (Lebra 1976, 152). Furthermore, Japanese mothers 
do utilize ‘maternal ostracism’ to punish their children, when the mother pretends the child 
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is no longer present by ignoring any response the child may have for hours at a time. The 
threat behind maternal denial is rejection or abandonment, which is the same threat of 
shame. Meanwhile, parents from Chinese cultures are more likely to use shaming as their 
educational techniques than American parents; in order to make misbehaving children to 
feel ashamed, Taiwanese parents readily disclose children’s transgressions to their guests or 
even strangers (Fung 1999). Many Westerners may consider such types of sanctioning is 
too cruel and undesirable to bring up the child as an ‘independent individual’ (Creighton 
1990, 298-300). Actually, this kind of concern emerged from a participant during my 
interview with teachers in an urban area in Central Oklahoma.31 
In a Confucian society, as children grew older, they are naturally or deliberately 
exposed to learn about shame because the moral system is supported by sharpening internal 
sense of shame. In this context, having internal shame is required to maintain moral pride, 
because shame and pride are two sides of the same coin. Shame is felt when one fails to 
attain a high ideal as well as when one transgresses a prohibition. Here, there is no clear 
dividing line between shame and guilt, but there is still plenty of room for group pressure. 
This implies that the experience of shame is important for children to become a member of 
moral community rather than a lone moral pioneer. The Korean educational system at the 
K-12 level is a notable example of teaching such shame morality in a formal way. The next 
chapter, Chapter 4, will show vividly how shame morality is taught through Korean moral 
education curriculum. 
                                                
31 I will give a concrete example later on in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter Summary 
A variety of views on shame have been thoroughly reviewed in this chapter, based 
on contemporary literature across disciplines. It turned out that the value of shame is 
underrated due to its surface appearance as ugly or dependent from the mainstream 
(predominantly Western-oriented) psychological, philosophical, and anthropological 
perspectives. Even when shame is recognized as a moral emotion, its position seems to be 
inferior to guilt. In short, shame is often considered either as an obstacle in establishing 
autonomy, or it should be accompanied by autonomy to be accepted as a morally valuable 
emotion. Yet, a preoccupation with rationalist moral autonomy prevents us from seeing the 
intersubjective nature of shame, which is not entirely individual nor social. The literature 
review throughout this chapter also suggests that different cultural contexts and differing 
theoretical traditions should be considered for a better and more balanced understanding of 
shame. The relevance of shame to moral education and how shame is differently 
approached and handled in the school settings of South Korea and the United States will be 
spelled out in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4. Description of Shame in Korean Morals Textbooks 
The education system in South Korea has rapidly modernized since the 1950s.32 
The Korean central government has been a strong influence over education in general by 
formulating educational laws and policies, designing national curriculum standards, and 
supervising education reform. The fact that the Korean (modern) national curriculum has 
been in existence for over fifty years is particularly noteworthy, because classroom 
instruction still has a high level of dependency on assigned textbooks based on the national 
curriculum standards.33 Currently elementary schools use uniform textbooks published by 
government-designated publishing houses, and middle and high schools select textbooks 
that are more adjusted to local conditions according to their respective national curriculum. 
Traditionally moral education has played a crucial role in reinforcing Korea's value 
system for the younger generation. The westernized moral education system began in 1955 
as a special course. Soon after, it became a compulsory school course at primary and 
                                                
32 The modern (the so-called Western model) Korean education system implemented 
since the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established in 1948. Currently the 
Korean K-12 education system is mostly similar to its American counterpart: six years 
of elementary school; three years of middle school; and three years of high school. It is 
mandatory to attend school for 1st to 9th graders.  
33 In addition to the school system, subjects taught at K-12 level in the Korean school 
are almost identical with those of American schools. At the elementary and middle 
school levels, the core subjects are Korean language, English, mathematics, science, 
social studies, physical education, music, fine arts, and moral education. In addition to 
the core subjects, middle school students take optional courses, such as home 
economics, technology, foreign languages, and environmental education. In high 
school, science and social studies courses are sub-divided into physics, chemistry, 
biology, earth science, geography, history, politics, economics, cultural studies, and 
ethics. The most distinct difference between Korean and American education is that the 
Korean government directly controls public education, managing its every aspect such 
as curriculum or funding.  
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secondary schools in 1973.34 As a result, under the same curriculum moral education has 
been taught in schools nationwide, whether parochial or public, urban or rural. Upper 
elementary and middle school students take a separate course for moral education as part of 
their regular curriculum. As basic teaching materials the series of textbooks for multiple 
years plays a key role in this process. 
Lower graders learn moral education with story-type books entitled 바른생활 
(pronounced “bah-ruhn-saeng-whal” and literally translated as “Right Life”) in a form of 
integrated curriculum. From 3rd to 9th grades, students learn moral education with the 
Morals series of textbooks entitled 도덕 (pronounced “doe-dawk” and literally translated as 
“Morals”) by each grade. High school students can take elective moral education courses 
such as 생명과 윤리 (pronounced “seang-myung-gwa-yoon-li” and literally translated as “Life 
and Ethics”) or 윤리와 사상 (pronounced “yoon-li-wa-sah-sang” and literally translated as 
“Ethics and Thought”), based on their future educational pursuits. Namely, conducting 
moral education in the Korean school is meant to teach and instill moral values in young 
people, utilizing resources like courses, lectures, and textbooks. All things together, 
examining references to shame in the Morals series of textbooks may provide critical 
evidence that shame has a moral educational value in the Korean context. 
Textbooks for elementary moral education are issued by the Korean government 
and thus uniform, so there is only one type of Morals textbooks by each grade in elementary 
school—3rd grade Morals, 4th grade Morals, 5th grade Morals, and 6th grade Morals 
(hereinafter, referred to as Morals 3, Morals 4, Morals 5, and Morals 6 respectively for 
                                                
34 Refer to Yi’s (1979) “Moral Education in Korea” and Moon’s (1995) “The Status and 
Perspective of Moral Education in Korea” for details. 
61 
convenience). On the other hand, middle schools can choose which textbook to teach for 
their moral instruction for 7th to 9th graders among six types of two-staged Morals I and 
Morals II, which are developed and issued by private publishers.35 Yet, despite textbooks’ 
localization, the right to select and organize content remained in the hands of the central 
government. Any school in South Korea, either public or private, must follow the national 
curriculum set by the Korean Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST). 
There is little difference in content between the six types of middle school Morals textbooks 
because they must conform to strict content and writing guidelines and must be approved 
by a government-authorized textbook committee, regardless of publisher. 
4 copies of Elementary School Morals textbooks (Morals 3, Morals 4, Morals 5, 
and Morals 6) that were most recently compiled by the Education Ministry and 2 copies of 
Middle School Morals textbooks (Morals I and Morals II) that were selected considering its 
high rate of adoption and the publishing company’s reputation, i.e. total 6 volumes of 
Morals textbooks are the main source for content analysis in this chapter (See Table 2).  
Table 2. Information of the Selected Textbooks 
 
Title First edition Latest edition Publisher 
Morals 3 March 1, 2015 March 1, 2015 MEST 
Morals 4 March 1, 2015 March 1, 2015 MEST 
Morals 5 March 1, 2015 March 1, 2015 MEST 
Morals 6 March 1, 2015 March 1, 2015 MEST 
Morals I March 1, 2013 March 1, 2015 ChunjaeEdu 
Morals II March 1, 2013 March 1, 2015 ChunjaeEdu 
 
Under the national common curriculum, the content of Morals textbook by each grade 
consists of the following four basic units: Self as a moral agent; Relationships between 
                                                
35 Since 1997, Korean secondary schools began to choose Morals textbooks from a 
government-authorized list. 
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others and us; Relationships with society, nation, country, and global community; and 
Relationships with nature and transcendental existence.36 Among these, contents around the 
topic of shame are addressed intensively, directly and indirectly, in the first unit, which is 
about moral agency having distinct but related sub themes such as self-respect, self-
reflection, and conscience (See Table 3). 
Table 3. Main Content in the First Unit for Moral Education Curriculum37 
 
Grade Self as a moral agent 
3rd–4th 
• My valuable life: Understand the meaning and importance of a valuable 
life and develop a positive attitude to make yourself feel more valuable. 
• Autonomous life: Understand the meaning and importance of autonomy 
and develop an independent way of life. 
• Honest life: Understand the importance of doing your best and being true to 
yourself. 
• Self-reflective life: Understand the meaning and importance of self-
reflection and reflect upon yourself to see if you did something shameful or 
wrong. 
5th–6th 
• Regulation and expression of emotion: Understand the causes of different 
emotions and learn how to regulate and express your emotions in the right 
place at the right time considering others. 
• Responsibility for one’s behavior: Understand the meaning and importance 
of fulfilling responsibility and develop an attitude to take the consequences 
of your actions. 
• Pride and self-development: Understand the meaning and importance of 
pride in your life and set your life goals based on pride in the true sense of 
the word. 
• Practicing self-control: Understand why we need to control senseless 
desires and practice self-control in your daily life. 
                                                
36 For further information, visit National Curriculum Information Center 
(http://ncic.kice.re.kr/nation.dwn.ogf.inventoryList.do) then find “The moral education 
curriculum (2009 revision).” 
37 This table has been edited and translated by the author based on the table of content 
structure in the Korean moral education curriculum (MEST 2012, 6-7). 
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7th–9th 
• Meanings of morality: Desire and duty; Manners and morality; Good 
conscience and a sense of shame 
• The purpose of living and morality: What do you live for; How does true 
happiness come; How do you live? 
• Moral introspection: Self-reflective life; Standards of moral introspection; 
Methods for moral introspection 
• Moral practice: Moral thought and act; Motivation of moral practice; 
Behavior by one’s convictions 
 
In the Korean language, there are many different words for shame or shame-related 
concepts such as 부끄러움 (pronounced “boo-gguh-raw-oom” and translated as “shame” or 
“mild shame”), 수줍음 (pronounced “soo-joo-beum” and translated as “shyness”), 창피 
(pronounced “chang-pee” and translated as “embarrassment”), 수치 (pronounced “soo-chee” 
and translated as “disgrace”), and 염치 (pronounced “yeom-chee” and translated as “sense of 
shame”). The most commonly used word for shame is “boo-gguh-raw-oom” in a generic 
sense. The Korean term expresses a broader conception of shame than the English word 
‘shame.’ 
A preliminary full-text search for those Korean terms for shame in the Morals 
textbooks was conducted. In order to see how shame concepts are taught and how shame-
related situations are handled in the Korean moral education course, a full-text search for 
those Korean shame terms and a full-scale context analysis of direct references to shame 
concepts and indirect expressions that allude to shame-related issues in the Morals 
textbooks were conducted. It turned out that shame is largely addressed along with some 
moral concepts in a positive way, which is vividly explained in the following subsections. 
Content in boxed texts and illustrations in this chapter are the author’s translation from 
Korean to English. 
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Shame as a Proper Emotion 
There are quite a number of examples showing that shame is a proper emotion to be 
developed in Morals 5. The following passage has a theme of ‘how to express your emotion 
properly’ through the main character Ji-Ho who lacks skill at controlling his temper (Morals 
5, 39-40).  
 
Although the shame that Ji-Ho felt later is not the main topic in this story, his feeling of 
shame seems to have a direct connection with his awareness that there was something 
wrong with what he did. Ji-Ho was not able to see how he did anything wrong at first. Ji-Ho 
did not accept Seo-Hee’s apology because his anger was not released, and as he talked to 
himself, he thought there was nothing wrong with the frank expression of his feeling. 
However, Ji-Ho suddenly underwent change of his mind by being reprimanded (See Figure 
1). 
The Story of Ji-Ho 
When Ji-Ho was sitting with his legs apart in the hallway, Seo-Hee accidently stepped on 
Ji-Ho’s foot and fell. Seo-Hee sincerely apologized to Ji-Ho many times, but Ji-Ho didn’t 
accept Seo-Hee’s apology, rather got extremely angry at Seo-Hee. Then Seo-Hee’s face 
turned red and tears dropped from her eyes because she didn’t know what to do.  
   Their homeroom teacher asked Ji-Ho what happened to Seo-Hee. Ji-Ho answered, “Seo-
Hee stepped on my foot” with a reproachful look. After listening to a circumstantial 
account from Seo-Hee and other friends of what happened, the teacher called Ji-Ho again 
and talked to him calmly, “Why don’t you accept her apology? Seo-Hee just made a 
mistake. In addition, because you put your foot on the hallway, I think it’s a little your 
fault, too.” 
   Eventually, Ji-Ho heard that his classmates were talking in whispers saying, “Ji-Ho is 
easily ruffled over nothing. That bothers us.” At this remark, Ji-Ho felt shame (“boo-gguh-
raw-oom”) of himself before his teacher and classmates, ‘What did I do wrong? I was just 





Figure 1. Ji-Ho’s Change of Mind38 
 
Ji-Ho’s feeling of shame was accompanied with the awareness that he failed to have a good 
reputation from his teacher and friends. Their criticism motivated Ji-Ho to look back on the 
situation (his manners in general as well as what happened to Seo-Hee and himself) and 
shame acted as a catalyst in this process. This is an instance where shame is effective in 
making positive change in the self. Shame made Ji-Ho repentant and motivated him to 
repair his social relationships. This case suggests that concern for social/public image and 
self-evaluation are closely interrelated. We can reasonably assume that Ji-Ho’s classmates 
and his homeroom teacher are Ji-Ho’s internalized others.39 Of course, Ji-Ho in this case 
was lucky in that shame worked in a constructive way. If he did not feel morally ashamed 
(i.e. simply felt hurt about having a bad reputation without true repentance), or if there was 
nothing Ji-Ho could do to change the situation, the morally positive form of shame would 
not be induced. 
On the other hand, references to shame are intensively seen in relation to 
conscience, “Shame is a noble emotion, which is inside of us. We acknowledge one’s fault 
                                                
38 Pictures cropped from p. 39 and p. 40 in Morals 5. 
39 The term ‘internalized others’ borrows from Williams (2008). Turn to p. 51. 
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through it, and it helps us become better. Do not avoid the feeling of shame; rather, confront 
it. Listen to its whispered words honestly and carefully” for example (Morals 5, 49). 
According to this, shame is a morally positive emotion that is an indication of conscience at 
work. However, it does not mean that shame equates to conscience and that shame itself 
causes advisable behavior (See Table 4). 
Table 4. How Do You Respond When You Feel Shame?40 
 
 Case A Case B 
Boy 
It slipped my mind to bring the 
supplies for my group activity. I do not 
want to lose face. I must say sorry to 
them.  
It slipped my mind to bring the 
supplies for my group activity. I will 
lose my face. How can I make an 
excuse? 
Girl 
I did not do my homework for hanging 
out. I think that is shame-worthy. I 
must study harder from now on.  
I did not do my homework for hanging 
out. People may think that is shameful, 
but I do not really care. It is too 
bothersome to do homework.  
 
Neither student looks comfortable with what they did. The boy student forgot the supplies 
for his group activity, and the girl student did not do her homework. The table shows two 
contrasting responses occurred after the feeling of shame has been left side to side: the 
responses on the left are seen as desirable, whereas those on the right are not. In both cases, 
the students admit their fault but the follow-up actions are very different depending on their 
attitude of mind. When they have a positive mental attitude with a sense of responsibility 
(as in Case A), the boy decides to apologize to his group members and girl determines to 
study harder to make up. On the other hand, when the students are in a passive avoidance 
situation (as in Case B), they failed to confront the reality; the boy looks for an excuse for 
                                                
40 This table is produced by the author, based on the illustration in Morals 5, p. 49. 
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his mistake and the girl seems to have a weak mind. The illustration finishes with the 
question of “Which side would you choose? How do you respond when you feel shame?” 
(Morals 5, 49). It implies that shame can be a vehicle for generating better results in a 
healthy way when it comes with an awareness of the logic of the situation. 
However, it is still uncertain what produced different results through the same 
feeling of shame. The following quoted passage says, “There are huge differences between 
one who feels shame in the presence of others and one who feels shame before one’s own 
self” (Moral 5, 51, as originally cited in Talmud). Here two types of shame are separated 
according to the contributing agent for the feeling of shame, and the latter type of shame 
(solitary, self-initiated shame) is recommended. When this interpretation applies to the 
aforementioned illustrative examples above (See Table 4 again), we may find a better 
answer why two different responses from the same state of being acknowledged emerged. If 
the boy student was afraid of being blamed for his carelessness from his group members, he 
is likely to find an excuse to get him out of an awkward situation. Similarly, the girl student 
might give up easily when her feeling of shame is transient because it was not actually 
grounded in her own self. To be specific, if the girl imagined for an embarrassing moment 
that a teacher points her out before her classmates, rather than thinking that not doing 
homework itself is worthy of shame, her willingness to do homework is also going to be 
lost soon after her shameful situation is over. In contrast, if the boy had the courage in the 
face of his mistake whatever others say of him, he acts in an honorable way in order not to 
do this again. Only when the girl felt shame from her inside with the realization that she 
could do better but she did not, is she able to use her feeling of shame to make positive 
changes. 
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Meanwhile, shame is beyond personal dimension; rather, it should be properly 
responded and expressed in relationships. The golden rule in this sense is ‘consider others in 
your conduct’ as follows (Morals 5, 56). 
 
Going back to Ji-Ho’s case (as in Figure 1), based on this guideline that is ‘treat others as 
you want to be treated,’ Ji-Ho should have felt shame of his selfish behavior¾not entering 
into Seo-Hee’s feelings. On the Confucian view, it can be shown that character development 
is closely connected to displaying shame’s moral quality. This passage emphasizes the role 
of shame as an internal standard, which examines ourselves to see if there is not anything 
shameful. Seen in this, shame plays a role as an integrity check tool in the process of 
moving toward something better, not what we desire in itself. This dimension of shame is 
closely connected to self-reflection or moral introspection, which is discussed next. 
Shame in the Self-Reflective Context 
Reflection is an important notion in contemporary pedagogy. The term ‘reflection’ 
originates from the Latin verb reflectere, which means bend or turn (flectere) backwards or 
back (re), and is now mainly used with the meaning of self-reflection (Bengtsson 1995, 26-
27). To be specific, self-reflection leading to self-discovery is discussed through the lens of 
shame in this section. Self-reflection, which is an introspective consideration of one’s 
character, actions, thought, and motives, is called 반성 (pronounced “bahn-sawng” and 
Take Care of Emotions of Mine and Others 
People make some effort to forget about or escape from worry and fear, so have a hobby 
or see a doctor to be treated. Confucius told us another way that is morally right to escape 
from worry and fear. If you didn’t do what is wrong or shameful, upon self-reflection, 
Confucius says you should confidently lead a blameless life. This means there’s no worry 
and fear when we live morally without doing shameful things. We can feel honorable and 
confident if we live life to the fullest by walking in the path of virtue day by day. You 
should reflect on yourself before you act by putting yourself  
in another person’s shoes. 
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translated as “self-reflection”) or 성찰 (pronounced “sawng-chahl” and translated as “moral 
introspection”) in the Korean textbooks. There is a unit discussing the way of judging 
correctly for “bahn-sawng” in the truest sense. The following case epitomizes the way self-
reflection produces good results (Morals 4, 127). 
 
Ye-Ji appeared to have a more mature and responsible attitude because she figured what she 
is going to do to become a better person. It is worthy of note that Ye-Ji’s feeling of shame 
went with the acknowledgment of her mistake. It is hard to tell if shame brings about self-
reflection or vice versa, yet self-reflection and shame are co-dependent, as Nathan 
Rotenstreich (1965) states that “shame is an outcome of reflection but it also engenders 
reflection” (63). That is, shame brings self-identification into active manifestation. There is 
a unit discussing the meaning and necessity of moral introspection. It describes moral 
introspection in company with self-reflection and then how to lead a moral life through 
moral introspection (Morals I, 40-41).  
The text emphasizes taking an objective view of oneself through moral 
introspection and/or self-reflection. Successful introspecting or reflecting myself cannot be 
performed egocentrically; rather, it may be done by other-considering thinking and 
judgments. As Jan Bengtsson (1995) explains, I can distance myself and my activities with 
the aid of reflection, and thereby get sight of myself (28-29). 
 
Let’s Look at How Ye-Ji Reflected on Herself 
Ye-Ji thought over what happened to her today while writing in her diary. Since Ye-Ji was 
completely absorbed in playing with her friends yesterday, she forgot to bring her school 
supplies to class. Ye-Ji felt so ashamed of herself for not preparing anything for class. She 
said in her mind, ‘It was my fault for not bringing school supplies needed for class. I need 




Understanding more about oneself in relationships with others may bring to 
maturity judgment on the one hand and sharpen one’s own sense of shame as a sign of 
becoming sensible and considerate on the other hand. The following illustration suggests an 
immediate connection between moral introspection and shame (See Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Moral Introspection and Shame41 
                                                
41 Picture cropped from p. 43 in Morals I. 
What is Moral Introspection? 
We look into a mirror several times a day. However, how often do we look at our inside 
or observe our society closely? Are we just used to concern about our appearance but 
indifferent to introspecting our own character and lifestyle and to straightening the society 
we belong to? Introspection essentially means self-reflection to see if there is something 
wrong or lacking with one’s sayings and doings. We often think and act solely based on 
one’s circumstances. Thus, there is a case that we fail to fairly judge whether one’s speech 
and action is appropriate or not. Yet, through introspection, we can see ourselves 
objectively without an egocentric perspective. Since humans are imperfect, we must see 
our faults while looking back on our thoughts and behaviors and then correct them. 
   We can lead a moral life through moral introspection, which is the way we act what is 
right according to autonomous judgment. The person who desires to constantly question 
how to live in the correct manner always reflects on herself to mend mistakes and errors. 
In this way, the person can observe self-constituted rules and principles. The person who 
listens to her inner voice through moral introspection can cultivate her character and 
personality. In addition, such a person not only earns the respect of others but also enjoys 
peace of mind with a feeling of satisfaction. 
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The image of the female student examining something with a magnifying glass expresses 
metaphorically that she is having time for self-reflection. The caption reads, “I feel shame 
reflecting on what I did—turning my back on my mom who wakes me up every morning. I 
should try to get up on my own from now on” (Morals I, 43). The female student might not 
thank her mom if she has taken for granted the things her mom does for her. This maybe is 
the reason why she took it out on her mom, but later on reflection, she realized that such an 
immature attitude towards her mom is shameful. We have seen the way that shame is 
manifested with self-reflection or moral introspection in the previous section. This type of 
shame is morally important because it require a candid evaluation of oneself. In this regard, 
from the Confucian point of view, shame is a fundamentally moral concept associated with 
moral mind, i.e., conscience. 
Conscience and Moral Shame 
There is a specialized unit on the subject of shame concerning conscience under the 
chapter entitled “Meanings of Morality” in Morals I, and it starts with the content of what 
conscience looks like as below (20). Such an understanding of conscience looks very 
similar to the description of it in the U.S. context: conscience is defined as “the sense or 
consciousness of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of one's own conduct, intentions, 
or character together with a feeling of obligation to do right or be good.”42 That is, 
conscience is a mental activity that works in self-evaluation in relation to the interior 
dimension of morality. Let us see what the Korean term for conscience is. It is 양심 
(pronounced “yang-sheem” and liberally translated as “conscience” or “moral mind”) that 
                                                
42 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “conscience.” retrieved from https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/conscience. 
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is the heart-mind of acting properly following one’s own criteria to judge what is right and 
wrong.43 
 
In the meantime, it is a Sino-Korean word so consists of two Chinese characters 良 
(liang) and 心 (xin). The first letter liang, which is a pictograph for winnowing basket, 
involves the idea of good such as benevolent, excellent and beautiful. The second letter xin, 
which is modeled on human’s heart, signifies mind, thought, soul and sprit. Thus, liang-xin 
is generally called ‘decent heart’ or ‘beautiful mind.’ From the Confucian perspective, based 
on particularly Mencius’s theory, the concept of liang-xin is referred as ‘naturally good 
heart-mind.’ And this is what Koreans usually uphold as the traditional understanding of 
conscience, in terms of an innate moral awareness. On the other hand, the following 
illustration represents the idea that conscience is shaped by education and practice (See 
Figure 3). 
                                                
43 National Institute of Korean Language, s.v. “양심.” 
What is Conscience? 
We can easily see the function of conscience in our daily lives. For example, we may say 
to the person who hesitates to decide whether to tell a lie so as not to be scolded by one’s 
parents like this: “Listen to the voice of conscience.” Also, we may express that 
“experience a pricking of conscience” when we feel regret for telling a lie to satisfy one’s 
selfish desires. In other words, conscience is an inner voice that requires us to do the right 
thing or admonish about wrong behavior. In this way, conscience establishes a standard of 
judgment what is right and wrong/what is good and evil, and it also scolds us for 
wrongdoings. Therefore, conscience is often referred to as ‘lawmaker and judge of my 




Figure 3. Developing Conscience in the Process of Continuous Moral Education44 
From left to right, the illustration puts three events in the order as they happened. The girl 
stole a wallet from a pocket, so her parents scolded the girl when her stealing was 
discovered. It seems that the girl was deeply regretful of what she did; as she shed tears, she 
thinks to herself that ‘I won’t do wrongdoings again.’ At the end, the girl has a sore 
conscience after finding a wallet again. The sight might tempt her to steal, but she could 
resist the temptation because of the signal from her conscience. This implies that conscience 
can be developed through accumulated experience in company with uncomfortable 
emotions such as a guilty conscience or shame. 
The following illustration depicts a boy blushing due to the sudden appearance of 
his father (See Figure 4).45 
                                                
44 Picture cropped from p. 20 in Morals I. 
45 Blushing is an outward display of shame, embarrassment, shyness and/or modesty 
(Crozier 2014, 205). 
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Figure 4. A Boy Whose Face Turned Red in Embarrassment46 
The boy was reading a comic book when he should not be, so he hid the comic book from 
his father’s view and lied “I was studying.” It is described in the text like this: “Why does 
your heart beat quickly and your face turn red when you lie to your friend or teacher? This 
is because you feel shame according to your conscience, which judges if telling a lie is 
wrong.” The the text goes on to accord shame special status by quoting a passage from the 
Mencius as below (Morals I, 21). The moral value of shame is explicitly addressed, which 
is heavily influenced by Mencius’s theoretical framework of heart-mind and virtue.47 It is 
suggested that shame is an indispensable human moral attribute. Moreover, the quotation 
form Mencius provides important insight into the distinction between shame and 
humiliation.48 The bases of the two emotions differs sharply from one another. While 
external criticism is the source of being humiliated, feeling shame at having been without a 
                                                
46 Picture cropped from Morals I, p. 21. 
47 Turn to p. 36. 
48 In the Korean context, feeling shame and being humiliated are clearly distinguished 
conceptually and linguistically. The word for humiliation is 치욕 (pronounced “chee-
yohk”), which should not be confounded with shame. 
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sense of shame requires the awareness of one’s want of moral sensitivity. Hence, it is stated 
that “people believe they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their 
humiliation” (Klein 1991, 117, emphasis in original). 
 
The wording in the passage above suggests that moral shame is a peculiar term 
alluding to self-reflection from within. Moral shame is stressed in improving conscience; it 
involves the process of cultivating or restoring conscience. This paragraph assumes that 
conscience is always morally correct and is advanced in a right way through moral shame; 
in other words, conscience stands for ‘good or clear conscience’ because conscience itself is 
morally oriented.49 Thus, moral shame should have an internal self-evaluative component, 
                                                
49 This assumption about conscience is not universally accepted. In fact, there is a case 
that conscience can be badly formed. For example, a person who is opposed to LGBTQ 
rights can say like this: “Based on freedom of conscience I have a right to follow my 
own belief that heterosexuality is superior and desirable so favor people who are 
straight and cisgender.” For further explanation of how shaping conscience can go 
wrong, refer to Covaleskie’s (2013, 10-14) discussion in his book on the formation of 
conscience. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I reckon without the case of badly formed 
Moral Shame 
Human beings differ from animals because we are able to feel shame about what is wrong 
with our behavior. It is commonly said, “Can anyone be human? A true person [of decent 
character] is human.” This means that the person who has no sense of shame cannot be a 
human worthy of the name. (emphasis in original) 
Mencius stated, “A man may not be without a sense of shame. When one feels shame 
of having been without a sense of shame, he will afterwards not have an occasion to be 
humiliated.” (Mencius 7A.6, emphasis mine) 
When we disobey the conscience’s commands for selfish desires, we feel moral 
shame. Such a feeling of shame asks us not to surrender to our selfish desires but to seek 
higher moral values. So people feel shame by themselves and have the pang of conscience 
when they violate their conscience. However, when we see someone who doesn’t feel 
shame or has no qualms about wrongdoing, the question ‘does the conscience exist 
indeed?’ can be raised. But that is not to say that such a person doesn’t have conscience. 
The demand of conscience has been continually ignored, so it became blunted and 
malfunctioned. Therefore, in order not to make our conscience blunted, we should have 
self-reflection; if it is dull we have to sharpen the conscience. Even if you have lived an 
erroneous life until yesterday, you can freshen up your life today, and the dull conscience 
can be newly recovered. (emphasis in original)  
76 
and the following illustration depicts this aspect of shame when moral shame works well 











Figure 5. Male Student Who Feels Great about Sustaining His Conscience50 
 
The Male student is taking a lost child to the police station by saying to himself that ‘my 
heart is filled with pride when I obey my conscience.’ If the student just passed by the lost 
child, he might feel ashamed of himself. 
Admittedly, pride is normally seen as the opposite of shame; however, keeping a 
sense of shame that enables us to aspire toward something honorable or at least avoid the 
dishonorable can make you feel proud of yourself. This tells us that conscience does not 
need to be a ‘guilty’ conscience; it can be a ‘clear’ conscience when someone’s inner 
reflection leaves them in the happy position of finding nothing wrong with how they have 
behaved (Cottingham 2013, 730). 
We have seen that developing a sense of shame is not particular to keeping 
conscience and that shame is not necessarily opposite to pride in its moral context 
                                                
conscience. Because it is firmly believed that conscience is always properly formed, 
and so morally right in the context of Korean moral education. 
50 Picture cropped from Morals I, p. 21. 
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throughout this section. These points indicate that shame is influential in leading a self-
respecting life, which is elaborated in the following subsection. 
Shame in the Self-Respecting Context 
From the moral philosophical perspective self-respect has been acclaimed for its 
relevance to one’s capacity for rationality and behaviors that promote autonomy (Roland 
and Foxx 2003). According to Kristján Kristjánsson (1998), self-respect is commonly 
believed to have psychological, moral, educational, and pragmatic values: it is essential for 
pursuing our life plans; it is linked with human dignity preserving moral character and 
contributing to the continuation of morality; it encourages us to keep working hard, not to 
let our talents go down the drain and to stand up to unfair treatment; and it help us be “more 
successful in life and better liked by one's peers by maintaining a proper sense of self-
worth” (5-6). Hence, it is worth considering self-respect in terms of a positive disposition or 
virtue that needs to be fostered for moral life. To respect oneself is to recognize oneself as 
having moral worth. Hence, a person who possesses self-respect has a sense of her own 
value and a set of standards by which she lives her life (Middleton 2006, 75; Taylor 1985, 
78). 
According Patricia White (1996), the notions of self-esteem and self-respect need to 
be distinguished. While the source of self-respect is one’s consciousness of doing the right 
thing, self-esteem comes from outside— “occupation, membership of an ethnic or religious 
group, sporting powers, agile wit, and so on” that may be extrinsic to one’s inner side (28-
30). An overemphasis on these external bases for self-esteem can generate a pedagogical 
problem, especially when educational institutions create an atmosphere in which some 
students feel a sort of self-esteem according to their advantage/privilege from a certain 
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membership or “academic or sporting success” (31). In other words, from an educational 
point of view, encouraging high self-esteem based on relative superiority or affinity can 
cause negative consequences, as White (1996) points out: 
It seems likely that fostering self-esteem may lead students to take a stand-offish, 
self-contained stance toward other people who are not supporters of the local 
football team or whatever; and at the worst, it may lead students to take highly 
divisive, bigoted attitudes towards others. Students might enjoy self-esteem, but at 
the expense of an insulated attitude of indifference to the rest of the community. (33, 
emphasis mine) 
 
This form of self-esteem may arouse an exclusive attitude among the mainstream towards 
the weak or outsiders. In such situations, for social minorities to have high self-esteem 
would be impossible. This issue needs to be seriously tackled considering its relevance to 
discrimination or shaming. 
One relevant passage in the 4th grade Morals textbook shows that Jin-Hee is 
apparently tormented by racism or xenophobia. There is every probability of bullying or 
harassment based on different looks and accents in school setting. It seems that Jin-Hee 
completely lost her self-esteem according to her inner monologue in this diary. Jin-Hee was 
ridiculed because of her multicultural background, and this made her feel ashamed of her 
physical appearance (Morals 4, 199). 
The Diary of Jin-Hee 
My classmates often make fun of me because they think I have darker skin and my Korean 
pronunciation is not very good. It occurred to me that what I did for this like washing my 
face many times to make my dark skin lighter. I painfully tried to fight back my tears. I 
promised my father that I would not cry and would keep my heart brave even if I were 
ridiculed. Actually, in my mother’s country the classmates also teased me that I have bad 
breath because of kimchi. I feel I am neither Korean nor a person of my mother’s land. 
Where should I go to live happily?  
79 
Looking at it the other way, the school bullies might have high self-esteem because 
they are native Koreans with ‘racial purity,’ considering the fact that Korea has long been 
considered by Korean themselves a homogeneous society. The following case deals with 
the issue of prejudice or stereotype against people with different backgrounds (Morals 4, 
95). 
This anecdote illustrates a likely story reflecting Korea’s peculiar situation of divided nation 
between South Korea and North Korea. The bully Jang-Hoon represents those who lack of 
consideration for others and are insensitive to other’s feelings. Jang-Hoon made thoughtless 
remarks to Seok-Cheol and teased him about the issue of poverty in North Korea. Jang-
Hoon might be proud of being South Korean and might be glad he is not a poor North 
Korean. Jang-Hoon’s self-esteem is grounded on exclusive membership of being South 
Korean in a narrow sense. Next, other-oriented self-esteem is relative and so incites 
competition between the strong and discourages the weak. Sports ability becomes the 
source of self-esteem in the following case (Morals 6, 13-14). 
 
 
Seok-Cheol from North Korea 
The kids in my classroom asked a lot of questions to Seok-Cheol during a break because 
they were curious about why Seock-Cheol came from North Korea. Among them, Jang-
Hoon jokingly asked, “Why did you come from North Korea? Because you were so 
hungry?” Dong-Seok felt uncomforable after hearing those words and said, “Jang-Hoon, 
what is your attitude toward Seok-Cheol?” Jang-Hoon replied bluntly that “because Seok-
Cheol is North Korean.” Then Seok-Cheol said, “I’m Korean. My mom told me that I’m 
Korean” with a long face. Dong-Seok and other friends defended Seok-Cheol like this, 
“He’s right. The other day our teacher said people from North Korea like Seok-Cheol are 
also people in this country. And South Korea and North Korea were originally one 
country.” Maybe Jang-Hoon did not like to give in, so he continued to say, “Well, we are 
still different from North Koreans. North Korean people are living in poverty indeed.” 
Dong-Seok became worried about such a response and thought that ‘it would be difficult 
to achieve reunification if many South Koreans think like Jang-Hoon.’  
80 
 
The gym class leader Young-Hoon feels proud of his athletic ability. Eun-Seon has precisely 
the opposite situation; she is deeply discouraged by her lack of athletic ability. For them 
athletic ability is the source of their self-esteem: Young-Hoon has high self-esteem in terms 
of his good athletic ability whereas Eun-Seon has low self-esteem because of her poor 
athletic ability. Here we must ask a question whether Young-Hoon’s high level of self-
esteem rooted in his good athletic ability makes him lead a self-respecting life; in other 
words, if he has the true sense of pride of himself. The text does not clearly respond to this 
question but suggests to find the way to have self-respect from the remarks of Deok-Ee and 
Ji-Hye (Morals 6, 14). 
According to my understanding, having a sense of self-respect is not conditioned on 
high level of skills or good results. Deok-Ee and Ji-Hye are not as good at running as 
Young-Hoon is, but they do not undervalue themselves because of a lack of athletic ability, 
unlike Eun-Seon. Young-Hoon has a condescending attitude towards Eun-Seon, based on 
Relay Race 
Eun-Seon said, “There’s no point in practicing more. I’m not confident. If I ever make a 
little mistake, other friends ridicule and neglect me. So, it’s better not to.” Several friends 
who laughed at Eun-Seon when she fell in gym class came across her memory.  
   Deok-Ee encouraged, “Never give up, anyone can make a mistake. You’ll be better if 
you practice baton passing more.” Ji-Hye also put in a helping word, “Our teacher 
promised to give more points to the team showing progress, so let’s do it.”  
   However, Eun-Seon still hung her head and dug sand on the ground with her shoes 
saying, “You guys are good at running, but I’m not. I don’t know why other kids like to 
make fun of me… I’m afraid to become a laughing stock. Ah, I really hate myself because 
I feel so useless.” 
   “You must be so distressed about what happened in the gym class. Actually I am not 
good at running, too. I often wish I were good at running like track  and field athletic. 
Yet, we are good at other things than running thus let’s not think we are useless,” Ji-Hye 
spoke kindly to Eun-Seon, taking Eun-Seon’s hand.  
   Suddenly Young-Hoon who serves as the gym class leader broke into the conversation 
and said, “Why don’t you stop practicing? You can’t do all things well even if you try. You 
will be able to feel proud with confidence when you hone your skill as much as mine.” 
   Deok-Ee thought within herself while looking at Young-Hoon and Eun-Seon, ‘Can I be 
proud of myself only if I’m better at something than others?’ 
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his athletic ability that makes him have high self-esteem. However, I have doubts about 
whether Young-Hoon truly respects himself. As it is shameful for one with self-respect to 
treat others with disrespect, Young-Hoon should have acted more mature if he truly had 
sense of self-respect. On the other hand, Eun-Seon who lacks self-esteem because of her 
low athletic ability needs to raise her level of self-respect overall. 
Jung-Hyun in the next diary appears to have a greater sense of pride in himself 
(Morals 3, 44). From the passage, we can see how Jung-Hyun is self-respecting and feels 
proud of his multicultural background. After this story, students are asked to “imagine how 
Jung-Hyun feels when he receives too much attention or discrimination because of his 
different appearance” (Morals 3, 45).  
 
This implies that students must understand others’ different circumstances and get 
along with those who have different backgrounds. Seen in this light, the content teaches 
students not to have a sense of superiority by reason of being part of the mainstream on the 
one hand; it also shows the way to keep one’s self-respect regardless of what others’ say on 
the other hand. This lesson connects with the topics of true pride and right judgment in 
The Diary of Jung-Hyun 
We took a group portrait today for my parents’ wedding anniversary. My mom said she 
will send the family picture to mom’s parents’ home in Vietnam. My mom met my dad 
when she came to Korea to learn Korean. While traveling in Vietnam and Korea my mom 
and dad came to know each other well then fell in love, so they got married. 
   I’m knowledgeable about both countries because I have been told from my parents many 
things about Korean and Vietnamese culture. I like both Vietnam and Korea where my 
mom and dad were born. But I feel sometimes uncomfortable that my dad and mom are 
different in ethnicity. This is because people often gaze at my face, as I do not look exactly 
like my other friends. I proudly reply, “I’m Korean.” whenever I’m asked where I come 
from. 
   I’m looking forward to seeing the family picture and I wonder if I look very nice with 
한복 (pronounced “hahn-boke” and literally translated as “Korean traditional clothes”) in 
the picture.  
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Morals 6. It defines the Korean word 자긍심 (pronounced “ja-gung-sheem”) as “a proud 
heart” (the same “heart” as in “heart-mind”) and “the mindset of speaking or acting fair and 
square with confidence” (Morals 6, 9). It is further explained why self-respect is important 
as below (Morals 6, 10). 
In Korean language, self-respect and self-esteem are not clearly distinguishable thus the two 
notions are used interchangeably. However, in the context of this useful distinction between 
the two it would be more appropriate to translate “ja-gung-sheem” as self-respect 
considering the content of the Morals textbook that pays attention to its ethical relevance: 
“It is not self-respect to be proud of oneself with no consideration for what is right or 
wrong. Rather, having a true sense of self-respect is concerned with one’s attitude of 
seeking what is morally right” (Morals 6, 26). Like this, self-respect or “ja-gung-sheem” is 
conceptually very different from self-esteem, which we have seen in the previous 
subsection. 
It is said that self-respect is closely related to pride and shame. Robin Dillon (1997) 
indicates that pride and shame are constitutive of being a self-respecting person; pride and 
shame are the elements of an ‘evaluative self-respect’ that is oriented around “the measure 
of quality of character and conduct” (228-229). In this sense, the following fable from the 
6th grade Morals textbook is intended to enhance thinking about what is self-respect and to 
indicate the relationship between self-respect and shame (Morals 6, 27). 
Why is Self-Respect Important? 
With self-respect we come to take care of ourselves and love ourselves. The self-
respecting person knows that other people are valuable as much as she is. With self-respect 
we can see ourselves positively as well as understand ourselves well. The self-respecting 
person likely attempts to do anything in reason with confidence. With self-respect we can 
make an effort to overcome shortcomings and develop strong points. 
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This fable conveys the lesson of leading a satisfying life according to one’s own talent. The 
peacock’s shame emerged with the sudden realization of how his complaint was immature. 
Once the peacock became aware there is no absolute standard of a satisfactory life, he does 
not need to measure his talent against others’. In other words, through his change in the 
perception that comes with feeling shame about what he previously did, the peacock came 
to see his own talents by his own standards. The peacock eventually would feel proud of 
himself in this process. 
Perhaps the peacock already had a sense of self-respect in that he felt shame 
anyway. Drawing upon Gabrielle Taylor’s account, “We can characterize self-respect by 
reference to shame: if someone has self-respect then under certain specifiable conditions he 
will be feeling shame. A person has no self-respect if he regards no circumstances as shame-
producing” (1985, 80). The point is that the Creator did not compel the peacock to feel 
shame. Rather, the peacock’s shame might be a manifestation of his self-respecting, which 
had not yet been revealed well. This elucidates the role of shame in moral education, which 
as Kristjánsson (1998) suggests “when properly felt…shame becomes an important 
warning recognition that one’s moral values are under threat” (14). 
Peacock’s Complaint 
There was a peacock who is always unhappy with his voice that is not very sweet. One 
day, the peacock went to see the Creator. The Creator said, “Why did you come to see 
me?”  
   “I have not been satisfied with my voice. You gave me the most terrible voice among all 
animals. Look at that nightingale who is enjoying a bright spring with his singing voice, 
which is strong and beautiful,” the peacock replied. 
   The Creator thought it is so stupid of him to have complaints about his voice. “You, 
peacock, seem to be full of complaints. But, don’t you like your beautiful plumes and 
accordion tails?” 
   On this account, only then the peacock realized that an animal has each own talent, such 
as hawk has strong wings, eagle has a brave character, and nightingale has a sweet voice. 
Like this, each one lives by displaying one’s talent. The peacock felt a sense of shame 
realizing that other animals are not jealous of other’s talents.  
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Chapter Summary 
So far, we have seen that shame is taught in a distinct manner in Korean moral 
education. Descriptions of shame throughout this chapter showed that the Korean moral 
education curriculum reflects the Confucian thoughts on shame extensively. Therefore, 
Korean students are expected to learn the moral value of shame systematically at school. It 
is characteristic of the Korean mind that shame is generally conceived as something very 
important for leading a moral life. What has been intentionally and openly encouraged in 
the context of Korean moral education is having an honorable life without shameful 
things—we should strive for a state of nothing shameful in order to attain the highest 
reaches of living in a communal life. Namely, sustaining and developing a sense of shame is 
highly emphasized in the course of pursuing this moral ideal, and thus shame is valued as a 
moral sensitivity that works as a creed we could live by. In Morals textbooks the 
interpretation of the shame concepts is deliberately broad, including some of notion of 
guilt.51 A general approach to understanding shame in Korean moral education does not 
seem to work with the typical contemporary psychological analysis of shame, which views 
shame as morally irrelevant or inferior. It does not mean that results of content analysis in 
this chapter and literature review in Chapter 3 are not completely antithetical—in fact, for 
example, in both chapters there are clear indications that shame makes reference to self. Yet, 
we can see that the way in which shame is interpreted in the Korean school environment is 
mostly philosophical and morally positive.  
                                                
51 Our previous discussion in Chapter 2 continues this line of thinking. 
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Chapter 5. Description of Shame via Practitioner Interviews 
Moral education is an extensive endeavor to help children and youths behave well 
and build up upright character, thus it is not limited to formal curriculum. A very few 
countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have reinforced moral instruction in classroom, 
by way of running a separate subject on a large scale. In the United States, in contrast, it is 
unusual for school education to have a stand-alone course as a formal part of the curriculum 
for moral education. There is little “formal moral instruction as a recurrent and identifiable 
piece of curriculum,” but rather, moral education is normally understood to cut across all 
courses (Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen 1993, 4). 
Character education programs are being partially implemented in the United State, 
yet, it is still insufficient to say that there is specific standard on what would be taught 
regarding moral education. It is also hard to detect specific materials over the topic of 
shame in connection with moral educational theory and practice in American K-12 
education system. Given the situation, a different type of data other than curriculum content 
is needed. On the assumption that looking at the practice of teachers and their conception is 
helpful to reveal when moral education is provided and how shame is perceived in 
American school settings, qualitative interviews that comprise the data for this chapter were 
conducted. In short, based on interviewing education practitioners in the south-central part 
of the U.S., a picture of the U.S. contemporary moral education concerning the concept of 
shame is suggested in this chapter. 
Framework 
Case study interviews are designed to see the ways that practitioners talk about 
moral education around the topic of shame and how they instantiate it in their classrooms. 
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The following presumptions serve as analytical framework. First, moral education is an 
inclusive term. Thus, it is not confined to a particular subject; any subject has a potential to 
be the teaching resource of moral education. Second, moral education can be done in 
various manners, with or without the planned, explicit curriculum.52 Third, schooling 
cannot overlook its task of moral education considering that K-12 schools as a conveyor or 
repository of cultural values and beliefs are influential institutions for children and youths. 
Fourth, teachers are significant agents for conducting moral education because students 
absorb almost everything from teachers, by observing how teachers treat or view 
curriculum content, current issues, and people including students and other adults in 
schools. All things considered, lastly, a more proactive approach to moral education in K-12 
schools needs to be pursued in the manner of cultivating moral mind beyond merely 
making students follow a set of rules. This is important to foster students to become 
‘morally educated citizen’ who love to do what is good as well as to know what is right. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants of this qualitative interview study comprise eight Oklahoman 
educators. The participants ranged in age from 31 to 48 years old (median 36.5), and their 
professional K-12 experience as teachers ranged from 1 ½ to 21 years (median 9.5). Among 
interviewees, five of them were practicing teachers, and the other three had been but were 
                                                
52 The explicit curriculum is a planned educational program that appears to be overt in 
schooling practices. By contrast, the implicit or hidden curriculum delivers values, 
expectations, and stereotypes beyond knowledge that are not generally included in the 
formal curriculum. The null curriculum refers to what schools do not teach (Eisner 
2002). 
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not currently working at K-12 schools. About their workplaces, five of them have taught 
only in public schools including charter and alternative schools, and the other three have 
taught in both public and private schools. The subjects represented by subject teachers were 
diverse, including STEM, Social Sciences, Humanities, and Special Education. Three 
quarters of the interviewees were women, and all participants had a high level of 
educational background, more than college degree (See Table 5). Based on the Profile of 
Teachers in the U.S. 2011, female teachers account for 84 percent of the total public school 
teachers, and 55 percent of the teaching force held Masters’ degrees (Feistritzer 2011). 
While this sample is comparable in terms of gender ratio and level of education, it is 
vulnerable to a diversity issue. All but one of the participants were Caucasians, and three 
quarters of the participants held Judeo-Christian beliefs. Such lack of racial and religious 
diversity, which is similar to or even worse than national average level, is representative of 
teacher demographics or the general population in Oklahoma unfortunately: White teachers 
occupied 82 percent in 2011-2012 (Boser 2014, 8), and 79 percent of adults have Christian 
faiths in Oklahoma.53  
Table 5. Summary of Participant Characteristics 
 
Age 31–48 years old (median 36.5) 
Gender 6 females; 2 males 
Race 7 Caucasians; 1 Biracial 
Religion 4 Christians; 1 Catholic; 1 Jewish; 2 No 
Highest level of education 7 Master’s; 1 Bachelor  
Length of K-12 teaching experience 1 ½ –21 years (median 9.5) 
                                                




Ethical approval was acquired from the University of Oklahoma Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for this study. The entire study process observed the IRB regulations, 
and all data remained confidential (See Appendices). Using a snowball-sampling method, 
study volunteers were recruited based on K-12 teaching experience in the Oklahoma City 
metropolitan area, and there were no other specific exclusion criteria for selection. Face-to-
face interviews were held between November 2014 and February 2015 and each interview 
session lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. 
For all interviewees, a set of open-ended questions was prepared beforehand (See 
Table 6). Upon meeting with the participants, the arranged questions served partially as 
guidelines to draw a reply.54 All interviews were audiotaped and then the records were 
transcribed verbatim. All participants were addressed by a pseudonym to avoid inclusion of 
names that make interviewees identifiable. The interview transcripts in which the 
participant names are addressed by pseudonym were reviewed repeatedly to seek patterns 
among the data. 





• Can you explain the general climate of your schools about moral 
education? 




• Have you had any memorable teaching experience regarding 
moral issues? 
• Have you had an emotional episode relating to shame in the 
school setting? When and what happened? 
                                                
54 This is the advantage of being in semi-structured interview. There is room for 
collecting extra information unintended or asking some spontaneous questions in a 
more relaxed atmosphere like having a conversation. 
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• Have you ever seen a teacher or someone eliciting negative 
emotions like embarrassment, guilt, or shame as discipline? 
• Have you ever seen kids who felt ashamed in schools? If so, what 




• What is your opinion that teaching morality is the responsibility of 
teachers? 
• What kind of subject matters or school activities do you think are 
related to moral education? 
• What do you think an appropriate or inappropriate discipline in the 
classroom looks like? 
Personal 
opinion 
• Where do you think moral values come from? 
• What is your opinion of shame for the formation of fit behavior? 
• How do you feel about shame? How does the concept of shame hit 
you? Can you define it in your own word? 
• Can you explain the difference between shame and shaming? 
 
For further rigorous analysis, methodologically, a qualitative approach of thematic analysis 
was applied in part. Thematic analysis, which is a process of coding qualitative information 
for “pinpointing, examining, and recording patterns (or themes) within data,” was chosen in 
order to produce an insightful description of the phenomenon being studied (Braun and 
Clarke 2006, 83). As a result, the key results of the qualitative analysis were broken into 
3 major themes with 9 sub themes and related concepts. All of these will be fully described 
with assistance from or with reference to relevant literature in the analysis section, which 
consists of the following elements. 
1) Forms of Moral Education: Wide-Ranging Moral Education; Education 
Programs in Operation; Moral Instruction in the Classroom 
2) Complex Conception of Shame: Distinguishing Shame from Shaming; Shame 
and Related Emotions; Moral Sense of Shame 




Forms of Moral Education 
From the interview participants’ responses different forms of moral education at K-
12 level are found. Generally, in the American education system moral education has been 
carried out in a broader sense, yet some specialized programs in operation are also 
identified In addition, several teachers have shared their teaching experiences in which 
moral instruction is intended.55  
Wide-Ranging Moral Education 
Moral education is in effect linked to all areas of school life. Ethical training, 
lectures on anti-drug/anti-bullying, and counseling programs are typical extracurricular 
activities for moral education in its broader sense. Cassidy and Frank respectively 
confirmed the fact that a variety of school affairs, for good or for ill, embody moral 
education. 
Cassidy: [Moral education] is kind of integrated within everything that you do. It is 
not so much a separate lesson but you have your classroom rules, you have your 
classroom procedures, you have your classroom environment and all those things 
kind of lend itself to how you treat other people. 
 
Frank: All teachers are teaching morality at some level because they are teaching 
people how to be with other people and using a lot of statements like you should do 
this or you should do that so they are kind of teaching morality maybe just not on 
purpose or just realizing it. 
 
Those remarks resonate the idea that students watch and learn all the time, as Theodore 
Sizer and Nancy Sizer claim, “We must honestly ponder what they see, and what we want 
                                                
55 This section is based on work previously published elsewhere: Sula You’s (2015) 
“Current Approaches to Moral Education in the State of Oklahoma.” In all cases they 
appear here with some modifications, and in some cases they have been substantially 
reworked. 
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them to learn from it” (2000, 120). Along this line, Rebecca argued that all teachings 
include moral aspects as below. 
Rebecca: I don’t really understand if you can teach without being a moral educator. I 
don’t know what that would look like. I can’t remember any teachers I have ever had 
that were not also moral trainers at the same time. Just to me it is one of the same. It 
is not something that I can just be one or the other. 
 
This response not only corresponds to an integrated approach to moral education but also 
mirrors John Dewey’s idea that all aspects of education provide opportunities for character 
development (2011, 358-60). It implies that anything between teachers and students is 
moral in nature because morals might be ‘caught and not taught.’ 
Education Programs in Operation 
Some specific education programs for moral/character education, either district-
wide or school-wide, were introduced by those who have engaged in primary education. 
Amy expressed her positive opinion of the autism integrated care program at her school. 
Amy: Our autistic children are integrated into regular classrooms so we want all of 
our kids to recognize that...there’s nothing wrong with them or bad just because are 
autistic... So I think our kids are very aware of that and they are very helpful to other 
kids because they see autistic kids a lot.  
 
Amy’s school adopts the method of incorporating autistic children into a traditional 
classroom. This is more than just a medical treatment only for autism; it is also for 
unimpaired children in that such an environment helps them to cultivate a sense of mutual 
cooperation. In addition, Amy explained that her school adopts Second Step program, 
which contains sets of lessons in social and emotional learning to be applied in pre-K 
through 8th grade.56 
                                                
56 Refer to http://www.cfchildren.org/second-step for details. 
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Meanwhile, Anne and Chris spoke about a character education program called 
Great Expectations, which focuses on professional development in teacher training 
throughout Oklahoma. Anne stated, “It was a recommended program, and I really liked it 
because it [was] sort of teaches concepts of connections and relationships.” Chris provided 
more information that teachers in the Oklahoma City Public School system receive Great 
Expectations training, which is highly recommended in elementary school.57 
Chris: It seems at my school that they do care about moral education...we have had 
all of the Great Expectations model throughout the school... So there are 8 
expectations just about how you treat one another and you know we will value one 
another as unique and special individuals and then there are life principles that all 
students in our school are taught about.  
 
Another character education program called Cloud9World was also identified throughout 
the conversations with Mary. 
Mary: There are 24 words and about 36 weeks...Like right now one of the words is 
‘love’ so we are doing that right now because it is Valentine’s Day and then we do it 
school wide so we enter the word... we purchased it and there is a book for every 
word and every word has like a mascot like an animal that goes with it.  
 
Utilizing visual displays with moral contents, in order to help students experience the 
virtues that are essential for positive development, is the feature of the Cloud9World 
program.58 
In this way, having seen several specific programs in operation, we could recognize 
institutional efforts to deal with moral education. The following sub section will show how 
individual teacher takes the opportunity for an immediate response to moral issues. 
Moral Instruction in the Classroom 
                                                
57 Refer to http://www.greatexpectations.org/ for details. 
58 Refer to http://www.cloud9world.com/program for details. 
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Using the fixed content of textbook often enables a teacher to facilitate moral 
discussion or convey a moral message effectively. In fact, moral instruction can be done as 
part of the regular curriculum. It is commonly acknowledged that Literature Arts and Social 
Studies courses often contain contents that are moral in tone or morally controversial. The 
following two paragraphs, excerpted from Richard’s previous teaching of advanced 
placement classes in high school, specifically demonstrate that moral issues are addressed 
with reading materials in literature class. 
Richard: We read Les Miserables. And we would get into rich discussion of the 
difference between justice and mercy. Because the two main characters of the book, 
police inspector Javert and a former convict Jean Valjean…both embody deeply held 
moral positions. And they are both right. That was what I wrestled with students… 
We got into some amazing discussions on what’s higher than the law? Because that’s 
what Javert keeps saying over and over that there’s nothing higher than the law. 
 
Richard: We read the Paradise Lost, which was John Milton’s huge epic of the fall of 
Satan and the fall of men... So it’s a very religious text… We had a stoutly devout 
fundamental evangelical kid…and we have a Muslim kid, a Jewish kid, and an atheist 
kid… So you would have some really heated conversation. And I would always have 
to say you can always attack any idea, but you cannot attack a person. You cannot say 
you’re wrong... That was probably the greatest skill I got out of the class was learning 
how to disagree with somebody. 
These vignettes show a strategy of how to treat different values as educational content. In 
the first case, Richard used the moral discussion approach, known as the Socratic method, 
to promote critical thinking in understanding a literary work. Moreover, he as the discussion 
leader stimulated “cognitive conflict in which students must reconstruct their moral 
judgments” (Powers and Higgins 1992, 230). The second case touches a sensitive issue, 
whether moral education has to deal with religious matter or not. Yet, as Robert Kunzman 
puts it, a question of fundamental importance here is “how do we help students engage 
thoughtfully with ethical disagreement, even when religion is involved?” (2006, 2) Hence, 
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the point we need to learn from Richard’s teaching method is how to introduce conflicting 
ideas in an ethical and respectful way. 
Chris utilized her homeroom as a good place for students to address social issues as 
well as to foster a sense of community as below. 
Chris: We do activities in our morning meetings before each class... We typically will 
come together and then discuss a current event or something going on in the world 
around us and share our feelings about that…we can see one another’s perspectives 
and that to me helps to build that culture and that community. 
 
Chris: I teach 62 fifth graders… I would say…thinking back maybe 50% Hispanic 
and then I would say 30% Caucasian and then a mixture of African American and 
other races like Vietnamese that are present. So there are definitely a lot of discussions 
about race and cultural variations…when we discussed Thanksgiving there were kids 
that came to school talking about turkey and dressing but then there were kids that 
came to school talking about their mom’s enchiladas that they had for Thanksgiving 
dinner so even discussions of why didn’t you have turkey and dressing. Because that 
is the American thing to do definitely ethnicity was brought into that discussion.  
 
In this manner, teachers encounter various moments that are moral in nature, so the 
opportunity for moral instruction occurs more frequently than anticipated. 
Complex Conception of Shame 
It seems that shame is regarded as something that needs to be banished in the U.S. 
education context, because it has a negative connotation similar to oppression or 
discrimination. This situation is primarily linked to some conceptual confusion about shame 
and relevant notions such as shaming or humiliation. When shame is called ‘self-conscious’ 
or ‘self-critical’ emotion, the experience of shame entails a negative evaluation of the self, 
and this shows its moral relevance in terms of encouraging a transformation of moral 
character. When shame connotes shaming, by contrast, it leaves immediately a bad 
impression, which is harmful and unethical. Hence, the conception of shame needs to be 
analyzed before discussing the educational implications of shame. 
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Distinguishing Shame from Shaming 
Shame is too often confused with shaming, although they are dissimilar. Since 
shame has a myriad of meanings and delicate connotations, let us look at shaming first. 
Shaming, using shame to others, is an intended act of blaming. It faces outward rather than 
inward. Like humiliation or embarrassment, shaming is often accompanied by public 
exposure. In this way, shaming works mostly toward outside except in the case of self-
blame. On the other hand, shame can head outside or inside. Shame focuses on either the 
social world or the internal world: External shame belongs to the first domain, when we 
become “an object of scorn, contempt, or ridicule to others,” and internal shame is involved 
in the second domain, relating to negative self-evaluation that is “derived from how the self 
judges the self” (Gilbert 1998, 17-18, emphasis in original). 
Several participants differentiated shame from shaming. Mary and Chris conceived 
“shaming as a verb” that exercises one’s influence over others. This implies again that the 
agent of shaming is not the shamed but the shamer. Mary articulated the idea that shaming 
possesses intention to “make you feel down” in this regard. In shaming, the shamer holds 
power over the shamed; the shamer has active voice whereas the shamed has passive voice. 
In addition, shame is different from shaming in the way that shame engages in self-
understanding, as Rebecca indicated. 
Rebecca: A person feels shame then definitely I think it is different than shaming 
because feeling shame is an understanding on your own something that was 
undesirable… I would think shaming would elicit feelings of again self-doubt anger 
you know not humbleness or humility you know it wouldn’t be like ‘oh you are so 
right, thank you for telling me how wrong I am’ you know because normally shaming 
happens in a very negative way you know where with yelling or pointing fingers or 
name calling something like that, so I definitely see a difference there. Our shame is 
more internal and intrinsic. 
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What can be inferred about shame and shaming is that the feeling of shame is not always 
occasioned by shaming. Being subjected to shaming (being shamed or humiliated) can 
induce shame feelings (feeling ashamed) or not because we sometimes “feel shame 
independently of shaming” (Teroni and Brunn 2011, 227). The following Richard’s story, 
when he was a coach in addition to being a subject-teacher, seems to shed some light on 
distinctions between shaming and shame. 
Richard: I was a basketball coach. I can remember chewing kids out at that time early 
on. As a coach you chew kids out. And it took me a while to realize that my job here 
isn’t to win the basketball games. My job is to use basketball to teach life to kids. And 
I can think of a specific kid that at that time when I was yelling at them that I could 
see their sense of self-worth, dignity and value just diminish. I look back with great 
shame that my thought at that time was I got to win the basketball game, be a hard-
nose, yell, scream at kids. And that affected me so much and I quit as a coach. I can’t 
be that kind of person anymore. And it wasn’t for several years that I didn’t even 
allow myself to go back to coaching because I wanted to make sure that I wasn’t that 
kind of person anymore. 
 
Richard spoke out of his shame over harsh behavior towards student athletics and the ideas 
about basketball class once he had. Yelling or screaming at students, which is disrespectful, 
is certainly shaming. As a basketball coach he might have used intentionally shaming 
strategy beyond being strict with his players in order to make the students practice harder. 
However, it is questionable whether that was the effective way of inciting the competitive 
spirit in sports game. Maybe some of them were motivated not to hear the coach’s scolding 
in future. On the other hand, maybe some others just were going to hate the coach and 
basketball rather than putting more effort. Indeed, as Fabrice Teroni and Otto Bruun (2011) 
pointed out, “the process of shaming actually blocks the elicitation of shame when the 
subject perceives it as inappropriate or as deliberately brought about” (238). Then, when do 
we feel shame of our own accord? I would feel shame alone about my mistakes or 
wrongdoings without any shaming provided externally, as Richard feels ashamed of his 
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shaming towards the students although nobody blamed his coaching. Therefore, it is not 
right to just lump shame and shaming together. 
Shame and Related Emotions 
Shame encompasses a wide range of conceptions such as embarrassment, shyness, 
disgust, humiliation, dishonor, modesty, and guilt, which are called “variants of the shame 
family” (H. B. Lewis 1987, 110). In reality, there were a number of references to shame-
related concepts in interviews. Firstly, shame and shyness were confusable, as shown in 
Cassidy’s response to the question—how does a student who appears to feel shame look 
like: “I have had some students who like painfully shy…didn’t want to speak up. They 
never wanted to answer any questions. They just wanted to be invisible in the room as much 
as possible… just kind of very much in their shell.” In fact, the expression or consequence 
of shame, such as a down-turned head and gaze, hiding, and withdrawal, looks similar to 
typical symptoms of shyness (Ikonen and Rechardt 1993). However, note that the 
experiences of shame and shyness occur differently—shyness involves “social fear and 
anxiety,” but shame is more appropriate in life situations that are “distressing, depressing, 
disgusting, angering, or guilt-inducing” (Mosher and White 1981, 71). Accordingly, shame 
need not be identified as shyness even though there is a link between shame and shyness. 
Secondly, the concept of guilt was most often merged with shame, and the terms of 
shame and guilt were used imprecisely or interchangeably by some participants. Chris 
indicated that shame gets easily confused with guilt inasmuch as these emotions are 
intertwined. Also, Frank said he does not have a good separation of guilt and shame in his 
mind, although he does not think they are the same thing. Such ideas show that 
phenomenologically shame and guilt may resemble each other. 
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Rebecca pointed out that we feel shame and/or guilt when we broke “kind of golden 
rule” such as “treat others as you would treat yourself.” This is parallel to the account that 
shame and guilt arise from one’s transgression. When someone transgresses, e.g. breaking a 
rule or violating moral norms, one makes a negative evaluation about the situation that 
leaves behind feeling of shame or guilt. In this regard, Chris and Anne also commented on 
the function of negative emotions that help to reflect on what is right thing to do as below. 
Chris: There are those moments where it is important for a child to know that emotion 
because I think it does help them to identify with how they should be anytime that 
emotion comes up then they know that is probably not something good that I have 
done if they feel that way. So I mean we have even talked about that in my classroom 
of when you feel guilty then you try not to do those actions again. 
 
Anne: It could be my Catholic background, but I don’t find guilt to be bad thing. I 
think sometimes you reflect in your mind what you think I know it’s wrong. I would 
feel guilty if I did that. And your conscience, I think your conscience is a good 
indicator. 
 
Moreover, Mary put a higher value on guilt in comparison to shame in terms of internal 
motivation.  
Mary: I feel shame is something that you do to someone and guilt is something that I 
feel internally. So I do believe that guilt might motivate me to make a different 
decision…like I am not going to do that again… But if someone externally tries to 
shame me I might feel ashamed but probably [I am not going to be motivated to make 
a difference]. 
 
Guilt has been commonly understood in connection with one’s internal motivation in this, 
yet shame can promote a motivation for self-change (Henniger and Harris 2014; Lickel et 
al. 2014). Suppose that you feel bad about your lack of effort, thus decide to try harder. 
Then shame would be a stimulus in a good sense. In the next sub-section, we will 
concretely see how “the shamed self can be a sign of health and a stimulus to moral 
improvement” (Murphy 1999, 341). 
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Moral Sense of Shame 
According to Deonna, Rodongo, and Teroni (2012), “shame episodes” and “shame 
dispositions” should be distinct from each other in the understanding of shame: shame 
episodes refer to shame’s affective phenomena such as depression; shame dispositions 
mean the dispositions associated with the emotion of shame, which are called the sense of 
shame (11, emphasis in original). In other words, a sense of shame is not just an emotion 
but an “ethical trait” that “keeps us from being ashamed” (Konstan 2006, 95). The 
following case confirms the existence of sense of shame. 
Richard confessed his shame in himself by recollecting his previous teaching. He 
was teaching at an inner city school when he first started teaching. He was out of his 
element in that environment. Somewhat surprisingly, Richard gave F to sixty students in 
that year because he had a high bar and rigor about his class. He said he is now very 
regretful for what he did. 
Richard: Now I have deep shame that they didn’t fail my class. I failed them. And 
that is something I have always…. And that changed how I approached… because I 
didn’t really see students as human beings. Not in a bad way, but I saw them as grades. 
I saw them as students coming and they had to take my class and read the books I 
gave them and get ready for the test I gave them. They had to do the work I gave them 
to get the grade… I only saw through my eyes. Here’s students for whatever reason… 
I did not see through their eyes. I did not see them as human beings in the process of 
becoming human beings. I just saw them as test takers, grades, and all that. I always 
have deep shame over that… At that time, I was looking at my gradebook and 
counting sixty students who failed and thinking that was a good thing. It wasn’t 
probably two three years later that I really wrestled with what was I doing? And once 
again that shame that I did not want to be that kind of teacher. 
 
Richard realized his shame a couple of years later, not at that time. Namely, there was a 
time lag between when he actually gave sixty students F grade and when he began to truly 
reflect upon his attitude towards students. Accompanied by his shame-feeling, Richard has 
woken up to the seriousness of the question of what kind of teacher he wants to be. As such, 
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his sense of shame in a thought process rather than just an emotional reception stimulated 
his self-awareness or vice versa. Through a sense of shame Richard has become motivated 
to review himself and his role of the teacher in a new way, which is totally different from 
what he had before. Like this, a sense of shame can be manifested or formed down in one’s 
mind. 
The following anecdote shows an educational effort to encourage students to 
develop an adequate moral sensitivity, an ability to realize deep feelings of shame over 
shameful things. 
Amy: It’s important to have a sense of shame; to be ashamed of certain behaviors that 
you might do. That’s important that helps you grow as a person to do something 
wrong and be ashamed of that. Like we have some kids here who steal things from 
their teachers’ desks and we have tried so hard to make them feel a sense of shame 
about that and they don’t… We even had police officers come just to let them know 
how serious it was. It was not to arrest them or anything like that, but so the police 
officer could talk to them and make them see that it is really wrong. If you continue 
down this path, when you are older you can get a lot of trouble doing that. And trying 
to get them feel a sense of shame about that you know, but with some kids. 
 
This explains the relevance of having a sense of shame to being aware of their errors. The 
teachers’ intervention was necessary to generate some emotional burdens on the student; it 
should not be indiscriminately denounced under the name of shaming. On the other hand, 
teacher intervention worked towards the way of letting students know where shame needs 
not to be accompanied, as in another of Amy’s statements. 
Amy: You could tell he was ashamed of the fact that his mother left the family. And 
he was being raised by his grandmother. And his grandmother was asking him why 
don’t you call your mom more often or write to her. And he said “You know I don’t 
have a relationship with her.” He was kind of laughing about it, but I could tell that it 
was something that bothered him. I was just like, “You know we all have 
dysfunctional families. We all have things that happened in our family that we’re not 
very proud of sometimes. But you have a loving grandmother. You know be proud 
and don’t be ashamed of that.” I was just trying to kind of talk kids through when 
they are shamed. 
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Amy explicitly told her student that dysfunctional family is not an accurate object of shame. 
Like this, students need to be educated on norms for moral shame. At the same time, 
students also need to be educated on non-moral things that are beyond one’s control and are 
unrelated to one’s morality in order not to feel shame of them. To clear up, teacher’s 
‘shame-eliciting intervention’ should be limited only if shame attaches to “an agent’s 
disappointment in aspects of her own moral character” (Manion 2002, 77). This should be 
separated from ‘shaming punishment’ that is “mainly coercive exercises in humiliation and 
degradation” (Murphy 1999, 338). 
And yet, it is not easy to make others feel shame as indicated by the fact that there 
was a girl in Amy’s school who is still stealing things all the time in spite of teachers’ 
attempts to stop her. This case begs the question as to if it is a natural thing that we are 
taught to be shamed of wrongdoings. Although the girl was taught by teachers that stealing 
is bad, she did not consider that stealing is really shameful. This means that shame did not 
work in her internalization of the norm of honesty or self-control. Even if the girl believed 
that stealing is something wrong in the abstract, she might think the norm does not 
necessarily apply to her. 
The real issue here is that the girl has not taken stealing very seriously. Maybe due 
to her lack of motivation to act in a morally virtuous way, the method teachers used was 
ineffective to stop her misbehavior. Calling the police officer in order to give her a sharp 
warning did not work. It turns out that the teachers and police officers were not very 
influential in making her self-reflect on her conduct and herself. In order to let her know 
what is wrong and shameful, who could be influential to her in changing her attitude and 
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internalizing moral norms? We need to discuss peer pressure and school culture in this 
regard. 
Moral Pedagogy 
Having seen how shame concept is conceived in K-12 school setting, we now move 
on to challenges Oklahoma moral education is facing, which might impede the 
development of deliberative moral education inside and outside of school. 
Challenges 
Among interview participants, those who are currently working or previously 
worked at secondary school level had more skeptical views on Oklahoma public school 
system in relation to moral education. They pointed to some external conditions that would 
cause widespread apathy towards moral education.59 The first factor was about Oklahoma’s 
distinct characteristics in which religious or political influence is never negligible. 
Frank stated that “I think in Oklahoma people just assume that everyone is Christian 
and goes to a big church, and so if any of that [moral value] was taught it was maybe an 
informal conversation or discussion.” It may be inferred that moral schooling is not 
encouraged in Oklahoma because lots of Oklahomans consider school as an unsuitable 
place to talk about moral values officially. Frank also showed concern about religious 
overtones of teaching morals. He regarded direct instruction on a certain moral value with 
disfavor, acknowledging that moral values come from religious beliefs and social norms. 
Frank: If I was a parent, I wouldn’t want my child being taught moral values from 
someone who maybe didn’t understand what my moral values were, and I want them 
to teach them in such a generic way that they were disregarding the differences 
between different denominations or religion.  
                                                
59 The discussion in this subsection is based on work previously published elsewhere 
(You 2015). In all cases they appear here with some modifications, and in some cases 
they have been substantially reworked. 
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In the meantime, Cassidy, who thinks that moral values come from religious upbringing and 
the political system “in the middle of the Bible Belt,” expressed her concern about 
religious/political influences over moral education. She stated that she has tried to “avoid 
some of the political dogmas in the intensely religious aspects” which relate to “patriarchy 
and white males being superior.” She described how the contents in science class are often 
associated with the issues of religion and politics. 
Cassidy: A lot of kids bring in what they have learned from their Sunday school 
lessons...there is a lot of biology... Some students have religious beliefs...so it is kind 
of a fine line between giving them factual information without getting the parents 
upset... Within the State of Oklahoma, we had adopted the common core and then we 
had axed the common core...one of the main things when I listen to our state 
legislatures when they complain about the science objectives...they don’t like the 
words ‘climate change.’ They definitely don’t like the word ‘evolution’...they just 
don’t want in the curriculum and these are decisions being made by legislatures who 
really don’t have a science background in anything.  
 
The second factor had to do with a lack of pedagogical interests and institutional 
efforts in creating morally sound school atmosphere. In this sense, Richard recalled that 
there was not serious discussion about moral culture at high schools where he was 
employed. 
Richard: I can tell you from my own experience from all three schools. There was 
very little discussion of shaping intentional moral culture...at the first two not at all. 
There was no conversation about what kind of should have moral culture? What 
would it look like? How do we get there? Nothing. In the last school I taught at there 
were some things discussed. But very little follow through on that.  
 
This comment calls for attention to what else we should consider for moral education 
beyond formal curriculum—considering the ethos of school conducive to moral education. 
In addition, some participants tended to be reluctant to actively engage in moral 
education. Mary showed her preference for the term ‘ethics’ in this line, with the remark 
that “I think the trick of the moral education is if it is hard enough to attach a judgment to it. 
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I think that is why [I] more like the ethics.” This negative image of moral education is based 
on her reluctance to use a normative statement that contains a value judgment. Teachers are 
rarely “trying to teach moral lesson per se,” even though different opinions or 
disagreements are noticeable (Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen 1993, 5-6). 
Mary admitted she used to teach students “what is the wrong choice [and] what is 
the right choice” but tried to talk indirectly such as “that choice is going to make your life 
harder or is that a choice that is going to make your life easier.” Mary continued, “A lot of 
kids don’t have that [moral] motivation. They don’t see that at home...that’s the kids that we 
were targeting working to help them develop those skills, just basically manners; being 
polite, sharing with friends, not interrupting.” In this way, she focused solely on student’s 
development of positive behavior, and this is what American teachers generally support. 
In terms of improvement of social skills, however, the question remains: How is 
internalizing moral behaviors as norms possible without moral choice or judgment? In this 
sense, Richard claimed that moral values are being taught in school anyway, as below: 
Richard: If you [are] in the process of educating students you are already in the 
business of human making, business of moral formation. And again if you’re not 
intentionally speaking...they are still being formed but by that overt curriculum and 
by that hidden curriculum. And so the idea that we should not teach values at school 
to me is just doesn’t ring true. It’s paradoxical because by your very nature you’re 
teaching values... And my argument is that schools should be intentional about that 
toward the certain end. This idea that we somehow divorced education and morality 
I don’t think it’s the case... Therefore, every decision is a moral decision. 
 
The above passage suggests that it is crucial for teachers to address moral issues in and out 
of curriculum. It calls for a more proactive approach to moral education rather than 
avoiding the real issues in the name of neutral public schooling. We may pick up some 
ideas from Anne’s opinion, mentioned in following paragraph, developed through her 
teaching experience in both public and private school: 
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Anne: I didn’t feel it was the same for my own experiences… In a Catholic school, if 
there was a misbehavior, you could directly talk about religion with it... So you could 
lay on very heavy concepts in private schools. In public schools, you cannot mention 
anything like that. So I think there’s a healthy balance actually where you can have 
some secular purposes like practicality but also there should be a deeper moral 
component...as a teacher at a public school I definitely felt nurturing and connected 
to the kids, but it is in a different way with moral habits. 
 
To promote moral components in school culture is to build a wholesome and reliable 
educational environment based on mutual caring and respect. School is a highly influential 
community among young people, in which peer pressure is strong. This is strengthened by 
Frank’s observation that most students are motivated other people’s beliefs about “what 
they should be doing.” From Frank’s remark that “they would correct them [because] there 
is peer pressure...on the other hand there is also peer pressure not to correct.” When the 
young people see someone treats someone else poorly, we can see that peer pressure may 
shape students’ moral values towards the right direction or not. 
Peer Pressure and School Culture 
Since children and youths in general so much care about what their peers think or 
say, peer pressure is a powerful aspect of the practice of moral education. It is by nature that 
students are proud of being popular among their friends; also, they are afraid of becoming 
estranged from their friends. Therefore, students tend to be heavily influenced by peer 
groups around them; they significantly learn from each other whether a morally 
constructive way exists or not. To begin with, we may assume that students are motivated to 
embrace moral values or social norms through interaction with their peers. A hypothetical 
case from Thomas Green’s work (1985) deserves to be re-introduced in that connection. 
Here is the story. Two young boys, little Mr. Punctual (as referred to ‘P’ hereinafter) 
and little Mr. Nonchalant (as referred to ‘N’ hereinafter) are close friends. N “never hastens 
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to make it on time” whereas P “always arrives at school on time.” P, as a friend of N, minds 
that N is always late thus says to N, “You really ought to get there on time. When you don't, 
the teacher gets angry at you, and that really doesn't help.” Despite such remark, it seemed 
N does not mind really, so P said again as follows, “It hurts me to see what you have to go 
through every day just because you are late, especially when I know that you don’t have to 
be late.” This time, N listened P’s sincere advice and tried to overcome his old habit so by 
regularly arriving at school on time since then. N is late occasionally, but on all such 
occasions, he apologizes to his friend but not to his teacher. 
The following is Green’s account on how we actually behave according to social 
norms. 
We would not hesitate to say that Nonchalant had acquired the norms of friendship, 
but we still might doubt that he had acquired the norms of punctuality even though 
he regularly arrives at school on time. Norm acquisition is not displayed merely in 
the fact that the behavior of persons conforms to a certain pattern. Rather, the 
existence or failure of norm acquisition is displayed in the presence or absence of 
certain feelings associated with departure from what norm requires. These feelings 
are typically the feelings of guilt, shame, anxiety, embarrassment, and sometimes 
fear, sorrow, and even pain. (Green 1985, 10) 
 
According to Green (1985), norm acquisition is strong when it occurs with those moral 
emotions. N has already acquired the norms of friendship as appeared out of “his feeling 
shame at causing needless pain to” P, and this acquisition of the norms of friendship led N 
to “conform to the school’s norms of punctuality” (Green 1985, 11). Through this case 
study, Green (1985) firstly concluded that moral education is “the education of a conscience 
that is cultivated by attachment to a social group,” i.e. “the education of conscience of 
membership” (12). Secondly, an exercise of empathy within the peer group could promote 
the acquisition of school norms. This is why creating a sound school culture where peers go 
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around together with mutual caring and respect is the prime need for the normalization of 
moral education.  
Nevertheless, in practice, there is still peer pressure that would hinder creating a 
sound learning environment. Encouraging in shaming one another is equivalent to the case 
of bullying. The topic of peer shaming frequently came up in conversation with several 
participants. Rebecca have witnessed a lot of shaming as harassment in her classes all the 
time “that goes on between the boys very openly and between the girls calling each other, 
you know, hoe or slut or whore” and recognized “there would be more shaming behind 
their back, you know, or like shaming them on social media.” Cassidy mentioned about 
“mean girl things” as a typical example of bullying. Chris also commented on this issue by 
saying that “kids can shame each other. They are really capable of having that power over 
one another… and they don’t even realize the power…power to shame her to make her feel 
bad about herself.” This type of peer shaming, which is mostly associated with external 
shame but morally unrelated, likely causes a major scare of being ridiculed or being the 
subject of gossip. The following remark describes the current school atmosphere well:  
Richard: In both classrooms and athletic settings, I witnessed that. It happens all too 
often. That happens all too often in a culture where there is no culture of community... 
There’s a very little space for compassion. We’re almost encouraged to shame. That 
culture in school almost encourages to shame the weak and the different.  
 
Under such competitive situation in school setting, where students consider their peers as 
rivals rather than friends in the true sense of the word, it is hard to imagine they would be 
interested in preventing each other from doing something shameful. In this way, students 
may learn some of the undesirable attitudes from the hidden curriculum at school; for 
example, as students can be encouraged to cheat because they are put under pressure in 
making better grades than their competitive peers do. However, again, as shown in the 
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aforementioned case of P and N, when students feel shame in the shady conduct before their 
valued friends, they would be less tempted to cheat without any supervision from the 
teacher. In a moral community, nobody wants to be a cheater and likes to have a friend who 
does cheat on tests or assignments.60 
To sum up, shame with regard to peer pressure has the power to establish, reinforce, 
or modify communal norms in two opposite directions, either morally constructive or 
harmful. Thus, in order to boost the overall level of moral culture in school, we cannot 
wholly leave the mission to students; rather, teacher’s proper guidance is urgently needed. 
Deliberative Moral Education 
Quite a number of the interview participants revealed their skepticism toward 
shaming, and several of them explicitly voiced their objections to shame-based education in 
particular. Amy said that shame-based discipline is ineffective. Because embarrassing 
students publicly, which is referred to as “kind of humiliation” such as calling out or 
standing out a kid in front of the rest of the class, is not appropriate or in handling child’s 
behavior problems. Similarly, Rebecca pointed out that putting child to shame as an 
educational tool, i.e. shaming punishment, is “counter-productive” in child development. 
Rebecca: If I am trying to insert power over my child because I have nothing else but 
other than to shame him then in time he is either going to reject me or he is going to 
always look for my approval or disapproval and again I just don’t see that they would 
be able to become self-reliant and self-assured.  
 
This is suggestive of Erik Erikson’s (1993) theory on development that children in early 
childhood may become overly dependent upon others, lack self-esteem, and feel shame or 
                                                
60 What is meant by the term ‘moral community’ here refers to a community of people 
who act morally or ethically in the normal sense. I do not intend to argue for different 
extensions of moral community such as ethical egoist or ethnocentric claim. 
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doubt in their own abilities when they are criticized, overly controlled, or not given full 
support.61 
Those matters are often related to an immensely conservative upbringing, rigid and 
repressive, that likely makes one take a passive attitude in decision making or establishing 
one’s values. Cassidy brought up the subject of cultural use of shame on children—teaching 
“certain things are evil, bad, and sins” in a very religious home. She viewed this as “a way 
of shaming for children to get them to behave in a certain way.” Shaming has been utilized 
as a technique of control for a long time; Older generations such as parents, teachers, and 
religious leaders used to use shaming to control the behavior and thoughts of their younger 
generations. Such sweeping use of shaming, which ignores learner’s development of 
independent and critical thinking, is what we must reject. The following comment is 
noteworthy in this regard. 
Frank: Real shaming [is] you are throwing them off the cliff but you have a rope, they 
are not going to actually hit the bottom you can pull them… It is difficult especially 
dealing with school kids… You can’t change people’s beliefs in one sitting about 
something that you perceive they did [something] wrong, but maybe they don’t 
perceive that it was wrong at all, or you want to let them know but they just take it as 
‘I am a bad person and this person hates me.’ 
 
                                                
61 Erik Erikson (1902-1994), a German psychoanalyst, developed his eight stages of 
development that are widely taught in psychology courses in the United States. 
According to his theory, every person must pass through a series of eight interrelated 
stages (Trust vs. Mistrust, Autonomy vs. Shame, Initiative vs. Guilt, Industry vs. 
Inferiority, Identity vs. Role Confusion, Intimacy vs. Isolation, Generativity vs. 
Stagnation, and Integrity vs. Despair), each with two possible outcomes, over the entire 
life cycle. Successful completion of each stage results in a healthy personality and 
successful interactions with others. Failure to successfully complete a stage can result in 
a reduced ability to complete further stages and therefore an unhealthy personality and 
sense of self. The second stage (the stage of Autonomy vs. Shame) occurs between 18 
months and 3 years. At this point, the child has an opportunity to build self-esteem and 
autonomy as s/he learns new skills and right from wrong. 
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This implies that the success or failure of shaming intended for educational purpose 
depends on how the shamed person would take it. Out of consideration of such a tricky 
issue, Chris articulated that teachers should handle carefully when they intend to give a 
good scolding as below. 
Chris: Sometimes I think I might be too hard on my students and then again I have to 
stop… this is going to help them but it is a thin line of choosing the words that I say 
depending on that student and how they are going to perceive it… I think sometimes 
it can be unintentional…in one of my classes they can be so loud and so I think 
sometimes when I come in and be like ‘you are being too loud.’ What if somebody 
walks by…and then directly speaking to a child and saying ‘you are being too loud.’ 
That is different because I am specifically pointing out that specific child whereas 
there might be other kids in the room who are also being loud so to me. I have to be 
careful of who I am calling out who is going to be my attention…there are some 
children that they are the same ones over and over causing that, and so I, based on, 
you know, just my experience with them I think I tend to call them out directly…I 
have to be careful not to be just shaming that child because of their usual behavior. 
 
The above passage suggests there is a fine line between education and miseducation when 
shaming is used or happened. While an unprepared or poorly designed shaming results in 
miseducation, it is thinkable that carefully planned approach such as the process of 
deliberative moral education can yield positive outcomes in student guidance. A well-timed 
and appropriate intervention is educational necessity. Practically, teachers should weigh 
whether to discipline or punish with deliberation.  
Deliberation entails “mindful, unhurried contemplation” (Collins and O’Brien 2011, 
132). As Aristotle explains in the Nicomachean Ethics, deliberation is “systematic rational 
calculation about how to achieve the end” (1112b15) and “good deliberation requires 
reason” (1142b10).62 Applying such Aristotelian conception of deliberation to teacher’s 
intervention, shame-eliciting reproach should not be the end itself but be finely and 
                                                
62 Translated by Terence Irwin (1999), p. 35 and p. 322. 
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thoughtfully designed with a valid reason and carried out by the right person at the right 
time. In other words, “the intention to reproach must be exercised with a light hand so as to 
avoid destructive possibilities of shaming” (Tansey 2008, 296). 
On the other hand, Anne argued that pointing out to a certain student who was doing 
something else in class by saying “what we are talking about on that page?” is not 
necessarily a mean thing but rather “checking” as part of “classroom management.” Anne 
continued to say that she did not treat her students in a disrespectful way and that “if you 
have good relationship with the students they would know you’re doing for their best 
interest” even though “for sensitive students it could be shaming.” From this, we can see 
that trust-building is the key to student guidance when it comes to shame-eliciting 
intervention. As such, Chris and Anne believed that a deliberative treatment by teacher is 
imperative. They recognized their responsibility as a “moral educator,” which creates a 
healthy and friendly classroom environment where students care about each other. 
When Chris heard that “low group class is the stupid class” from one of her students 
from the high group, she took the student aside and admonished, “I am really disappointed 
that you said that.” Because she did not want to see that happen again—looking down on 
others between her students.  
Chris: Once I pointed that out it, just suddenly he realized that was wrong and tear up 
and he was like I am so sorry. I said “…because you have done this one thing, I am 
going to push you to try to do ten things positive with those people…to make up for 
it.” …Whenever you sit down and have a conversation about it they tend to reflect, 
and I think reflections are a big deal with morality when they have time to process 
and they are not in the moment of something then, yes, I think they have become 
emotional. I have had kids that have wanted to write letters of apology, and that is 
huge… I am ashamed because I am being lazy, then he might not actually push 
himself to actually do the work on his own. There are so many of my students that I 
have to sometimes make them identify with a sense of shame to motivate them to 
push themselves to succeed, if that makes sense. 
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It was a teachable moment to Chris, and thus her prompt response to the student’s use of 
improper language was necessary. It was her deliberated treatment considering “the 
repercussions that was going to have on those students that he was saying about,” as Chris 
put it. As Chris was worried, due to his remark that might foster conflict between students, 
if her students lose the culture in which “they want to reach out to another student.” Thus, 
one may say that Chris’s instant and direct action was timely and necessary. Viewed in this 
light, this is a shame-eliciting educational treatment, which was well-meant to impress 
teacher’s moral expectation on students. Therefore, shame worked for improving one’s 
sensitivity to change oneself guiding moral action in this process. 
Chapter Summary 
So far, throughout this chapter, we have seen in the Oklahoma City metro area 1) 
how moral education is conducted, 2) how shame is conceived by education practitioners, 
and 3) how shame is treated for the practice of moral education. Various ideas and episodes 
emerged from the interviews showing that shame has a lot to do with moral education, 
whether positively or negatively. The practitioners’ talks over the topic of shame were 
sometimes in accord with the mainstream psychological analysis of shame, which we have 
discussed in Chapter 3. For example, their remarks often reflected the debate on moral 
quality of shame compared with guilt that has been addressed in much of contemporary 
academia. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that a few interviewees perceived 
shame more broadly and less negatively. There is a massive range and diversity in moral 
education in the U.S. school system. Thus, the results of this case study cannot be easily 
generalized to the overall characteristics of U.S. moral education in relation to the 
conception of shame and shame-related issues. In addition, a qualitative analysis based on 
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interviews is always limited to the perspectives of the interviewees and to certain areas, in 
that the interview participants who self-selected to participate might have felt very strongly 
about the topic. Nonetheless, their opinions and lived experiences as education practitioners 
would be suggestive of what may be commonly seen about how different ideas and 
practices concerning shame are treated in moral education in the American K-12 school 
setting.  
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
The cultural contexts of South Korea and the United States are different in many 
ways. Descriptions of shame in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 show that shame differs in 
interpretation depending on context. Hence, while shame is of great value in terms of moral 
development in Korean education, it seems to be one of the least socially acceptable 
emotions in the U.S. educational context. It follows that shame can be perceived and 
interpreted differently according to dissimilar socio-cultural constructs between the two 
societies. And discussed within the previous chapters, shame deeply involves the self and 
the relationship between the self and others, so differences in the conceptions of the self and 
others may be closely linked to the dissimilar meaning of shame and differential shame 
experience by culture. 
Most contemporary Koreans do not think of shame in a negative light, as people in 
ancient Greece and China did not. In the east Asian context, shame has been valued and 
encouraged because there is a direct association between having a sense of shame and 
cultivating one’s character, which is based on Confucian ethics. According to the traditional 
Confucian idea of self-cultivation (xiushen 修身) through relationships in the community 
that is an extension of the self, a person without self-cultivation is considered a shameless 
person.63 In effect, having a sense of shame or feeling shame can be vital for developing 
virtue within this Confucian outlook. The same holds true for Koreans: to be able to feel 
shame or have the sense of shame is to be able to reflect on one’s humanity through self-
                                                
63 Self-cultivation is a prominent concept throughout different Chinese traditions, 
including Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. For further information, see 
Ivanhoe’s (2000) book in which introduces the seven Confucian thinkers and their 
respective theories of self-cultivation. 
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cultivation in relationships (Hong 2009). This philosophical history explains why the 
Korean moral education curriculum covers the subject of moral shame by quoting some 
Confucian texts. 
This attitude towards shame in Korean society is a striking contrast from the 
American attitude of shame as taboo. Shame is far less present in daily communication in 
contemporary U.S. society. This may concern with the general indifference to what it means 
to have a sense of shame. Furthermore, in American school settings, there may be even 
intentional educational efforts to eliminate discussions on shameful acts of the past via an 
erasure of histories of marginalized others (Zembylas 2008).64 On the other hand, as a 
survival strategy for the individuals who are vulnerable to be ashamed and so suffer from 
shaming or stereotyping, such as poor immigrants, a prevalent social norm in the U.S. urges 
people to ignore or deny their feelings of shame.  
As Thomas Scheff (2003) pointed out, the functions of shame are still retained in 
both social interaction and identity formation (cited in Holodynski and Kronast 2009, 372). 
That is, shame still plays an important role in American social interaction, notwithstanding 
being hidden behind the culture. This influence of shame was found by some American 
practitioners’ discussions including their teaching and subjective experiences in the school 
context, which we have seen in Chapter 5. 
When it comes to shame in educational practices, with particular emphasis on the 
role of shame in moral education at K-12 level, there are both similarities and differences 
                                                
64 For instance, in Oklahoma, the ‘Tulsa Race Riot (1921)’ was once taboo discussion 
and thus any references to the riot would have been hard to find in Oklahoma history 
textbooks. Now it is included in the state’s academic standards for Oklahoma and U.S. 
history but the standards contain no mention of how should be taught. 
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between the Korean context and the American context. South Korea and the United States 
are dissimilar in cultural tradition and social composition. South Korea is among the 
world’s most ethnically homogeneous nations, with an absolute majority of the Korean 
ethnicity that accounts for approximately 96% of the total population. Korean culture 
traditionally places a lot of value on interdependence, and thus Korean people have a 
relatively strong sense of community. Confucianism has had far-reaching effects on Korean 
society at large, although currently Buddhism and Christianity function importantly as 
major religions. On the other hand, in the United States the population is pluralistic in its 
ethnic origins, with a higher percentage of people descended from Western European 
countries. Accordingly, the majority of Americans recognize the Judeo-Christian religion as 
their cultural heritage. Historically, “there is a strong thread of libertarianism, an 
interpretation of democracy that emphasizes individual liberty and freedom” and thus it is 
safe to say the U.S. culture is basically individualistic (Covaleskie 2013, 120). 
The two societies might seem to have little in common, but in truth, both face 
numerous matters concerning shame in the context of moral education. No matter how 
shame is conceptualized in different ways, in both societies there is some uncertainty about 
how shame should be understood and treated in the K-12 school setting and how public 
moral education should play a role in this. This is because shame operates powerfully on 
social norms and climate as well as individual psychology and behavior, as we discussed in 
the previous chapters. In this chapter, after an examination of the cultural differences in 
shame concepts and approaches to moral education, a synthetic discussion surrounding 
shame/shaming as something that moral education might encourage or discourage across 
cultures will follow. 
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Differences 
Cultural Differences in the Experience of Shame 
Francis Inki Ha (1995) argued that differences in cultural attitudes about shame, 
recognition and awareness of shame, and values concerning relationships might partially 
account for cultural differences in the experience of shame.65 
People from shame cultures such as that of Japan are reckoned to be more prone to 
shame, as Benedict suggested that shame is more “deeply felt” in shame cultures (1946, 
224). However, we can think differently. Japanese people may not feel more shame or feel 
it longer; they may just be more aware of their shame. Research on proneness to shame and 
guilt indicates that Asian Americans, rather than being more shame-prone, may be more 
explicitly aware of shame experiences than African Americans or Whites (Tangney 1990). 
There is further empirical evidence to support this conjecture: about the Asian Americans’ 
greater awareness of shame, the study by Marsella, Murray, and Golden’s (1974) showed 
that shame is less clearly identifiable to Caucasian Americans, and that Asian Americans 
might learn to perceive more accurately their mental state in shame-inducing situations. In 
the same vein, a cross-cultural research suggests that Chinese are more concerned and 
aware of the feeling of shame than Americans (Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz 1992). In 
summary, Americans may be feeling shame but not have the interpretive framework to be 
explicitly and consciously aware of it. 
When it comes to the experience of shame, cultural beliefs and attitudes about 
shame is another important factor. In Western societies, shame seems to be the least socially 
                                                
65 The subsequent discussion in this subsection owes a great deal to Ha’s (1995) 
“Shame in Asian and Western cultures.” 
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acceptable emotion, and this tendency may incite members to repress feelings of shame 
(Scheff 1990). In addition, shame may not receive enough attention and cultural 
recognition, in that shame is not much discussed about in Western cultures (Frijda and 
Mesquita 1994). By contrast, shame certainly looks more acceptable in Asian cultures; to 
put it more precisely, since shame is close to the concept of modesty, it is virtuous to feel 
shame timely in an appropriate manner.  
Next, the differences in values concerning social relationships and relational bonds 
between Asian and Western cultures may explain the cultural differences in the experience 
of shame. It has been suggested that shame has some connection with approval or respect 
(e.g. Hui and Triandis 1986; Frijda and Mesquita 1994), yet we should pay more attention 
that one’s experience of shame can depend on one’s social standing: “For a status superior, 
shame is felt when not enough respect/honor is given. For a status inferior, shame is felt 
when acceptance/approval is not given” in Asian cultures (Ha 1995, 1117-1118). It has also 
been said that there is a greater concern for the relational bond in Asian cultures. The 
dimension of individualism/collectivism is commonly used to describe different forms of 
social ties in this regard. According to Geert Hofstede (1984), who initially conceptualized 
the individualism/collectivism dimension, while individualistic cultures such as the United 
States, Canada, and Western European countries emphasize autonomy, emotional 
independence, self-fulfillment, and “I” consciousness, collectivistic cultures such as Asian, 
African, and Latin American countries emphasize collective identity, emotional 
dependence, group solidarity, and “we” consciousness. Even though there is lack of 
empirical data to verify how much different interactional patterns relates to cultural 
differences in the experience of shame, it may be provisionally accepted that the greater 
119 
concern for relational bonds, the more heightened awareness of shame (Ha 1995, 1119). In 
short, the experience of shame is influenced by the attitudes and values a culture has about 
relationships. 
Confucianism and the Concept of Shame in Korea 
It is no exaggeration to say that the differing treatment of shame between S. Korea 
and the U.S. springs from different thoughts on education and morality upon which each 
society was founded. The biggest difference would be that Confucianism has deeply 
influenced Korean society at large. Confucianism has long been the dominant ideology in 
Korea, especially since Choseon dynasty (1392-1910) officially adopted it in the form 
referred to now as Neo-Confucianism.66 Confucian values are now gradually weakening in 
contemporary Korean society and no longer completely dominate Korean political and 
social life. Yet many Korean people continue to adhere to Confucian values and practices in 
their everyday lives, as Kohls (2001) remarked that “anyone who wants to study 
Confucianism in daily life today would be well advised to go not to China or Japan, but to 
South Korea, where Confucianism is still very much alive” (38). 
Korean moral education is no exception to this influence, in that Confucian 
principles and ethical codes have been by far the most influential among all the 
philosophical roots of Korean culture. First of all, in the Confucian tradition the self is not 
an isolable individuality but is a center of relationships, and this human relatedness is best 
explained by the following description of five cardinal relationships: “There should be 
affection between parents and children; righteousness between sovereign and minister; 
                                                
66 Korean society was thoroughly and systematically ‘Confucianized’ in that period, so 
the former Goryeo dynasty’s Buddhist-oriented structure and indigenous Korean way of 
life were intentionally replaced by Confucian doctrine. 
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attention to their separate functions between husband and wife; a proper order between old 
and young; fidelity between friends” (Mencius 3A.4). The violation of these five morals is 
considered the most shameful behavior within the Confucian framework. Likewise, the 
major forms of shame in traditional Korean society arose from the violation of the rules and 
meanings rooted in the principles. Korean parents still teach their children to treat seniors 
with respect, and they feel shame when their children do not express proper respect for 
seniors because of their failure to provide adequate moral education as well as their 
children’s violation of the principle of a proper order between young and old. In other 
words, Koreans are likely to feel shame when their family members do something wrong 
(Yang and Rosenblatt 2001, 367). 
Second of all, from the Confucian perspective learning is essentially the process of 
broadening the self. To learn is to be sensitive to an ‘ever-expanding network’ of 
relationships. This represents the Confucian emphasis on human interrelatedness and proper 
human relationships, which led to reverence and affection for others, harmony, and proper 
order in family and society. For example, a woman’s self-identification of being a daughter, 
sister, wife, mother, friend, or coworker dominates her awareness of herself as a self-reliant 
and independent person. In this way, “symbiosis of selfhood and otherness” is entailed in is 
the Confucian conception of the self (Tu 1985, 113). This relationship network is well 
depicted by a series of concentric circles, from the self, family, community, country, to 
world, which corresponds to the way of great learning:  
When things are investigated, knowledge is extended. When knowledge is 
extended, the will becomes sincere. When the will is sincere, the heart-mind is 
correct. When the heart-mind is correct, the self is cultivated. When the self is 
cultivated, the clan is harmonized. When the clan is harmonized, the country is well 
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governed. When the country is well governed, there will be peace throughout the 
land. (Great Learning 1, emphasis mine)67  
 
In this way, character building or personality development is realized through interaction 
between the self and the surrounding environment. This process of continuously 
communicating with an ever-expanding network of human relationships enables the self to 
embody an increasingly widening circle of inclusiveness in its own sensitivity. And 
sensitivity, an inner quality of the heart-mind, is neither private nor individualistic but 
communal (Tu 1994, 183-184). The heart-mind (xin 心), which is the defining feature of 
being human and serves as our fundamental spiritual and moral resource within the 
framework of Confucianism, provides theoretical and practical foundations of (moral) self-
cultivation.68  
In a word, the gist of Confucian education is self-cultivation. Since this project of 
self-cultivation begins with nurturing the moral heart-mind, emotion or sensitivity is 
emphasized in Confucian morality. An active form of engagement with the heart-mind is 
material to self-cultivation, as follows: “When heart-mind is not present, we look but do not 
see; we hear but do not understand; we eat but do not know the taste of what we eat. This is 
what is meant by saying that the cultivation of the person depends on the rectifying of the 
heart-mind” (Great Learning 7).69 Hence, Confucian moral education aims at sustaining 
                                                
67 Translated by James Legge. Retrieved from http://ctext.org/liji/da-xue. 
68 The Chinese character xin is best translated as ‘heart-mind,’ which is the term 
blurring the distinction between heart and mind, i.e. feeling and thinking. It is regarded 
as the site of both cognitive and affective activities in Confucian ethics that underscores 
feeling as the basis for knowing, willing, and judging. For futher information, see Tu 
Wei-ming’s discussion on the heart-mind (1989, 1994). 
69 Translated by James Legge, Retrieved from http://ctext.org/liji/da-xue. 
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and nurturing the moral heart-mind, i.e. developing moral emotions and moral sensitivity. 
Following this tradition, in Korea it is highly valued and encouraged to improve one’s own 
heart-mind up to the socio-culturally idealized level (Hong 2009, 140). When looking into 
the current Korean nation-wide moral education curriculum, I found that a substantial 
portion of content uses Confucianism as a conceptual framework.70 The importance of 
emotion and sensitivity that Confucian ethics emphasizes is woven into the content area. 
Especially, shame-related content is dotted with the Confucian ethical ideas, as we have 
seen in Chapter 4.  
Social characteristics about shame in the Confucian tradition, as previously stated, 
are also found in Korean society. Shame is still an acceptable and well-recognized concept 
in contemporary Korea. Koreans are well aware of shame-inducing situations and sensitive 
to their experiences of shame. Therefore, Koreans can talk in complex ways about the 
functions and meanings of shame. In addition, Korea remains largely a collectivistic culture, 
and the Korean concept of the self is relational and contextual, thus social respect/approval 
and relational bonds are influential in relationships.71 In this sense, Riwha Hong (2009) 
proposed, “Korean patterns of shame must be explored on the basis of the specific nature 
                                                
70 This does not mean Confucianism is only emphasized in the Korean moral education. 
Different traditional ideas such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Korean indigenous 
shamanism and western theories such as Greek philosophies and Christian ethics are 
neutrally covered throughout the curriculum. Yet, in percentage and intensity, content 
regarding Confucian teaching has been central to moral instruction in secondary school. 
71 This aspect is clearly revealed through Koreans’ language habits. Korean native 
speakers prefer using the plural first person pronouns in the conversation. For example, 
in expressing ‘my family’ Korean use naturally the plural possession ‘our family.’ The 
most common plural first person pronoun is 우리 (pronounced as “woori” and translated 
as “Korean we-ness”). According to Cha (1994), the continuous and frequent use of this 
word among Koreans is an indication that collectivism is strong in Korean society. 
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and content of Korean collectivism and specific aspects of the Korean interdependent self” 
(83). The characteristics of Korean society are germane to the hallmarks of the Korean 
sense of shame. Shame in Korea is experienced individually and socially by way of 
cultivating one’s moral sensitivity and maintaining social harmony. 
Approaches to Moral Education 
Currently both South Korea and the U.S. have a secular public education system 
based on the principle of separation between religion and state. However, the two countries 
show a marked difference in approaches and attitudes to moral education. Unlike Korea, the 
U.S. has not fully developed a standardized curriculum or stand-alone course for moral 
schooling. This is highly related to American politics and values. First, as the responsibility 
for education rests with each state, the education system in the U.S. is much less 
centralized, but rather localized and independent. Second, as LePage and Sockett (2002) 
indicate, in the U.S., there are many different opinions on what it means to be moral, and 
thus it is hard to reach an agreement on how to deliver public moral education. Because 
some people equate morality with a certain type of conservative Christianity, many other 
people are concerned about using the terms ‘moral’ or ‘morality,’ and thus consider that 
moral education in itself has some problematic religious overtones. In addition, it is often 
believed that morals are relative, so that finding a shared sense of direction towards moral 
education is no easy matter (cited in LePage et al. 2011, 367-368). 
When looking into the degree of detail with which national values are expressed or 
prescribed in education legislation across countries, according to Le Métais’s (1997) 
framework, while the U.S. is categorized in the group in which references to national values 
are minimal in education legislation, Korea belongs to the countries with highly centralized 
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systems that express detailed aims and clear educational and social values. Korea, one of 
the countries with a ‘values-explicit’ approach, is much clearer than those countries from a 
‘values-neutral’ tradition such as the U.S. as to the aims and goals of education and 
therefore the role of schools, teachers, and the curriculum (Kerr 1999, 10). 
According to David Kerr (1999) who classifies Korean moral education as a kind of 
citizenship education in a global sense, there are three main curriculum approaches to 
citizenship education—separate, integrated, and cross-curricular. When applying this 
categorization to the moral education, both Korea and the U.S. adopt a mixed approach. In 
the Korean school system, separate and specialized moral education as a specific subject is 
provided in the primary and lower secondary curriculum whereas moral education at the 
upper secondary level is integrated with social studies. In the U.S. school system, moral 
education is largely cross-curricular; it permeates the entire curriculum and linked to other 
subjects such as social studies or other curricular areas such as character education. This 
corresponds with a classroom observation analysis by Jackson, Boostrom, and Hansen 
(1998) or Sizer and Sizer (2000) that moral lessons are less likely to be realized within 
regular curriculum in the U.S. In other words, moral instruction is often diffused into other 
courses, and school rituals and ceremonies, regardless of the subject matter or even of 
purpose. 
Despite the fact that the integrated approach to moral education is found in both 
South Korea and the U.S., the two countries differ considerably in terms of statutory/non-
statutory provision. Moral education is a statutory part of the core national curriculum in 
Korea, while in the U.S. it is non-statutory, with greater freedom left to states, districts, 
schools and teachers. Hence, the style of moral education tends to be much more rigid and 
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explicit in Korean schools than American schools. Korean teachers must operate moral 
education based on the given national curriculum and prescribed textbooks. This often 
causes their instruction to be content-led, knowledge-based, and utilizing didactic teaching. 
Yet, this difference in the form of moral education between the two countries does 
not mean that moral schooling only happens in Korean education system. Moral education 
does happen in the U.S. school setting because its scope is beyond formal curriculum. 
Therefore, it must be understood that the different forms of moral education, according to 
whether it is statutory or not, leads to different way of operating moral instruction and 
approaching moral education in general. 
There is little comparative research on the differences in attitude towards moral 
education between Korea and the U.S., so alternately we need to look at LePage and her 
colleagues’ (2011) study, which compared how school teachers in Turkey and in California 
defined morality, taught moral lessons, and encouraged moral development in children. 
Many American teachers defined morality not only as knowing right from wrong, but also 
were inclined to associate morality with moral decision making and respecting differences. 
On other hand, the Turkish teachers emphasized virtues and social values when they 
defined morality. This difference in teachers’ views on morality suggests that morality is 
more personal and culturally relativistic to the U.S. teachers whereas it is tied with social 
and national values to the Turkish teachers. Meanwhile, teachers from both countries 
believed morality could be taught, and thus both agreed that teaching morality is part of the 
schools’ responsibility. However, they held differing opinions towards explicitly teaching 
about morality. While the Turkish teachers were more likely to think morality should be 
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taught as a stand-alone topic, many American teachers thought morality should not be 
taught separately.72 
Surprisingly, these results are identical to the findings from my interviews with 
teachers in an urban area of South Central United States and from my content analysis of 
Korean textbooks for moral education. In addition, judging from my experience in South 
Korea, Korean teachers generally would agree with the following statements regarding 
moral education: 1) Morality and social values are closely connected. 2) Morality can be 
taught in the school system. 3) Teachers are responsible for teaching moral values as well as 
their own subject matter. 4) Moral values can be taught separately through a specialized 
course. We can conjecture that these ideas that many teachers (and other adults) in Korea 
hold could help support public moral education under the national curriculum compulsory 
in K-12 school system or vice versa.73  
When narrowing down to the topic of shame, for Koreans shame has its moral 
value, and thus the moral sense of shame as educational content should be learned by 
oneself or with some adult assistance. This understanding may develop into the social 
mechanism of shame in Korean culture, as seen below: 
Korean parents teach their children about shame partly through comparison with 
other children and partly through expression of criticism or concern in various 
situations. Children learn what the norms are, the unpleasant aspects of shame, 
etiquette surrounding shame, and how to avoid shame… Parents are willing to 
make their children fit in with the majority through the use of shame… Teachers use 
                                                
72 The content in this paragraph is based on a brief summary of LePage et al.’s (2011) 
“Comparing teachers’ views on morality and moral education, a comparative study in 
Turkey and the United States.” 
73 I can only guess the correlation between the implementation of Korean moral 
schooling and the general attitude of Koreans toward moral education, yet, I am unable 
to answer about the causal relationship between them because it is a chicken and egg 
problem. 
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shame as an effective mechanism for controlling children… It is powerful both to 
the child who is shamed and to children who witness it. (Yang and Rosenblatt 2001, 
369) 
 
The above depiction of the role and function of shame in Korean society, which represents 
Korea fifteen years ago, applies to some extent to the case of shame/shaming being utilized 
as a tool for self-discipline punishment in both Korean and American educational settings 
today. This turns our attention to a more general pedagogical concern about how moral 
education should treat shame in this era of globalization. 
Pedagogical Concerns  
The Dynamics between Shame and Shaming 
Shame is a thorny, contentious issue in education, especially in the United States, in 
that it is conceptually diversified and practically intersubjective and so interpreted in 
various ways. Assuming that conscience associated with shame is always shaped in an 
appropriate way, shame is morally desirable and educationally recommendable when it 
refers to a mature ‘sense of shame’ that marks moral sensitivity and modesty, the same as in 
the Greek term ‘aidos’ and the Confucian term ‘chi or xiu.’ Shame is morally neutral when 
it denotes the ‘feeling of shame’ that is personal and subjective. Shame is morally 
questionable and problematic when it means other-inflicted shaming, i.e. the use of shame-
based criticisms that harmfully humiliate victims. A sense of shame is essentially 
independent, and shaming is dependent on others by definition, and thus the feeling of 
shame (being ashamed, felt shame) can be self-oriented or other-oriented depending on 
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personal dispositions and the context of particular cases. In this way, these different forms 
of shame are mixed up in practice.74 
To put it simply, in order to become an autonomous moral agent, we must develop 
an internal sense of shame but also become free from others’ shaming. This is a common 
educational idea about shame held by those who value the moral sense of shame, such as 
Aristotelians, Confucians, some moral philosophers, and perhaps Korean moral education 
curriculum developers. Yet, admittedly, this ideal is a near impossibility in a context in 
which inequalities and injustices exist. We need to look at the dynamics between shame-
feeling and shaming in this regard (See Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. The Dynamics between Shame and Shaming75 
 
                                                
74 Throughout the literature review (in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), we have discussed 
about conceptual confusion surrounding shame. 














In the figure, shaming goes on the horizontal axis and shame-feeling goes on the vertical 
axis on the assumption that shame-feeling can be caused by shaming.76 Imagine a situation 
in which racial or ethnic criticism has been expressed. For example, Quadrant I would 
indicate a case in which a Korean American in the U.S. tends to feel ashamed of being 
Asian when she is racially taunted and harassed by her classmates, which is similar to the 
case of Jin-Hee who struggles with her racial identity (as in p. 78). On the other hand, 
Quadrant IV would indicate a case in which an act of shaming or cultural stereotyping 
based on race or ethnicity does not make the shamed minorities feel ashamed, which is 
found in the case of Jung-Hyun who is proud of his multicultural background (as in p. 81). 
Quadrant I and Quadrant IV show the most likely situations across cultures. From 
the educational point of view, it is suggested for the shamed to ignore acts of shaming and 
repress their feeling of shame. This strategy for marginalized people is more popular in the 
American context where shaming issues are mostly tangled with social injustice, but it is 
not the fundamental solution for the problem. Similarly, in the sexist or heterosexist society, 
women and sexual minorities may be encouraged to disregard acts of shaming by resisting 
being ashamed. 
Now let’s assume the case of no act of shaming (i.e. no societal-induced shame), 
which may be realized in a perfectly egalitarian society. Quadrant II would indicate that 
shame is felt subjectively but there is no evidence of the imposition of shame. This situation 
can have two different interpretations. Imagine there is an unemployed Ph.D. who accepted 
                                                
76 Mathematically, the dependent variable goes on the horizontal axis (called x-axis) 
whereas the independent variable goes on the vertical axis (called y-axis). However, 
since shaming does not necessarily cause shame-feeling, in this figure, note that shame-
feeling is not meant to be the dependent variable. 
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his temporary job as a donut shop cashier. He may feel ashamed of the depressing job even 
though shame is not inflicted directly by others.77 On the other hand, when shame is 
interpreted as a sense of shame based on the Confucian perspective, this type of shame 
should be present in everyone’s heart-mind in that it basically emerges from self-
recognition of one’s deficiencies. Viewed in this light, the case in the Quadrant III (no 
shaming and no shame felt) is considered as a virtual impossibility for most ordinary people 
who cannot fulfill a perfect realization.78  
As shame is primarily conceived as a ‘sense of shame’ in Korean society, while 
discovering and developing sense of shame is the focal point for the Korean moral 
education curriculum, there is lack of consideration of different conditions that may lead 
one to ‘being ashamed’ and to marginalized groups who are more likely to be shamed 
against their will.79 In Korea, shame in the second dimension (being ashamed) occurs 
disproportionately more often in women and social minorities. In other words, there are 
important differences between men and women and between the mainstream and minorities 
in what feels and is treated as shameful. Gender-biased norms have been more negatively 
applied to women, and the norm of similarity have been more valued than diversity in 
Korean society. In fact, according to the results from an extensive cross-cultural research 
                                                
77 This case suggests that implicit shaming at a society level can exist without particular 
acts of shaming. 
78 Confucian remarked “from seventy I could give my heart-mind free rein without 
overstepping the boundaries” (Analects 2.4). When Confucius reached seventy, 
eventually he became happy to the utmost degree and perfectly moral even without 
consciously thinking about whether an action is moral, as he had already internalized 
moral principles. It seems to be the case that he no longer felt any shame. 
79 This is based on my personal and professional experiences in South Korea. I learned 
moral education throughout my K-12 and taught Morals subject in middle school. 
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which investigates the cultural differences between 62 countries, Korea ranks significantly 
lower in gender egalitarianism and significantly higher in in-group collectivism (House et 
al. 2004).  
From my findings via Korean Morals textbook content analysis, although racism 
that makes social minorities ashamed or discrimination against foreigners is partly dealt 
with, issues surrounding gender discrimination or the oppressive nature of shame for 
women are barely addressed through official moral education.80 This situation is the 
opposite of the U.S. education. The focus on moral education in American context is 
minimizing harmful effect of ‘being ashamed’ and eliminating shameful situations rather 
than emphasizing the moral value of a ‘sense of shame,’ as we have seen from the 
practitioners’ answers at the interviews in Chapter 5. 
The Use of Shame for Educational Purposes 
Although an antithesis between Eastern society as shame culture versus Western 
society as guilt culture has proven inadequate, it is also acknowledged that shame has been 
an important concept in Asian cultural areas and that community-based shaming has been 
perceived as acceptable to Asian people to the extent that it comes from people’s good 
intentions. In Korean society, people generally locate shame within the moral domain, and 
thus they believe that a basic sense of shame should be promoted at a very young age in the 
process of learning right and wrong and that a shameless child should not be left untreated. 
This observation surrounding shame and moral education is not something that happens 
normally in the U.S. context, yet it is not the case that the use of shame in parenting does 
                                                
80 A more detailed discussion on the oppressive nature of shame for women is found in 
my proceedings work. See You’s (2013) “Women’s Shame as Oppression.”  
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not occur at all. American caregivers also utilize shaming for educational purposes so that a 
child should not be spoiled. 
Of course, there is a lot of concern about shaming when it is used as an educational 
tool.81 Opponents of the use of shame usually claim that shaming is horrific and ineffective 
parenting on the grounds that shame hampers the growth of self-esteem.82 However, as 
Julia Steiny (2014) points out, if we disagree fundamentally with any bad feelings, children 
would not learn to “take responsibility or be accountable to their peers, parents and 
community.” It is loosely permissible to use shaming to keep children on the right track, as 
a last resort. We may use shame in an educative form to correct errors when necessary. If 
your child or student took to Twitter to fat-shame her classmate, what is the best way to 
respond? The goal of educationally appropriate shaming is to help the shamed to internalize 
desirable behaviors and right ideas. It is the responsibility of adults to encourage children 
feel ashamed of their wrong doings, when their jokes or comments hurt the other person. In 
this sense, we do not want to let our children become shameless. As Martha Nussbaum puts 
it, “The person who is utterly shame-free is not a good friend, lover, or citizen, and there are 
instances in which the invitation to feel shame is a good thing” (2004, 216).  
                                                
81 Now a sort of public shaming is spreading to social media. As the Internet becomes a 
public arena, online shaming is often utilized, but I have doubts about whether it can be 
educationally justified. There are many different issues that are problematic regarding 
online shaming discussed in Jon Ronson’s (2015) book, So You've Been Publicly 
Shamed. As Diana Kwon (2016) indicated, public shaming on social media is a 
powerful punishment, but it risks making the wrongdoer defensive rather than 
repentant. 
82 This is a common response from the psychological perspective, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3. 
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In addition, John Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of shaming is helpful to discuss about 
how and when the use of educative shaming can work properly. According to Braithwaite, 
there are two different types of shaming: i) shaming that is stigmatizing called 
‘disintegrative shaming’ and ii) shaming that is followed by reintegration called 
‘reintegrative shaming.’ The difference between disintegrative shaming and reintegrative 
shaming is not in the degree of the shaming, but in its aim and in the processes that follow. 
While disintegrative shaming makes no effort “to reconcile the offender with the 
community” by creating a permanent stigma on the offender, reintegrative shaming is 
followed by efforts to “reintegrate the offender back into the community of law-abiding or 
respectable citizens through words or gestures of forgiveness or ceremonies to decertify the 
offender as deviant” (Braithwaite 1989, 100–101). In short, disintegrative shaming 
emphasizes the evil of the actor, and reintegrative shaming acknowledges the act as an evil 
thing, done by a person who is not inherently evil. Shaming that is stigmatizing and 
disintegrative occurs when the actor who does something evil is denounced as unworthy of 
the community.83  
On the other hand, parents would not typically deliberately shame their beloved 
children to drive them out of the house, town, or society of which they belong. Rather, the 
intent inherent in using shame is to reintegrate the children back into family and the 
community by encouraging them to become more mature and responsible members. Under 
this scheme of reintegrative shaming, the shamers are supposed to forgive the shamed, and 
                                                
83 We can say ‘Name and Shame’ campaign, which seeks to publish the names, 
photographs and offending histories of sex offenders, is a humiliating penalty rather 
than a shaming penalty. This is because such a contemporary “scarlet letter” measure 
gives no thought for rehabilitating; it is based on the idea that sex offenders ought to be 
banished and shunned from the community (McAlinden, 2013). 
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the shamed have the opportunity to apologize and return to the community. As such, the 
educative impact of shaming depends on the way shaming is delivered. Shaming must be 
offered in a reintegrative way while maintaining bonds of respect between the shamer and 
the shamed. If not, it is counterproductive and can be a vicious attack. This is because, 
without building good relationships, shame-based punishments may compel children not to 
trust their parents and to devalue themselves (Sixbear 2012). This recalls Anne’s (an 
interviewee) comment that trust-building is the key to student guidance (as in p. 105). We 
should give much thought to the aim of moral education through the use of shame. It does 
not originally have the intention of excluding the shamed. The main concern of educative 
shaming is to help the shamed to improve personal morality as well as prosocial disposition. 
Yet, as Nussbaum (2004) indicated, shame often engenders problems of negative 
stereotyping or stigmatization of a deviant group, as seen in all kinds of vicious shaming 
such as slut-shaming, race-shaming, or poverty-shaming. This is because shame is 
intertwined with the moral values or standards of a given culture. As John Covaleskie 
(2013) points out, we cannot ignore the social context in which defines what is “shameful” 
or “shame-worthy,” and thus the criteria concerning shame/shaming can be unfavorable to 
certain groups of people who are not the mainstream or likely to be marginalized. If a 
particular race is believed to be shameful or shame-worthy, the act of race-shaming would 
not be challenged, and internalized shame based on racial identity would not be viewed as 
problematic. However, if we all agree that racism is shameful and race-shaming is shame-
worthy, it can be acceptable to name a person as “racist” under the expectation that the 
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shamed person will change her mind and correct behavior (Covaleskie 2013, x-xi).84 As 
such, the definition of shame and the acceptable levels of utilizing shame in society have 
relevance to the society’s conditions and trends in public perception. 
Shame works differently from culture to culture and generation and generation. A 
high school student in one culture can be ashamed after losing her virginity, while in 
another culture, she may feel shame if she is still a virgin (Lee 1999, 182). Both South 
Korea and the United States are faced with a generation gap revolving around shame. Older 
generations in both societies may lament that young people have no sense of shame. There 
was an article that laments becoming a shameless society: “The loss of shame threatens our 
survival as a civilized society. For most of the acts we are ashamed of are not punishable by 
law, and civilized living depends upon the observance of unenforceable rules” (Hoffer 
1974). Likewise, “a young Korean woman may feel proud of having many boyfriends, 
while her mother would have felt ashamed to have many boyfriend” (Yang and Rosenblatt 
2001, 368). These examples show that descriptively different cultures may have different 
                                                
84 There was a case that public shaming towards the perpetrators of racism was not 
primarily intended to straighten out the shamed. Responding to The University of 
Oklahoma (OU) Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) racism incident that occurred on March 7, 
2015, the OU President David Boren issued his statement that is full of moral 
condemnation of the SAE members and expelled two of its leaders. According to 
Covaleskie (2016), “this is an example of public shaming where the purpose is the 
moral formation of the rest of the university community, not the individuals guilty of the 
offense” (Italics in original). It can be also called ‘bystander effect.’ As Boren’s public 
shaming was not for the shamed (or Boren might not have considered how to educate 
the perpetrators to accept them again to the university community because they were 
already not real members of the university community in his mind), his shaming was 
basically disintegrative. Yet, I would say it played the morally educative role of the OU 
community in terms of speaking out against racism and articulating any racist behaviors 
are intolerable, inacceptable, and shameful. 
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criteria used for defining what is shameful or shame-worthy and that standards surrounding 
shame for one generation may not be applicable for another generation in the same culture. 
By all accounts, the use of shame for educational purposes is a double-edged sword, 
as Julia Steiny (2014) puts it in her column that “shame is like fire, a natural force that can 
serve either good or evil.” Thus, we need a new moral pedagogy in helping students to 
foster an appropriate sense of shame, which will never be achieved simply by shaming 
students. Instead, as suggested, a proper moral pedagogy should demonstrate “good 
behavior in such a way that children want to be the sort of people who behave that way” 
(Covaleskie 2013, 127). 
Good Conscience and Good Community 
That shame is based on socialization to care about the opinion of others is a 
common belief about shame across cultures (K. C. Barrett 1995). School is an important 
place for students to be socialized as well as to learn, because the purpose of school 
education is not just about imparting knowledge to students but also instilling for socially 
desired attitudes and values. This has a thread of connection to John Dewey’s idea that 
school has a responsibility for building “an environment in which play and work shall be 
conducted with reference to facilitating desirable mental and moral growth” (2011, 109). 
Students can naturally learn school norms and practice what is expected of them in 
the classroom while interacting and communicating with others students and teachers. As 
schools organize learning basically in same-aged classroom groups, the class becomes a 
relevant ‘social reference group’ for students. A reference group refers to a group to which 
we compare ourselves, and according to sociologically-oriented studies, which focus on 
social inclusion and exclusion, the loss of the desired attachment to the relevant reference 
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group can trigger shame (e.g. Pekrun 1992). In this way, one may say schools are one of the 
main settings which offer a variety of opportunities for students to encounter shame-related 
issues. School culture is particularly influential in the process in which the internalization of 
shame becomes constitutive for compliance with norms and values that are accepted by 
their peer group (Holodynski and Kronast 2009, 373). 
As peer group impacts on one’s way of thinking and how one behaves, we need to 
examine how peer group pressure affect student’s experience of shame in school settings. 
Peer pressure can work differently, positive or negative, towards the same matter because it 
is to be carried along by a certain atmosphere. For example, a model student can join in 
cheating under the influence of unsavory peer group (Shuffelton 2011). This is because 
young students are afraid of becoming estranged from their peer group. And the other side 
of it is that students put a premium on peer evaluations. That is, if there is a culture of 
integrity in the classroom supported by students themselves, they are to be stimulated not 
cheat, even without the vigilant supervision of examinations by teachers. If nobody wants to 
be a cheater or likes to have a friend who does cheat on tests, they become aware of the fact 
that cheating is shameful. This shows how students acquire norms and values through a 
sense of shame with good peers and is the case in which a hidden curriculum can promote a 
positive classroom climate inducing students to aspire to things that they are proud of and 
avoid things that they are ashamed of.  
As such, the experience or imagination of shame caused by the violation of shared 
norms and values may have a positive effect on future motivation. When the shame-
triggering situation cannot be avoided, shame can lead to greater effort to counteract any 
further experience of shame in the future. In this case shame is not just a negative feeling 
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but a moral emotion, which engages the agent in “active coping behavior” necessarily 
accompanied by a change of mind or attitude (Holodynski and Kronast 2009, 374). We 
have seen the cases displaying this constructive aspect of shame in both Korean and the 
U.S. samples. For example, Ji-Ho changed his mind and manner after feeling shame 
accompanied with the awareness that he failed to have a good reputation from his friends 
and teacher (as in p. 68). Another example is found in the scene in which Jang-Hoon teased 
Seok-Cheol who came from North Korea. Other classmates criticized about Jang-Hoon’s 
attitude towards Seok-Cheol, which means their peer group put pressure on Jang-Hoon not 
to discriminate against anyone based on national origin (as in p. 84). On the other hand, a 
girl in Amy’s school failed to consider stealing as a shameful thing in spite of teacher 
intervention (as in p. 107). We may assume that she lacked a good peer group who could 
bring her to her senses or she had not been exposed to an environment in which stealing is 
treated as unacceptable.85 
The development of moral behavior cannot be a purely private affair. To maintain a 
good conscience facilitated by a healthy sense of shame, we need a good community in 
which we develop a strong sense of moral norms and in which those norms are shared and 
transmitted in appropriate ways (Covaleskie 2013, xiv). This is why we view moral 
education as the medium that connects a moral person and a moral society, and so, as 
educators we must think and discuss it more clearly. Moral schooling should make 
strenuous efforts to create a morally normative culture which inhibits biases, discrimination, 
partiality, etc. and promotes mutual respect and responsibility. Moral schooling should also 
                                                
85 Or, this stealing case shows the weak point of U.S. public schools’ typical measure to 
deal with transgressions, which is a ‘rule-based’ approach with a “thin consensus,” and 
therefore fails to shape morally normative school culture (Covaleskie 2016). 
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keep taking note of the established order and the dominant morality that could be unjust or 
immoral (Covaleskie 2013, 64). In this process students are encouraged to attain good taste 
and judgment through the guidance of teachers.86 By doing so, they naturally strengthen 
their moral behaviors while avoiding what is shameful. 
Conclusion 
Summary 
I have so far explored the nature and complexities of shame in moral education 
cross-culturally, between South Korea and the United States. A sketch of this dissertation 
research is introduced in Chapter 1. To investigate different ways of understanding shame, I 
have utilized a variety of sources lengthwise and breadthwise. Historical differences over 
the concept of shame are discussed in early chapters. Shame and related terms in the 
wisdom traditions are introduced drawing on the works of Attic Greek and early Confucian 
philosophers in Chapter 2. And, in Chapter 3, from the contemporary perspective diverse 
dimensions of shame are reviewed based on various theories from different disciplines. 
Later chapters in this dissertation cover cultural differences in shame-related issues with 
relevance to moral schooling. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 include descriptions of shame in 
education practices, which were collected by my own content analysis of Korean Morals 
textbooks and a case study interviewing American education practitioners. According to the 
two distinct data sets, I suggested that shame is an important topic in moral education but it 
often appears in different guises in different cultures. Then a synthetic discussion has been 
made in Chapter 6, which elaborates how shame is differently approached and conceived 
                                                
86 Here all teachers are assumed to be morally mature adults.  
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from Korean and U.S. contexts and how shame is essentially associated with moral 
education, regardless of culture. Hence, some pedagogical concerns are addressed that 
would make a contribution to the re-contextualization of shame for moral education in 
today’s globalized age. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation, which examines diverse issues surrounding the concept of shame 
and its relevance to moral education, argues that the misusage of shame is underestimated 
in South Korea and the moral potential of shame is undervalued in the United States. This 
puts a new complexion on the matter of shame in moral schooling in the sense that the two 
societies learn from each other by reviewing the existing approach to moral education and 
the dominant attitude towards shame. Ultimately, this study proposes that creating a 
comprehensive understanding of shame in company with promoting intercultural awareness 
is urgently needed for a well-balanced, quality moral education. 
The analysis of shame has received little attention in the school context (Leitch 
1999, Monroe 2008; 2012), and no previous research takes multicultural school contexts 
into consideration. Researchers reached the simple conclusion that shame and shaming have 
a negative influence on students, with no consideration for wide-ranging perspectives and 
the lived experiences of individuals from diverse backgrounds. For example, Ann Monroe 
(2012) identified school-induced shame experience based on narratives of college 
freshmen, but more than eighty percent of the personal accounts were obtained from White 
students, which suggests her data did not reflect the reality and lived experience of racial 
minorities in the United States. Thus, my future research would delve into the matters 
concerning power dynamics and cultural norms in multicultural classrooms, which arise out 
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of what I have not fully explored in this dissertation. From a critical multicultural approach, 
I will pay attention to the practices and politics of discrimination and oppression involving 
cultural shaming and gendered shame because shame and shaming in education is deeply 
intertwined with issues of race, class, language, disability, gender, or sexuality. A notable 
example is the pervasiveness of shame among Korean American women (Son 2006). 
Considering this, the politics of shame will be vigorously discussed in my immediate future 
research project on critical multicultural education as moral education. 
Another item for my further research concerns cultural linguistic analysis of Korean 
shame terms, which are briefly introduced in Chapter 4. Like Chinese, there are rich terms 
and concepts regarding shame in Korean language. As it is generally agreed that language 
and culture are closely connected, it will be interesting to see how Korean understanding of 
shame is involved in various Korean shame terms and related concepts. 
Final Remarks 
My own perspectives and subjective experiences are inevitably reflected in this 
dissertation, which is relevant to my current social standing in between South Korea and the 
United States.87 This dual position as a cultural insider in South Korea and a cultural 
outsider in the U.S. may help my analysis and arguments become more balanced and 
unconventional. Because I did not argue for a dichotomous or reductive understanding such 
as shame culture vs. guilt culture, this dissertation study does not claim which of the two 
                                                
87 I am a native of South Korea who was born and raised in the largest city, Seoul. At 
the same time, I have lived in a college town of a South Central state in the U.S. for 
several years while working on my Ph.D. I have learned to see my native society 
through the lens of a second language and culture. I also have seen American society 
from a foreigner’s viewpoint. As I have experienced culture shock and reverse culture 
shock, I intended in this dissertation to furnish a cross-cultural understanding of shame 
within the context of moral education. 
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societies better treats shame or carries out moral education. Rather, through intercultural 
communication and perspectives we can draw a bigger picture as a way of complementing 
what each society has not seen. Shame is conceptually complex and no easy matter; shame 
can be positive or negative, helpful or harmful, and morally right or wrong. This is why 
moral education in a global age should be more effective and proactive at conceptualizing 
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